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This research investigated the issue of keeping alternative insti-

tutions alternative both as an organizational problem of bureaucratization and as a research area with methodological complications.

More

specifically, the research addressed both sides of the issue by defining

bureaucratization as gradual transformation of member control into conventional hierarchical control, and by employing an action-research
model.

To develop a coherent context for substantive and methodological

questions,

a

detailed literature review identified several relevant

areas of past research and commentary.

In

this review the Holleb and

Abrams (1975) model of organizational development was examined in detail.

Following consideration of workplace democratization and organi-

zational learning areas, a central research proposition emerged:

suc-

cessful alternative institutions require formal organizational structure
in three areas:

(1) work,

decision-making and coordination; (2) main-

tenance; and (3) organizational

learning.

To evaluate this proposition,

interviews and documents were obtained from eight varied alternative in-

i

v

stitutions from the same geographical region.

By employing the Holleb

and Abrams model, the current state and the previous structural development of each organization was assessed, resulting in eight detailed case
studies.

By equating organizational success with the same model's con-

sensual democracy stage, the case studies were divided into three successful and five unsuccessful instances, and were then subjected to

three comparisons of structural features to test the research proposi-

The first comparison examined current structural features and ap-

tion.

peared to support the proposition.
all

three areas of formal

Successful organizations employed

structure while unsuccessful ones employed

only those in the first two areas.

In

order to assess the converse of

the proposition, that no organization with formal structures in all

three areas could be unsuccessful,

a

second comparison was devised that

considered instances of formal structure throughout each organization's
history.
mal

In

this comparison, both types of organizations evidenced for-

structures in all three areas, apparently invalidating the proposi-

tion.

Based on a rationale that formal structure should be enduring,

the original proposition was modified to say organizational success re-

sulted from sustained formal structure in all three areas.

sustained structures as those lasting at least one year,
ison was performed which produced

the first comparison:
mal

a

a

By defining

third compar-

pattern of results very similar to

successful organizations employed sustained for-

emstructures in all three areas, while unsuccessful organizations

ployed them only in the first two areas.

v

Since the results strongly

.

supported the modified proposition, the comparison was examined in detail.

In

the area of work, decision-making, and coordination, only suc-

cessful organizations employed sustained structures of job rotation and

decision-making.

In the maintenance area, successful

organizations

showed considerably more structures than unsuccessful organizations, es-

pecially in regard to information sharing, conflict resolution, and member orientation and training.

Since only successful organizations em-

ployed sustained formal structures of organizational learning, their
specific structures, usually retreats or special portions of meetings,

were scrutinized closely.
tional

This examination revealed that the organiza-

learning structures were consistently used by members to create

and modify structures in the first two areas, as well as to alter orga-

nizational goals.
formal

From this examination, it was apparent that sustained

structures of organizational learning were central to the success

of these alternative institutions.

Following this major structural com-

parison, some comparisons of non-structural features were also made.

The results of these secondary comparisons generally suggested that in
contrast to unsuccessful organizations,

successful organizations have

lower member turnover, and slightly older members with better process
skills and more relevant past experience.

The results were shown to

alternahave practical applications for the design and creation of new

within existing
tive institutions, as well as for intervention activity

ones

vi
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

Over the past half-decade, the term "alternative institutions" has
become

a

way of describing

tional structures^

a

diverse range of unconventional organiza-

for work and living.

Examples of such structures

include, among others, cooperatives, collectives, collaboratives, communes, networks, free schools, and free clinics.

native," derives from
tions:

a

The rubric, "alter-

major characteristic shared by these institu-

the fact that they stand as "alternatives" to conventional

of producing, distributing or consuming goods and services.

forms

Alternative

institutions represent more than organizations which are merely unconventional, however -- their oppositional nature is political as well as

organizational.

As Rothschi ld-Whi tt (1976) points out, alternative in-

stitutions can be defined by "their resolve to build organizations which
are parallel to, but outside of, established institutions and which can
fulfill

social needs without bureaucratic authority"

(p.

76).

In

their

2
attempt to replace bureaucratic hierarchy with other forms, alternative

institutions have developed

a

commitment to "participatory/democratic"

con(or "consensual/democratic") modes of organization, modes which

alternatrast sharply with the rational -bureaucratic society in which

Benello &
tive institutions are embedded (see Rothschi 1 d-Whi tt, 1971;

Roussopoulos, 1971).

Within bureaucratic hierarchy, authority filters

the theory of
down from upper levels, while in consensual democracy,

1

2

political democracy is applied at an organizational level, distributing
final authority equally among all

the members of an organization.

Alternative institutions are an important social phenomenon in at
least two ways.
a

For their members, these institutions often represent

concrete means of social change (Roussopoulos, 1971).

By successfully

demonstrating that work and living can be organized in new and meaningful

ways, alternative institutions maintain

"what is" in
social

a

a

crucial

society at large, and what "could be."

tension between
As a route to

change, such institutions are unique in that they simultaneously

serve as both method and example:

observers on the outside see

a

tan-

gible demonstration of what could be, while participants within gain

direct experience of the alternatives proposed.

In this way, alterna-

tive institutions represent "experiments" in the best sense of the word.

And secondly, alternative institutions are noteworthy precisely be-

cause they are not a new phenomenon.

As pointed out by a number of

authors (e.g., French & French, 1975; Kanter, 1972), the emergence of

alternative institutions over the past decade closely mirrors the rise
of communal and communitarian movements in this country during the mid-

nineteenth century.

Others suggest that these contemporary institutions

represent only new forms of the cooperative movement which developed its
formal beginnings within 1870'

s

agriculture (see Abrahamsen, 1976).

are these institutions unique to this country
mon with the kibbutzim of Israel

—

Nor

they share much in com-

(Rosner, 1973); worker self -management

Mondragon
in Yugoslavia, Norway and Sweden (Adizes & Borgese, 1975); the

worker cooperatives of Spain (Johnson & Whyte, 1976; Oakeshott, 1979);
and the collectivist organization in China (Whyte, 1973).

3

In short,

alternative institutions represent

a

pervasive and recur-

rent social phenomenon which extends beyond both national and historical boundaries.

What also transcends these boundaries is an additional

characteristic shared by alternative institutions:

their tendency to

degenerate over time, taking on the organizational form and function of
their more conventional counterparts in

a

society.

This process can be

seen in many of the nineteenth-century Utopian communities (Kanter,
1972), in the transformation of American agricultural cooperatives into

twentieth-century agribusiness, or in the recent history of the kibbutzim (Vallier, 1973).

This degeneration is typically gradual, persistent

and, in addition, often goes unnoticed by those most affected by it.

In

terms which are more contemporary and local, we can find examples as

well.

The cooperative household, which begins as an exemplar of

shared activity, over time often looks more and more like

a

rooming

house, family or dormitory -- traditional sex- roles reemerge, decision-

making and responsibility fall to one, or perhaps two people, and little more is shared than a collective roof.

Similarly, the food co-op,

despite rhetoric to the contrary, begins to take on characteristics of
the supermarket:

jobs originally performed by co-op members in exchange

for lower food prices increasingly become the domain of paid employees;

food prices rise accordingly; and policy decisions, at one point re-

solved in large open meetings, start to be made by the small group of
paid staff.

The co-op which initially set out to remove the middlepeo-

them; what was conple in the food distribution chain has now recreated

ceived as an alternative to the supermarket now appears to be
and inefficient replica of one.

a

clumsy

While the process of degeneration can

.

4

take a number of forms, there is one central theme
throughout.

Power

and authority become concentrated in an organization where they
were to
be shared originally

—

bureaucratic hierarchy.
describe such

a

a

reemergence of the most basic feature of
While it is difficult to find an exact term to

process, there is one which seems appropriate, although

admittedly awkward:

"bureaucratization."

Thus we begin to define the central problem of alternative institutions -- how are they to be kept alternative?

If we are concerned with

the viability of this mode of social change, the question is of utmost

The bureaucratization 3 process, when it occurs, is easily

importance.

interpreted by both observers and participants alike as negative evidence regarding the practicality of the organizational forms and
goals advocated by alternative institutions (e.g., see Doyle, 1977; Hackman,

1975).

In

order for these institutions to stand as effective

demonstrations of how work and living could be organized in our society
along parti cipatory/ democratic lines, it is essential that they work
and work wel

1

Problems with Existing Research

Although

a

small, but increasing amount of research focuses upon

alternative institutions, little of it is of direct relevance to the individuals who populate them and their need to confront the central

problem of bureaucratization outlined above.

For example, Kanter's

(1975) recent paper on "Couples in Communes" provides the communard with
a well

-written and moving description of the difficulties which couples

encounter in communal living arrangements.

Kanter's paper, however,

5

provides few hints to communal couples as to how their recurrent
conflicts and tensions might be resolved.

In

other work which focuses upon

urban communes we find similar shortcomings (see Brown & Brown, 1973;

Hershberger, 1973).

Organizational difficulties and personality clashes

are carefully documented by means of questionnaires, interviews, and

sociometric measures, but such descriptive research alone does not provide

a

basis for addressing important organizational issues.

Research

participants in alternative institutions often come to this realization
and react by refusing to answer questionnaires (Hershberger, 1973) or by

directly confronting the researchers about the nature of the research
relationship (Abrams & McCulloch, 1976, pp. 221-224).
In

other research concerned with alternative institutions, we find

that the level of analysis chosen by the researcher may preclude effective application of the results.

Rothschild-Whitt's (1976) recent study

outlines structural conditions which can support or undermine the parti-

cipatory/democratic functioning of alternative institutions.

Many of

the conditions upon which she focusses, however, are largely external to

these institutions and consequently beyond the ability of their partici-

pants to alter.

For instance, Rothschild-Whi tt concludes that an alter-

native institution will be supported if it is located in
which has
be helpful

a

large

1

iberal -professional community.

for those who wish to locate

a

a

community

Such information may

new alternative institution,

but is of no help to the institution which finds itself located in
community lacking such

a

a

population.

The point to be made here is that present research regarding alter-

native institutions does have value:

it can illuminate and define many

6

of the critical problems of these institutions.

Where this research

falls short, however, is in the identification of appropriate ameliorative strategies given these problems.

shortcomings are

a

Herbst (1976) argues that such

function of both the conception of research activity

and the research relationship which accompanies such

a

conception.

In

brief, Herbst divides social research into three broad categories:
(1)

theory.

Basic research

Research in this mold attempts to produce

.

"The data and those from whom the data are obtained are looked

at as dispensible after use"

(Herbst, 1976, p. 109).

The research re-

lationship, modeled after the natural sciences, is one of researcherobject.

Traditional academic research typically falls into this cate-

gory, regardless of the setting in which it takes place.
(2)

Applied research

.

In this case the product of research is a

new system which results from the appl i cation of theory in
setting.

a

Theory guides the application and is not revised as

quence of research activity.
searcher-client:

specific
a

conse-

The research relationship is one of re-

the researcher is seen as an expert who brings his or

her skills and knowledge to bear upon the client's problem.

A typical

example is the researcher who designs an advertising campaign for clients on the basis of his or her know! edge of attitude change theory.
(3)

Action research

duces a new process.

.

Research conducted along these lines pro-

Within organizational research, for example, the

theory about the existing organization often loses its relevance once

modified form of organization arises through research activity.

a

The re-

search relationship is a collaborative one in which the researcher
learns about the organization and the organization learns about re-

-

7

search.
ops

If carried out successfully, the organization gradually
devel-

its own internal

research capacity, thus minimizing future depen-

dence upon the researcher.

Given Herbs t's typology, we can easily categorize most of the ex-

isting research concerned with alternative institutions as basic research.

That such research often fails to directly address the problems

of alternative institutions in general, and those of bureaucratization
in particular, should not be surprising.

The primary emphasis of basic

organizational research is theory-building and not problem-solving.
Thus within

a

basic research model, the most immediate client is the

researcher and not the individuals within the organization who produce
the researcher's data.

Consistent with this priority, the research re-

lationship is constructed in ways which exclude research subjects from

contributing to either the formation of important research questions or
the identification of probable crucial variables.

Less obvious, per-

haps, is the possibility that these features of basic research are them-

selves expressions of an implicit theory of organization.

Drawing upon

the functional similarities between the research relationship of basic

research and the manager-worker relationship Argyris (1970, pp. 89-102)
argues that basic research is typically structured along rational

bureaucratic lines.

As C. Wright Mills

(1959) points out, the bureau-

cratization of social science in general should allow us to understand
its inability to meet the needs of those it claims to serve.

condition not only places the researcher within
tural

relations, but also endows him or her with

Such a

unique set of struc-

a
a

particular conscious-

ness regarding scientific activity which Mills identifies as the

8

"bureaucratic ethos" (1959, pp. 100-118).

Given Mills' analysis then,

the interaction of researcher and collectivist becomes
something more

than social science:

tions
pp.

it also represents the clash of opposing institu-

(for an excellent example of this, see Abrams & McCulloch,
1976,

221-222).

By requiring the members of alternative institutions to

become his or her "workers," the basic researcher inadvertently invokes
a

research relationship which is directly contrary to the relationships

upon which these institutions are built.

Research activity predicated

upon this research relationship can both disrupt alternative institu-

tions and antagonize their members.

Viewed in this light, the resis-

tance of individuals within these institutions to research involvement

becomes more comprehensible.

Their reactions, of course, inevitably af-

fect not only the quantity of data, but also its quality.

In

this way

the end-results of basic research can often be more revealing of the

research relationship itself than of the institutions in question.
is needed,

What

then, is not only more research regarding alternative insti-

tutions, but also

a

fundamentally different conception of how that re-

search should proceed.

Research Conception

The development of

research mode appropriate for addressing the

a

issue of bureaucratization in alternative institutions has two major

aspects:

(1)

developing

a

specific conception of research that can be

concretely translated into method; and

within

a

(2)

placing the research activity

larger strategic framework.

In attempting to define the dimensions of a new paradigm for social

psychology, Gadlin and Ingle (1975) and Ingle
(1976) point to what the
general features of

a

different research conception might be:

that we

should learn from past errors and omissions; that
phenomena should precede method; and that research should be both
relational and reflexive.

Taking these injunctions one at

a

time allows us to provide rather di-

rect translation to guidelines for research with
alternative institutions

:

Learning shoul_d occur from

p_as_t ej^rors_ and^

omissions

.

Previous re-

search regarding alternative institutions, with few exceptions, is

characterized by two major shortcomings --

a

preoccupation with re-

searcher needs and concern with variables and parameters which are of
limited usefulness to those within the institutions under study.
a

revised conception of research requires:

(1)

Thus

that alternative insti-

tutions and their members be considered partners in

a

collaborative re-

search enterprise; and (2) that the variables or conditions examined

within the research activity are aspects of organizational life that the

participants within these institutions can in fact alter.
Phenomena should precede method

conceived broadly:

.

Method, as it is used here, is

it encompasses not only the tools and techniques of

research, but also the relationship between the researcher and re-

searched, as well as the researcher's awareness of that relationship:

Rather than selecting for research those phenomena suited to
our methods, we ought to shape and develop our methods to fit
Method is essential to science, but it can
phenomena.
emerge from confrontation with phenomena rather than being
applied to them (Gadlin & Ingle, 1975, p. 1007).
.

.

.

From this perspective, the development of research "method" appropriate

10

to examining bureaucratization process is not
a simple task.
a

It demands

familiarity with both the dynamics of bureaucratization and the
or-

ganizational setting in which it takes place.

Such familiarity encour-

ages a sensitivity to not only the unique features of alternative
insti-

tutions, but also the possible effects of raising the issue of bureau-

cratization for their members.
Research should be relational and reflexive

.

For research to be

relational, it must attend to the nature of the research relationship
and acknowledge that invariably this relationship becomes part of the

phenomena under study (Ingle, 1976; Rowan, 1974; Argyris, 1968).

In

other words, research which directly examines social systems is synonymous with intervention.
it is crucial

In

regard to alternative institutions, then,

that the research relationship is consistent with or even

better, encouraging of, the relationships existing within these organizations (for an elaboration of this point see Ingle, 1976, pp. 69-95).
Put in more concrete terms, the cooperative relationships which are the

underpinnings of alternative institutions should themselves suggest
models for the research relationship.

Developing congruence between the research relationship and the re-

lationships under study represents one way in which research can become
reflexive:

the researcher who asks questions about alternative institu-

tions is also examining his or her relationship with those institutions.

Reflexivity also arises in at least one other curious way.

If we review

the guidelines generated here we soon arrive at the conclusion that this

revised conception of research is as much an "alternative" as the institutions for which it is designed.

Thus the central question of alterna-

11

-

tive institutions

how to stay alternative

-

becomes a relevant one

for the development of "alternative" paradigms in the
social sciences,
as well.

The conception of research outlined here is hardly made
new

by its al ternati veness

decessors and even

a

,

however; it is

name

—

a

conception with historical pre-

action research (Lewin, 1946).

Research Strategy

Action research, unlike its conventional counterparts, however, demands the articulation of
can be located.

a

general strategy in which individual studies

Herbst (1976), drawing from his personal involvement

with workplace democratization in Northern Europe, argues that there are
three stages in an action-research project which focusses upon organizations.

The first of these may appear to be similar to academic research

in

that it is characterized by descriptive and analytic field studies.

In

point of fact, however, these field studies are conducted as action

research projects and not in the basic research mold.

between researcher and organization is
search itself often represents

a

a

collaborative one, and the re-

short-term organizational intervention

in that the resulting data form the basis of
the participating organization.

The relationship

a

formative evaluation for

The second stage requires the estab-

lishment of demonstration projects and long-term interventions with
selected organizations.

The third and final stage is diffusion of the

innovative forms of workplace organization.
Herbst'

s

three stages of action-research, while perhaps appearing

as an idealized strategy, actually represent a fairly accurate reflec-

tion of the development of workplace democratization in Northern Europe
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over the past twenty years.

The applicability of these stages to the

present situation of alternative institutions in this country,
however,
is

somewhat restricted, but still useful.

The emergence of alternative

institutions occurred largely in small isolated pockets during the middle sixties.

Primarily through the medium of the alternative press,

these organizational forms became widely known by the early seventies -as evidenced by the sudden increase of cooperatives,

at that time (French & French, 1975).

collectives, etc.,

In terms of Herbst's model,

the

development of alternative institutions in this country largely omitted
the first stage of descriptive and analytic research, and jumped ahead
to the second and third stages.

Although descriptive case studies ex-

ist, comparati ve studies which are both descriptive and analytic are ex-

tremely rare (see Holleb & Abrams, 1975, for

example).

a

solitary but excellent

Alternative institutions are the demonstration projects; the

diffusion process tells us about their failings as well as their successes; and precious little is known about why or how they fail or succeed.
On the basis of my personal experience, which includes ten years of

living, working and intervening in alternative institutions,

I

am con-

vinced that there are three levels of knowledge which are needed if these

institutions are to effectively and creatively circumvent the bureaucratization process to which they are apparently so susceptible.

The first

level needs to occur within alternative institutions themselves.

The

members of these institutions need to learn more formally about their
internal

functioning if they are to make informed choices regarding the

future of their organizations.

This entails both the generation of
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valid information and the means of generating it.

The second level of

knowledge requires the accumulation of more generalized and
comparative

information regarding alternative institutions.

This second level com-

plements the first in that it provides the members of alternative in-

stitutions with

a

broader perspective in which to place their own or-

ganizational changes, conflicts and development.

And lastly, the third

level of knowledge involves the sophistication of those, like myself, who

often intervene in faltering alternative institutions.

Ourknowledae

presently is informal at its best, haphazard at its worst.

We need a

more systematic way of understanding both the institutions within which
we work as well as the effects of our interventions.

Taking these three levels of necessary knowledge and Herbst's stages

of action research together, the most prudent choice at this point in
time appears to be

a

return to the first stage -- descriptive and analy-

tic field studies:

The aim is to identify emerging innovative trends,
and to diagnose existing situations which are known
to be problematic in order to generate possible directions for development (Herbst, 1976, p. 43).

Provided that these studies are both comparative in nature and placed

within an action research framework, we can see that three possible
levels of research activity arise which parallel the three levels of re-

quired knowledge outlined above.
the level of

a

First of all, information collected at

single organization can begin

search for that organization.

a

process of formative re-

The second level of research activity

occurs when information obtained across organizations is compared, pro-
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viding a broader view of alternative institutions in general.

A third

level of research takes place if the researcher chooses to
assess the

effects of formative research across participating organizations.

Ar-

gyris characterizes the simultaneous occurrence of all three levels
as
a

broad form of intervention activity in itself:

The resources of the client system and the resources of the
interventionist are joined together to conduct an intervention
that helps the client understand the nature of its problem and
adds to the.
.theory of intervention activity.
The objective of this intervention activity is to help the client system and simultaneously to develop new conceptual models that
help to explain that particular case as well as others that
may be identified in the future (Argyris, 1970, p. 32).
.

The purpose of the present research is to better conceptualize the

problem of
some of its

b urea uc rati

zation in al ternati ve institutions and to identify

contri buting factors

in order to pinpoint potential

,

areas

for amel iorati ve intervention in exi sting organizations and to improve

the design of future organizations

.

Given such

a

purpose, the appropri-

ate focus of research is the second level of learning and research out-

lined above -- the comparison of data across alternative institutions.

While it is recognized that the process of action research involves im-

portant activity at the other two levels, formative research and intervention effects, their careful assessment requires extensive longitudinal

documentation which is beyond the scope of the present research ef-

forts.

As potential

sources of incomplete information, however, these

two levels may provide supplemental material which aids our understand-

ing of the how and why of both bureaucratization and its remedies.

Hav-

ing defined the purposes and general strategy of this research, it is
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now appropriate for us to turn to the literature which bears more

directly upon the problem of bureaucratization in alternative institutions.

Consistent with the concern for organizational intervention and

design, it is important that we examine not only the understanding of

bureaucratization that this literature provides, but also the courses of
action which this understanding suggests for alternative institutions.

CHAPTER

II

CONTEXTS FOR BUREAUCRATIZATION

Introduction

Viewed from the perspective of traditional political theory, alternative institutions are both unreasonable and unworkable.

This pessi-

mistic view, based upon what is generally known as the "iron law of oli-

garchy," or the "Weber-Mi chels position," maintains that the eventual
fate of truly democratic forms of social organization is ajway_s_ oligar-

chy (see Michels, 1960, for a lengthy statement of this position).

In

brief, this transition comes about primarily because of structural dif-

ficulties inherent in large scale democracies and because individuals
at the top of an organization often subvert democratic organizational
goals in order to preserve their own positions of privilege

focussing instead upon organizational growth and maintenance.

and power,

Contem-

porary writers (e.g., Rothschi ld-Whi tt, 1976) who link the "iron law of

oligarchy" to the situation of alternative institutions do so with

disregard for the issue of scale.

a

Both Weber and Michels were primarily

concerned with large-scale organizations -- social movements, states and
nations -- not smaller work organizations.

Michel's views, for example,

were based largely upon observations of nineteenth-century political
parties and labor unions.

Weber, in fact, was even positive about the

prognosis for smaller democratic organizations:

16

17

Though a certain minimum of imperative powers in the
execution of measures is unavoidable, certain corporate groups
may attempt to reduce it as far as possible. This means
persons in authority are held obligated to act solely in accordance with the will of the members and in their service by
virtue of the authority given by them.
In small groups where
all the members can be assembled at a single place, where
they
can know each other and can be treated socially as equals this
can be attained in a high degree.
It has, however, been attempted in larger groups, notably the corporate cities and
city states of the past.
.(Weber, 1947, p. 412).
.

Despite qualifications regarding scale, acceptance of "the iron law of

oligarchy" by contemporary organizational theorists is widespread (see
Tannenbaum, 1966; Katz & Kahn, 1966).

Its influence can also be seen in

traditional models of organizational development which typically assume
the appropriateness and necessity of rational bureaucracy (e.g. Filley
& House,

1969).

Given such foundations, most models of organizational

development are clearly inappropriate to the examination of alternative
institutions.

And of those relevant models, only one directly addresses

the problem of bureaucratization in any detail.

Given this model's sin-

gular appropriateness, it is essential that it be reviewed thoroughly.
As we shall

see, such a review not only sharpens our sense of the

bureaucratization process but also raises important questions about its
interpretation.

The Holleb and Abrams Model

During 1973 and 1974, Holleb and Abrams (1975) carried out exten-

sive interviews with members of several alternative community mental
health programs that had emerged in the late sixties and early seventies.

On the basis of their interviews, Holleb and Abrams were able to

reconstruct individual program histories and then create

a

stage-model

s
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which generally describes the developmental features common
to the programs.

As the authors point out, however, this model is not limited
to

alternative community mental health programs, but is also applicable
to
"other innovative service programs and work cooperatives" (Holleb &
Abrams, 1975,

p.

In order for us

142).

to appreciate this point,

it is

necessary to look closely at the model itself.

Overview

.

Central

to the Holleb and Abrams model

is the notion that the

development of consensual /democratic organizations includes

a

period of

bureaucratization from which these organizations may or may not recover.
In

total, the model is comprised of three initial stages, and one of two

final stages.

The first stage, consensual anarchy

,

characterizes the

nascent organization which has no formal decision-making procedures or
division of labor.

Informal

differentiation

the beginning of bureaucratization.

,

the second stage, marks

Conventional modes of work and de-

cision-making emerge in an unacknowledged manner.
formal

differentiation

,

In the third stage,

deliberate organizational structure is created

which is bureaucratic in nature.

According to Holleb and Abrams, orga-

nizations in this third stage eventually reach an important point of
choice.

Consistent with prevailing trends, they can move on to full-

fledged bureaucracy , or they can attempt to move towards consensual

democracy , a stable compromise between consensual/democratic ideals and
the realities of organizational life.

Different organizations, of

course, move through these stages at different rates and the movement

itself can be reversed, as in

a

temporary return to

Schematically, then, the model is as follows:

a

previous stage.

:

:
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consensual anarchy
I

informal differentiation

formal differentiation

bureaucracy

or

consensual

democracy

Further elaboration of the model requires that we carefully examine each
stage by pointing to its major features.

What follows is taken directly

from Holleb and Abram's original outline (1975, pp. 142-150).
Consensual anarchy

.

According to Holleb and Abrams, an organiza-

tion at this stage is still an association of friends and coworkers,

and has yet to be formalized.

Its major features are:

Characte ri sties
--fluid membership and minimal entrance requirements
--undifferentiated tasks (everyone does everything)
--highly ideological
--response to crises rather than planning
--high energy
Leadership
--small group or single charismatic leader
--consensual decision-making with no formal procedures
emphasis on individual autonomy
Staff rewards:
--commitment to ideals
--social contact
personal growth
--autonomy in work
Problems and pressures:
--little or no money
--decision-making procedures unclear
--power struggl es
--membership unclear; potential members continually unsure
whether they are in or out
--inconsistent delivery of services
--important work does not get done because tasks are too
loosely delegated
--sloppy public relations

—
—

:
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—high staff turnover
In

commenting on this stage, the authors note that:

This period may last for a few months or for a few years,
depending upon the ideological commitment and tolerance for ambiguity of the staff.
In this stage service is secondary to
planning and staff building, but as the program becomes more
accepted by the community and the pressure builds to provide
more and better services, problems with the consensual anarchy
system begin to emerge. Some of the staff realize that others
are forgetting to show up for work shifts.
It becomes clear
that certain members are more competent, responsible and committed than others.
The more work-oriented and dedicated staff
members become frustrated with the difficulties of trying to
organize amid the chaos and ambiguity of the program's structure.
Gradually these people push the organization in the
direction of increasing differentiation of roles and tasks,
and clarification of procedures (Holleb & Abrams 1975, pp.
143-144).
,

What is important to emphasize about the consensual anarchy stage
that it represents the emergence of an organizational

substantial procedures for actualizing that ideal.

is

ideal which lacks

As the organization

begins to face the pressures of day-to-day operations, we start to find
a

divergence between consensual theory and organizational practice.
Informal differentiation

.

Holleb and Abrams' description of this

stage captures the beginning of the bureaucratization process.
di

Informal

fferentiati on has the following features:

Characteri sti cs
--de-emphasis of ideology
--informal divison of labor; first job description
--continued fluid membership but informal boundaries
tighten
--membership based on friendship or "good vibes"
--organization in period of rapid expansion and implementation of services
Leadership:
formation of the core group

—

:
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— day-to-day

decisions made by core group with major decisions left to entire membership
--lack of formal decision-making procedures
Staff rewards
increasing effectiveness and competence as helpers
(learning through skill sharing)
--sense of family in core group
autonomy i n work
--personal growth
Problems and pressures:
--power struggles between core group and other staff;
jockeying for status and influence
core group feels responsibility but none of the power
--non-core staff feels left out of important decisions
--organizational rules and regulations apparent but not
formally recognized or written down
--outside agencies, especially funders, demand tighter
bookkeeping and internal accountability
--clients and referral services demand more consistent

—

—

—

servi ces

Within informal differentiation

the formation and functioning of the

,

core group should be highlighted.

This group fills an important gap

within the organization by providing leadership and taking responsibility for day-to-day activities.

At the same time, however, the way in

which this gap is filled generates new organizational problems:

[The individuals comprising the core group] are recognized by
most other members as being the leaders; however their leadership is not acknowledged in the form of titles or higher saThe core group devellaries or formal investitures of power.
They act like a family.
op feelings of closeness and sharing.
The other staff feel excluded from this family and envy the
Since there
status, power and intimacy of the core group.
are no clear boundaries around membership in the program or
in the core, staff struggle to find ways to be sure that they
Differing factions of cliques within the staff
really belong.
vie for power and influence within the organization.

At the same time the work of the programs begins to be
Administrative jobs are
more rationally distributed.
apportioned to specific staff members with particular skills.
Staff members begin to take on consistent duties and responsibilities. The problems at this stage of development usually
.

.

.

:
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converge around issues of power and issues of inclusionexclusion (Holleb & Abrams, 1975, pp. 144-146).

At this point we can see that the process of bureaucratization
is

starting to gather momentum.

Not only is the organization beginning to

appear more conventional, but it is also beginning to function more
conventionally as well.

Thus attempts to resolve internal issues of

power and inclusion-exclusion within the organization themselves become

expressions of this increasing conventionality.
Formal

differentiation

.

The next stage is described as follows:

Characteristics
--creation of administrative hierarchies
--staff positions filled by "qualified outsiders"
--administrative and clinical staff differentiated
--volunteer and client status and power diminished
--energy directed toward service rather than organizational
experi mentation
--lower staff turnover
Leadershi p:
program leadership formalized in core group or one or
two administrators
more efficient decision-making procedures
Staff rewards:
career training
--more clearly delineated power relations
--more clearly defined work
--more recognition from outside world
Problems and pressures:
--loss of ideological purity
--loss of family
--breakdown of interpersonal and intergroup communications
--decreasing autonomy in work

—
—
—

As we can see, power and inclusion issues are resolved within this stage
by further formalization of the organization along conventional lines.

Both organizational roles and decision-making procedures are defined by
an increasingly bureaucratic and hierarchical structure.

At this point,

:
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claim the authors, the organization reaches

a

critical crossroads:

The transformation from a consensual to a hierarchical organization occurs through numerous minor reforms and policy
changes rather than one massive reorganization.
Bureaucracy
can happen without the conscious intent of the staff.
Soon
the staff begin to realize that they have little by little
lost many of the values upon which they were founded. This
realization leads to an important organizational point of
choice.
The staff can either reassert their initial goals of
equality and consensus.
.[by moving towards consensual
democracy]
.or, with a shrug of their shoulders and a sigh
of regret, move on to an even more bureaucratic and hierarchical structure.
.[ bureaucracy ] (Holleb & Agrams, 1975, p.
.

.

.

.

The choice, then, is between bureaucracy or consensual democracy as
final stage in organizational development.

Let us look at the two

choi ces.

Bureaucracy

.

Major parameters include:

Characteri sti cs
--staff responsibilities and power clearly defined
--differential salaries
minimal involvement by volunteers
--jobs filled by professionals and highly trained nonprofessionals
--hiring and firing done by administrators
Leadershi p:
--administrators become unquestioned leaders and decisionmakers on all programmatic, financial and public relations issues
--individual staff members exercise autonomy only in their
—specific job areas and are carefully monitored by supervisors
Staff rewards:
--job security
--competitive salary
--recognition from outside world
Problems and pressures:
--decreasing autonomy in work
--loss of personal commitment to job
--formalization of relationships
—staff excluded from organizational decision-making
--competitive pressures from other social service agencies

—

a
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If this path is chosen, the process of bureaucratization is nearly
com-

pleted -- the organization now mirrors the forms to which it was
originally an alternative.

Although innovative services may still be provided

by the organization, it is usually only
tional

a

matter of time before func-

replication sets in also.

Consensual democracy

.

Major features of this stage include:

Characteristics:
--return to consensual forms
--constitutional democracy with clear rules and procedures
--clearly defined boundaries and entrance requirements
structures for sharing work and feelings
--administrative and maintenance work shared by all staff
--work contracts for staff
Leadership:
--leadership informal, shifting and shared
--subgroups, program components given wide latitude in
decis ion-making
representative groups employed for overall program planning
--all major decisions referred to total staff
Staff rewards:
--autonomy
--involvement in planning and decision-making
--community and support
--increasing effectiveness and competence
Problems and pressures:
--low salaries
--decision-making slow and cumbersome
--difficulty in hiring and firing
--loss of clinical time doing administrative work
--difficulty in obtaining funding
--licensing laws and other threats from professional establishment
--limitations in scope of services and target population
--difficulty in getting referrals from and tying in with
established agencies

—

—

As Holleb and Abrams point out, the organization which moves towards

this stage enters uncharted territory.

The articulation of consensual

democ racy does not occur in a vacuum, however.

It is guided by past
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organizational lessons:

.this system differs from the more rudimentary consensual
forms of the early years.
The staff know if they are to avoid
hierarchies and tight lines of management, they have to develop consensual forms that meet some of the needs that hierarchies fulfill. They need rules and procedures for running the
organization that are well defined (if changeable). No one
should be left to wonder if he is a member.
When a new member
joins the program or an old member changes his job, his responsibilities must be clearly delineated (Holleb & Abrams,
1975, p. 150).
.

.

The programs have discovered that a system of clearly defined rights and obligations is less repressive of individual
autonomy than the illusion of total freedom with an actual
underlying system of expectations (Holleb & Abrams, 1975, p.
137).

Recovery from bureaucratization

.

Within the sample of organiza-

zations studied by Holleb and Abrams, most resisted further bureaucratization and moved toward consensual democracy

,

while

to the momentum of increasingly bureaucratic forms.

a

few succumbed

What distinguishes

the organizations which survive the bureaucratization syndrome from

those which do not?

Holleb and Abrams identify one major factor:

The swing back from bureacuracy results primarily because
of deeply held political values of the staffs. As we have
said, the staffs are made up of former political activists and
counter-culture standard bearers; even as they age and become
more conservative, they maintain a commitment to innovation
within the structure of their organization. They attend to
the process of its development and worry over the meaning of
changes in structures (Holleb & Abrams, 1975, p. 153).

While members' political values may provide the stimulus for

a

shift away from bureaucratic forms, Holleb and Abrams also argue that
the marginal ity of these organizations is what allows such
take place.

a

shift to

Located outside of the established social service system,
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innovative programs are not directly obligated to respond to
pressures
for "more efficient" structures of leadership and service delivery.

Their marginal ity, then, ensures the organizational flexibility
necessary for restructuring along consensual -democratic lines.
The beginnings of bureaucratization

.

Although Holleb and Abrams

are quite explicit about the organizational features which promote re-

covery from bureaucratization, they are less clear about those which

bring it on in the first place.

Drawing heavily upon Sarason (1972),

they argue that the prior socialization

begin, over time, to exert a strong influence over
how people in alternative programs modify their creations.
Staffs of such alternative organizations carry with them, in
the back recesses of their minds, old scripts about how an
organization should be run.
These scripts will be more conventional than the rhetoric of the founding days. Over time,
the basic beliefs will be enacted and the organizations will
begin to swing back, in terms of structure of tasks, type of
staff rewards, and nature of services, to more conventional
approaches (Holleb & Agrams , 1975, p. 152).
.

.

.will

In addition,

the authors periodically mention three other factors which

seem associated with the onset of bureaucratization:

pressure exerted

by external agencies and funding sources for more conventional organizational arrangements; lack of ideological commitment on the part of

members; and lack of forms of organizational structure which are con-

sistent with consensual-democratic ideals.

Holleb and Abrams' treatment

of prior socialization and these other three factors associated with

bureaucratization is largely descriptive.

The authors point to forces

which seem responsible for bureaucratization, but never attempt to examine either their individual or combined effects in an analytical
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fashion.

Summary

.

Holleb and Abrams' work represents the state-of-the-art

model of organizational development for alternative institutions.

though their model

is

Al-

based upon the development of alternative com-

munity mental health programs, there

little doubt that their descrip-

is

tion of both the bureaucratization process and the choices which this

process brings about are highly relevant to other alternative institutions as well.

Their model details

a

path of change which is all too

familiar to those of us concerned with these unique organizations.

Un-

fortunately, this relevance is slightly clouded by the authors' under-

standable use of social service parlance in designating various organizational roles.

If,

instead of administrator, staff and client, we

substitute the terms manager, member and consumer, respectively, translation of the Holleb and Abrams model

services is simplified.

In consensual

only members and/or consumers.

core group represents

a

to contexts other than the social

anarchy there are no managers,

Within informal differentiation

,

the

clique of informal managers; by assuming re-

sponsibility for day-to-day operations, this group takes on executive
functions.

Under formal differentiation

,

managers are officially desig-

nated and hold executive powers as well as an increasing share of legis-

lative or policy-making functions.

Bureaucracy is marked by the un-

questioned executive and legislative powers of managers (which transforms members into employees).

And within consensual democracy

,

legis-

lative powers are returned to members (and/or consumers) by means of an

explicit organizational structure which also alters the executive functions associated with day-to-day operations.

Phrasing the Holleb and
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Abrams model in these terms, we find that it clearly details

a

scenario

consistent with past developmental accounts of food cooperatives (Nagy,.
1978; Wertheim, 1976), free clinics (Taylor, 1976), collectivized work-

places (Bernstein, 1976; French & French, 1975), and large cooperative

households (Israel, 1971).

In all

of these accounts, organizations

constructed initially upon ideals of shared work and decision-making
slowly move towards more bureaucratic arrangements; some succumb while
others reaffirm their ideals by establishing formal consensual democra-

Broadening Holleb and Abrams'

cies.

the appropriateness of their model

terminology not only underscores

to a broad range of alternative in-

stitutions, but also crystallizes our sense of the problem of bureau-

cratization itself:

we can now define bureaucratization as the emer -

gence of both conventional manager-employee relati onships and the

structure of organi zational authori ty by which these relationships are

increasingly forma li zed

.

The congruence between Holleb and Abrams

1

stage-model and the de-

velopmental accounts of other alternative institutions appears to sup-

port their claim that this model

.describes the basic stages of growth of many other innovative service organizations and work cooperatives. This sequence represents the general directions in which alternative
programs move, as, over the years, they establish a degree of
stability and permanence (Holleb & Abrams, 1975, p. 142).
.

.

As this statement makes clear, Holleb and Abrams see their model not

only as

a

description of the development of alternative institutions in

development.
the past, but also as a guide for their present and future
value as
Despite the descriptive accuracy of their model, however, its
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a

prescriptive device needs to be questioned.

Critiquing Holleb and Abrams.

Holleb and Abrams'

treatment of the

problem of bureaucratization in alternative institutions

is

undoubtedly

the most significant aspect of their stage model, but this significance
has both positive and negative sides.

In order to appreciate this

point, we need to look more carefully at both their model and the cor-

rective strategies which it suggests.
Historical description versus organizational prescription
to the Holleb and Abrams model

is

.

Central

the clear implication that a large

measure of bureaucratization is an inevitable step in the organizational

development of alternative institutions.

For one of these institutions

entering the informal differentiation stage, their model suggests that
little can be done until formal differentiation is reached.

It is only

at this point, according to the authors, that the contradiction between

members' radical political values and an increasingly bureaucratic

structure brings the organization to the critical point of choice between bureaucracy or consensual democracy

Applied in this prescriptive

.

way, the Holleb and Abrams model, as any model, promises to be trans-

formed from

a

historical description into

By locating the critical

a

self-fulfilling prophecy.

point of choice late in the bureaucratization

process, their model precludes the possibility of earlier attempts to

establish stable consensual -democratic forms of organization.

For ex-

ample, alternative institutions which deliberately develop clear organizational structures right from the beginning (and there are

a

few such

instances) are seen as anomalies from Holleb and Abrams' perspective.
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And secondly, what the authors label as "a critical
point of choice" for

alternative institutions threatens not to be

a

choice at all for many

organizations -- the call for major organizational change comes at
time when it is already too late.

differentiation

,

As an organization moves into formal

members with strong political convictions may leave and

be replaced by others who are less committed to the consensual

earlier days.

more consensual forms.
a

ideals of

Increased division of labor between "production" tasks

and "managerial" tasks at this point can also inhibit

fined to

a

small

a

change toward

Since managerial expertise and knowledge

is

con-

number of people, the majority of the organization's

members may be at this point unwilling or unable to share in managerial
tasks and responsibilities.

And finally, the onset of formal differen-

tiation is associated with the creation of

a

managerial hierarchy which

may place the responsibility for both raising issues and the authority
for implementing change in the hands of those who stand to lose the

most (i.e., in terms of salaries, status, power, etc.) in
consensual democracy

.

a

shift to

Although most of the programs examined by Holleb

and Abrams were able to surmount those difficulties and reassert their
consensual ideals, the suggestion that contemporary alternative institutions must also face the same delays in their attempts to establish con-

sensual democracy seems ill advised:

it would ensure that many of these

alternative institutions would continue to succumb to bureaucratic
forms.

What contemporary organizations need is

a

clearer picture of

"earlier" choices in their development.

Freeman (1972

/

1973), in an analysis of organizational forms char-

acteristic of the women's liberation movement, provides an excellent
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example of what one of these earlier choices might
be.

Pointing to

groups which Holleb and Abrams would categorize as
consensual anarchies,

Freeman argues that so-called "structureless" groups simply
do not exist.

Although groups of this sort may not have formal structures,
such

as explicit and recognized roles,

rules and procedures, informal struc-

tures inevitably emerge which are contrary to the original
notions of

shared power and responsibility.

Some individuals are aware of the in-

formal structures and are able to use them; others without such aware-

ness are denied access to the real structures of power in the group.
Due to the prevailing theory of "structurelessness" in such groups,

however, these informal structures and the unequal distribution of power
that they represent typically remain unacknowledged or unquestioned.

According to Freeman, this situation can be rectified only by deliberate
efforts to make group structure explicit so that

cision-making are open and available to everyone.
1973, p.

152).

As we can see,

".

.

.

."

.the rules of de-

(Freeman, 1972/

the determination to formalize decision-

making procedures in ways consistent with democratic ideals obviously
represents

a

development.

critical choice for alternative institutions early in their

Holleb and Abrams' failure to identify this and similar

"early choices" stands as

a

significant omission in their work.

we to understand such an omission?

How are

Consideration of both their sample

and methodology suggests a number of possible explanations.
All of the organizations examined by Holleb and Abrams are repre-

sentative of the "first wave" alternative institutions which arose in
this country during the late sixties and early seventies.

One major

characteristic shared by these "first wave" organizations was their al-
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most total ignorance of the

numerous accounts of past attempts to es-

tablish organizations predicated upon consensual ideals (French
French, 1975).

&

Deprived of these critical lessons of the past, members

of emergent alternative institutions were not able to anticipate the de-

velopmental difficulties which their organizations were certain to face.
As Holleb and Abrams point out repeatedly, the organizations which they

studied were largely unaware of the "choice"

between consensual and

bureaucratic modes of organization until quite late in the bureaucratization process.

From the perspective of the individuals within these

organizations, then, "earlier choices" did not exist -- some degree of
regression was unavoidable.

In essence,

the work of Holleb and Abrams

captures this historical innocence, detailing the uninformed development
of "first wave" alternative institutions as it was played out within

innovative community mental health programs.
about Holleb and Abrams

1

work, however,

is

What is somewhat striking

the degree to which their

view of bureaucratization (i.e., that some bureaucratization is inevitThat Holleb and

able) merges with that of their research participants.

Abrams incorporated this pessimism within their model might be traced to
a

descriptive rather than analytic research approach.

On the other

hand, these authors may not have known any other way of looking at

bureaucratization problems, since they themselves were central members
of one of the programs in their sample.

their own experiences within

a

In attempting to understand

"first wave" alternative institution,

Holleb and Abrams may have been unable to take on the more distant and

analytical stance evident in Freeman's (1972/1973) work.
a

careful

In any event,

reading of their book suggests that one other element may have
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influenced their view of bureaucratization

-

the timing of their re-

search relative to the developmental stage of their
sample.
In 1973 and 1974,

when Holleb and Abrams interviewed members of al-

ternative programs, it appears thatmostof the participating
organizations were in the process of switching from formal
differentiation to
some form of consensual democracy

.

Although the authors were able to

reconstruct the entire histories of individual programs, the bulk of
the

bureaucratization process in these organizations existed only as history
at the point when their research began.

Abrams'

Given this sense of Holleb and

timing, we can better appreciate why their model emphasizes re-

covery from bureaucratization rather than the conditions which encourage

bureaucratization in the first place and then sustain

it:

the informa-

tion most relevant to the bureaucratization process was that which was

least accessible to them.

This aspect of Holleb and Abrams' research

may also have contributed to their view of partial bureaucratization
(i.e., informal and formal dif ferentiati on) as

development of alternative institutions.

a

necessary feature of the

Looking back upon the recon-

structed histories of these organizations, it may have been difficult
for the authors not to attribute a degree of inevitability to bureau-

cratization.

Had Holleb and Abrams'

research focused upon organizations

in earlier stages of their development they might have understood the

onset of bureaucratization in

a

way more similar to Freeman's (1972/

1973) -- as an unfortunate and perhaps unacknowledged choice, rather
than an inevitable course of events.

Despite the generality of their description beyond community mental
health settings, then, we find that the failure of Holleb and Abrams to
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phrase bureaucratization within conditional terms
raises substantive

questions regarding the prescriptive value of their
model.

What is at

issue is not their description of bureaucratization, but
rather their

interpretation of it.

While their model could serve contemporary alter-

native institutions as

a

critical warning from the past, in that it de-

tails the probable consequences of ignoring bureaucratization in
its

beginning stages, it remains
ent.

questionable prescription for the pres-

a

A brief consideration of the intervention value of the Holleb and

Abrams model raises additional questions about the adequacy of their in-

terpretation of bureaucratization.
Implications for intervention

.

One major difficulty with Holleb

and Abrams' interpretation of bureaucratization is that it points to

ameliorative strategies which are of dubious value for alternative institutions.

In order for us

to see how this is the case, we need first

to examine the contributing factors which these authors link to bureau-

cratization.
Hooeb and Abrams mention three factors which seem to precipi tate

bureaucratization initially

:

(1)

external demands for more conventional

forms of organization (raised by agencies, funding sources, etc.); (2)
lack of ideological

commitment on the part of members (and the re-emer-

gence of conventional consciousness regarding organizational life) and
(3)

lack of organizational structures which reflect consensual-democra-

tic ideals.
fail

Their detailed analysis of why organizations recover or

to recover from bureaucratization

,

however, is couched primarily

in terms of a single characteristic of members -- the degree of their

commitment to radical politics.

If this commitment is strong, an or-
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ganization can reverse the tide of bureaucratization, but
if it is weak
or lacking, bureaucratization continues until conventional
forms are

firmly established.

Despite the fact that Holleb and Abrams do mention

other contributing factors, the emphasis they place upon this single

membership characteristic leads to

a

view of bureaucratization which

I

believe is problematic for at least two reasons.
First of all,

a

person-centered interpretation of bureaucratization

can be misleading because it redefines the nature of organizational dif-

ficulties.

What was initially

a

problem with the relationships which

bind people together within organizations now becomes

with the people themselves.

problem only

a

The inappropriateness of such an interpre-

tation becomes even more apparent when we begin to trace its implications for corrective action within alternative institutions.

Holleb and Abrams

1

Given

analysis, we are quickly led to conclude that the

best hedge against bureaucratization would be the careful selection of

members on the basis of their political beliefs.
approach, of course, should be quite obvious.

The flaw in such an

Rather than constructing

alternative institutions, we find ourselves constructing institutions
full

of "alternative" people.

And secondly, Holleb and Abrams' person-centered interpretation of

bureaucratization suffers because of its

uni directional

i

ty

.

Members'

political beliefs are seen as affecting the structure of the organization over time, but this structure is not seen as acting on members'

political beliefs.

To deny the effect of organizational

structure upon

political beliefs is to deny the reality of socializing forces in orga-

nizational life.

It should be obvious that particular structural ar-
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rangements within an organization can either reinforce
or undermine
members' original political

beliefs.

These structural arrangements can

also influence the entry and exit of members in
ways which could affect
the degree of political commitment within the
organization as

a

whole.

For example, an organization which mixes consensual
rhetoric with informal

bureaucratic practices may lose its more politically inclined mem-

bers, while at the same time attracting new members whose political
po-

sitions are more moderate.

Recognizing the probable connection between

members' political commitment and organizational

Holleb and Abrams have identified as

a

structure, we find what

critical factor contributing to

bureaucratization may instead represent an associated symptom.
ternative institutions succumbing to bureaucracy
political commitment can be seen as at least

a

,

In al-

then, the lack of

partial consequence of

the organizational structure (formal or informal) in previous stages of

development.

This is not to say, however, that political commitment is

unimportant.

Holleb and Abrams did find that this single member char-

acteristic effectively discriminates between consensual and bureaucratic
paths of organizational
they studied.

development in the innovative programs which

What these authors fail to do is provide

a basis

for un-

derstanding the issue of political commitment in organizational as well
as individual

Consequently we are not led by their analysis to

terms.

look for structural arrangements which might either support or undermine

political commitment in the first place.

There is, then,
work.

a

certain amount of irony within Holleb and Abrams'

Although these authors have carefully documented sequential

changes in the organizational

structure of alternative institutions, at
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the same time they have ignored these changing
structural arrangements
as a vehicle for both comprehending and confronting
the problem of

bureaucratization.

Their person-centered interpretation of bureaucra-

tization not only downplays the structural aspects of alternative
institutions, but also directs our attention away from the fundamental
task
of these organizations -- that of creating new sets of relationships
for

sharing work and decision-making.

In this way,

source of alternative institutions

—

the greatest single re-

their willingness and ability to

deliberately alter their own internal organizational structure -threatens to remain both unexamined and underutilized.

Learning from Holleb and Abrams

.

In

order for us to make sense of Hol-

leb and Abrams' work in ways which would point to corrective actions for

alternative institutions, we clearly need to attempt another interpretation of the problem of bureaucratization.

Building on the shortcomings

of their interpretation, we now know that any improved understanding of

bureaucratization will need to be based at least in part upon the structural

features of these organizations and not solely upon the character-

istics of their members.

Not surprisingly, it has been my personal ex-

perience to hear this same conclusion voiced by members of more successful

alternative institutions who are altogether unfamiliar with the work

of Holleb and Abrams.

Their experiences in past organizational experi-

ments have led them to construct alternative institutions which seem to
be pursuing a path of organizational

development which diverges consid-

erably from the Holleb and Abrams scenario.

Older and probably wiser,

these veterans have begun to build alternative institutions which for-

.
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malize some aspects of consensual democracy right from
the start.
one case that

I

am aware of, for example,

cooperative began its operation with

a

a

full

In

recently established food
set of bylaws which clearly

outlines participation in decision-making and work as both
rights and

obligations of all members.
crease, appear to point to

Such examples, now apparently on the ina

"second wave" of alternative institutions

which are much more structurally sophisticated than their predecessors.
There are presently no written accounts of these anomalous "second wave"

organizations, and few indications of their probable success or failure,
but it seems reasonable to follow their lead and explore the structural
side of alternative institutions more closely.

As we should recall,

Holleb and Abrams mentioned three factors which contribute to regression, but highlighted only one -- the issue of members' political com-

mitment.

At this point, let us begin to consider the two not emphasized

-- lack of organizational

structures consistent with consensual /democra-

tic ideals and external pressures for more conventional organizational

arrangements.

By turning now to a literature rarely associated with

alternative institutions,

I

believe we can see not only how these other

factors are related to the problem of bureaucratization, but also how
they can provide a realistic basis upon which to predicate corrective

strategies

CHAPTER

III

THE RELEVANCE OF WORKPLACE DEMOCRATIZATION

Introduction

If the recent emergence of alternative institutions
could be termed
a

"movement", we would then find that it is not the only "movement"

whose primary goal is the development of radically democratic alternatives to bureaucratic hierarchy.

This same general goal is shared by

another quieter, but somewhat broader coalition which includes the proponents of self-management (Vanek, 1975; Adizes & Borgese, 1975), workers'

control

(Gorz, 1967; Hunnius, Garson & Case, 1973), workers'

parti-

cipation (Pateman, 1970), industrial democracy (Bellas, 1972; Blumberg,
1968), and workers' cooperatives (Oakeshott, 1979).

While the particu-

lar choice of terms often reflects important differences and distinc-

tions within this movement regarding specific long-range objectives, the

diverse factions are bound together by

a

common strategy which appears

to set them apart from the proponents of alternative institutions.

Ra-

ther than attempting to create new organizations, this movement primarily seeks to transform existing ones.

In recognition of this strategic

similarity, Bernstein (1976) and Gustavsen (1973) have given the process
of transformation itself
is

a

label

-- workplace democratization -- which

increasingly applied to the movement as

a

whole.

As Bernstein points

out, the choice of the word "democratization" is significant not only

because of its inclusiveness, but also because
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.the emphasis on process that is inevitable
with the term
democratization seems more realistic for the long
run
It
helps to keep us aware of the fact that, in all
probability,
there is no fixed, single, or final state of
workplace democracy (Bernstein, 1975, p. 4).
.

.

Bernstein's comments should serve as

a

clue to the relevance of the

workplace democratization movement for those of
construction of alternative institutions.

us

concerned with the

As we shall

see, what initi-

ally appears as a major strategic schism diminishes in importance
when

we compare the two movements more closely.

History

.

Much like the current attempt to create alternative institu-

tions, the workplace democratization movement can also locate its early

history in the nineteenth-century communal and communitarian experiments
of both Europe and the United States.

The philosophical and political

underpinnings of these experiments figured prominently in the develop-

ment of organized labor in the United States during the latter half of
that century.

For example, the Knights of Labor, the first major labor

organization in this country, was

a

strong advocate of restructuring

workplaces along radically democratic lines (Grob, 1961).

Similar in-

fluences can be seen at work in the plywood cooperatives which emerged
in the Pacific Northwest during the 1920

ly,

's

and 1930's.

Not surprising-

these early production cooperatives are often pinpointed as the pro-

totypic attempts to create democratized firms in this country (Bernstein, 1976).

Focal point of change

.

In essence,

the proponents of alternative insti-

tutions and those of workplace democratization both agree that the cen-
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tral

problems of conventional workplaces stem from the
manager- employee

relationship and the system of bureaucratic authority
in which it is
embedded.

Due to the fact that attempts at workplace
democratization

often need to be sanctioned by owners and managers of
traditional firms,
however, proponents of this movement sometimes veil this
conviction.

Bernstein, for example, defines workplace democracy as any attempt
to

"increase employee influence in the management process, especially in

decision-making" (1976,

p.

4).

Other advocates are much more straight-

forward, declaring openly that this movement "strives for the elimination of boss-employee relationships"

(Wilson, 1974, p. 45).

The disdain

for manager-employee relationships does not extend to management functions in themselves, however.

Proponents of democratization recognize

the critical need for management functions

(planning, coordination,

etc.), but seek to develop increasingly egalitarian sets of workplace

relationships through which these functions might be carried out.

Overall vision

.

For the proponents of workplace democratization, the

manager-employee relationship merely reflects at an interpersonal level
the downward flow of authority which characterizes conventional organi-

zations.

They would like to see instead

a

leveling of the hierarchy of

authority, in which authority is distributed equally throughout the organization, making workers, of course, very influential.

In actual

practice, the details of such an arrangement depend in large part upon
the size and scale of the work organization under consideration.

In

large conventional industries, for example, the management functions

represented by the day-to-day chain of command remains in place, but the
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managers in this hierarchy are answerable to those whom
they manage.
In small worker co-ops, on the other hand, many
management functions may

be distributed among the workers, with perhaps

the remaining day-to-day affairs.

a

coordinator to manage

Although the various factions of the

workplace democratization movement differ considerably on the
degree to
which authority should be shared and the specific mechanisms for
its
administration, they remain united by the central premise that final

authority should always rest with all the members of an organization.
Such a notion, of course, is very similar to that of consensual demo-

cracy espoused by Holleb and Abrams (1975).

The process of change

While it is impossible here to provide

.

a

de-

tailed discussion of the range of specific strategies which fall under
the rubric of workplace democratization, it should suffice to say that

most strategies aim at

a

fundamental alteration of the governance system

within traditional firms, and often at increasing collectivization of
work groups on the shop floor (see Zwerdling, 1978, for
of current examples).

a

recent review

It is precisely this focus -- the restructuring

of work and decision-making -- which points to the most crucial simi-

larities and differences between the workplace democratization movement
and that of alternative institutions.
In the process of reorganizing work and decision-making, both move-

ments are faced with the task of generating new workplace relationships

with only the negative examples of conventional workplaces to guide
them.

In addition,

both need to maintain these new relationships over

time and buffer them against internal and external pressures to return
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to more conventional

arrangements (see Hackman, 1975; Bernstein,
1976).

Recognition of these similarities underscores the
fact that both movements share
itself.

a

number of identical concerns about the process of
change

Equally important, however, is the awareness that
they begin

the process of change under very different conditions.

A crucial difference

.

The major factor which differentiates alternative

institutions from workplace democratization projects is the nature
and

intensity of their respective confrontations with bureaucratic hierarchy.

In brief,

democratization projects are firmly grounded in the con-

ventional work organizations which they attempt to alter, while alternative institutions have

change.

a

less substantial

basis on which to predicate

For democratization projects, bureaucratic hierarchy provides

an immediate context which must be faced directly and continuously, on

both organizational and personal levels.

Typical projects require the

authorization of top management, the downward implementation of authorized changes, management approval of innovations recommended by lowerlevel employees, and much more.

In

addition, the individuals within

these projects have been immersed in bureaucratic hierarchy for most of

their working lives, making their thoughts and actions at times insep-

arable from it.

While this fact makes change

a

risky and difficult

undertaking for these individuals, in that it threatens the security of

long-established roles, relationships and assumptions (e.g., the traditional

"perogatives of management"), it also ensures that all partici-

pants have

a

working knowledge of the specifics of bureaucratic hierar-

chy, at least as it is applied to their specific industry.

In democra-
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tization projects, then, there is little
disagreement about the conventional practices for distributing work and
decision-making responsibilities -- the everyday realities of bureaucratic
hierarchy are quite
clear.

Instead, disagreements center on the viability of
altering spe-

cific practices and the long-range effects of such
alterations (e.g.,

replacing individual piece-rates with group incentives).
Within alternative institutions, on the other hand, the confrontation with bureaucratic hierarchy is much less straightforward.

First

of all, these organizations are typically isolated from conventional

workplaces.

True, there is some contact with banks, suppliers and gov-

ernmental agencies, but these periodic interchanges occur at the inter-

organizational

level, typically revealing more about the external rela-

tions of bureaucratic hierarchy than about its internal dynamics.

Sec-

ondly, members of alternative institutions are usually young and from

middle or upper-middle class backgrounds.

Thus their contacts with

bureaucratic hierarchy are often limited to short-term employment and to
experiences gained as receivers of services from educational, health and
governmental institutions.

For example, it appears that very few indi-

viduals active in food cooperatives have ever worked in

a

supermarket,

or in any other facet of the food distribution industry (Nagy, 1978).

This is not to say, however, that members of alternative institutions
have not learned about bureaucratic hierarchy -- clearly they have.

As

Herbst (1976) points out, one fundamental building-block of bureaucratic

hierarchy is the superior-subordinate relationship.

Considering the im-

pact of school systems alone, we would be hard-pressed to argue that mem
bers of alternative institutions had not "learned" in some ways about
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bureaucratic hierarchy.

Such learning, of course, is qualitatively
dif-

ferent than that of the long-term employee in
nization

-

a

conventional work orga-

more akin to socialization than the accumulation
of

to-day working knowledge.

a

day-

Thus we find that the members of alternative

institutions are placed in an awkward position.

They have been

"schooled" in the fundamentals of bureaucratic hierarchy, but
have only

limited experiences in actually practicing it.

Handicapped by

a

lack of

specific information regarding day-to-day practices and somewhat
isolated
from conventional workplaces, they often build organizations in opposition to a conception of bureaucratic hierarchy, rather than in opposi-

tion to its working-day realities.

Under the circumstances, of course,

this conception of bureaucratic hierarchy not only tends to become sty-

lized and oversimplified, but also promises to remain untested.

Worse

yet, the oppositional notions which underlie the construction of alter-

native institutions may also tend to be stylized and oversimplified,

providing
making.

a

poor basis for generating new modes of work and decision-

Non-hierarchical can come to mean no structure; and non-bureau-

cratic can translate to no procedures.

By tracing the effects of such

conceptions we can both illuminate the organizational development of al-

ternative institutions and also demonstrate the particular relevance of
what has been learned within the workplace democratization movement.

Imp!

i

cations

.

Recognizing the partial vacuum of experience and informa-

tion that surrounds the creation of alternative institutions, we are now
in a position to comprehend more fully the developmental

mented by Holleb and Abrams (1975).

In

scenario docu-

particular, we can appreciate
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how an oversimplified view of bureaucratic
hierarchy can lead to the

-

first stage of development

consensual anarchy_

-

a

stage character-

ized primarily by the absence of formal
structure and procedures.

Given

this void, we can also appreciate how the
prior socialization of members

provides them with conventional models of the workplace
which soon become the basis of informal
tion.

structure and procedures within the organiza-

As pointed out previously, these conventional
models, over time,

also become the means to increasing formalization along
bureaucratic
lines.

Within the Holleb and Abrams model, this process of bureaucrati-

zation continues until the formal differentiation stage, when the con-

tradiction between members' initial values and the organization which
they have built precipitates a major organizational choice:
or consensual democracy

.

With

a

bureaucracy

certain amount of irony, it should be

pointed out that the members of an alternative institution who decide
to change the course of bureaucratization by moving from formal differ-

entiation to consensual democracy are engaged in
zation project of sorts:

at this

a

workplace democrati-

critical point in development, they

are actually attempting to transform an existing organization (admittedly of their own making), rather than create a new one.

perspective, it

is

as

From

a

larger

if members have inadvertently compensated for

their limited experience with bureaucratic hierarchy by relying on their
past socialization to build

a

bureaucratic version of their own organi-

zation; armed with the vividness and immediacy of this experience, they
are then in a better position to begin fashioning a more realistic oppo-

sitional structure.
Thus we begin to see the genuine relevance of experiences gained
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within the workplace democratization movement
for those of us concerned
with building alternative institutions.

What appears initially as

major strategic division between these two movements
now emerges
central basis for their integration.

a

as

the

For alternative institutions which

have committed themselves to the transition from
formal differentiation
to consensual

democracy

,

the factors central to successful workplace

democratization are clearly worth examining.
ever, the attempt to move to consensual

As argued previously, how-

d emocracy

at this late point may

be thwarted because the process of bureaucratization has
already gone

too far -- the "management" of an alternative institution may not be

willing to "authorize" the move.

In

keeping with the notion of identi-

fying "earlier choices" for alternative institutions, then, it is important that we look closely at the factors deemed essential for workplace

democratization with an eye to how they might provide clues for improving the initial

development of oppositional structures.

siderations in mind, let us now turn to

a

With these con-

major work in the workplace

democratization literature.

The Bernstein Model

Drawing upon an extensive number of cases involving manufacturing
firms in the United States and abroad, Bernstein (1976) has constructed
a

comprehensive model of six interdependent components minimally neces-

sary for the maintenance of the workplace democratization process.

six components are:

1.

Participation in decision-making, whether by direct or by
elected representation.

The

.
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Frequent feedback of economic results to all
employees (in
the form of money, not just information).
Full sharing with employees of management-level
information, and, to an increasing extent,
management-level expertise
Guaranteed individual rights (corresponding, it turns
out
to the basic political liberties).
An independent board of appeal in case of
disputes (composed of peers as far as possible).
A particular set of attitudes and values (a type
of consciousness) (Bernstein, 1976, p. 45).

2.
3.

.

4.

5.

6.

In

his book, Bernstein elaborates at some length upon each of
the com-

ponents, illustrating with numerous examples the range of specific

mechanisms which lie between full and minimal democratization.

purposes,

a

brief review of each of these components should be suffici-

ent to introduce

a

us

to his model:

Participation in decision-making

1.

For our

.

Bernstein begins by defining

completely democratized organization:

.the upward flow [of criticisms and suggestions] expands
to include the selection of the managers by the managed; in
such cases it equals or outweighs the downward flow of instructions and information from the managers to the managed.
A
ci rcul ar pattern of authority is, therefore, said to exist in
.

.

fully democrati zed organizations, daily managerial authority
downward being balanced by employees' ultimate power to remove
the managers, plus employees' frequent upward input into
policy-making at almost every level (Bernstein, 1976 , p. 47).

In

order to locate different systems of participation in the range be-

tween full
sions

and minimal democratization, Bernstein relies on three dimen-

:

1

.

2.
3.

the degree of control employees enjoy over any single de-

cision ,
the issues over which that control is exercised, and
the organizational level at which it is exercised (Bernstein, 1976, p. 47)

.
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2.

Economic return

.

In his

research Bernstein finds that one

crucial component supporting participation
is "regular monetary feedback
to employees from the surplus that they
themselves have produced"

stein, 1976, p. 63).
return are:

(1)

(Bern-

Important qualifications regarding this economic

that it be related to what workers themselves
have pro-

duced; (2) that this return belong to the
employees by right; (3) that
the return be made to the entire participating
group, managers included;
(4)

that it be separate from the basic wage; and
(5) that the return be

frequent in order to inform employees of the immediate effects
of their
efforts
3.

Sharing management-level

i

nformation

also necessary for effective participation.

gests that "any degree of access.

.

.

This third component is

Bernstein's research sug-

.that is less than guaranteed access

to the company books will not sustain democratization" (Bernstein, 1976,
p.

69).

Given such a finding, the crucial factor underlying this com-

ponent then becomes the ability of employees to interpret and to act on

management-level information.

Bernstein argues that although the devel-

opment of this expertise has often presented

a

major stumbling block to

democratization efforts in the past, employee training and certain struc
tural arrangements of employee representation have proven themselves to
be acceptable long-term solutions.

Citing the past experiences of labor

unions, Bernstein also points to the use of employee-controlled technical
al

assistance programs as

a

short-term solution for obtaining manageri-

expertise prior to extensive employee training.
4.

Guaranteed individual rights

.

The assurance that individuals

cannot be penalized for their participation is also crucial for the de-

.
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velopment of

democratized workplace:

a

Such acts as criticizing existing procedures
or opposing proposed policy changes could invite reprisals from
management
or sometimes from fellow employees.
Establishing workers'
councils (or some other structure for participation),
or ensuring full access to information will be worthless
as long as
it is too risky to voice one's view because one
is in the
minority, or because one can be penalized by persons in
hiqher
positions of power. ...

Consequently, to be successful, democratization needs to
guarantee to its participants freedom of speech, assembly, petition of grievances, secret balloting in elections, due process and the right of fair appeal in cases of discipline,
immunity of workers' representatives from dismissal or transfer
while in office, and a written constitution alterable only by
majority or two-thirds vote of the full collective Bernstein,
1976, p.

5.

75).

An independent judiciary

.

Although Bernstein's data show that

this component is seldom fully differentiated from legislative and exec

bodies in democratized firms, its three major functions remain

utive

quite clear:

1.

2.
3.

6.

To settle infractions of the rules in a just manner;
To uphold and be the last-resort enforcer of basic rights;
and
To protect the by-laws (constitution) of the enterprise
from violation by any member, be he manager or managed
(Bernstein, 1976, p. 83)

A participatory-democratic consciousness

.

While admitting that

this particular component is undoubtedly the most difficult to specify,

Bernstein emphasizes the centrality of attitudes for the successful im-

plementation of all the other components and of democratization efforts
more generally.

Basing his conclusions upon an integration of existing

research (including his own), Bernstein is able to isolate two primary
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factors which comprise

a

participatory-democratic consciousness:

a

re-

sistance to being manipulated; and an ability to
create and organize
policies (Bernstein, 1976,
ly in behavioral

terms

—

93).

p.

as

Phrasing these factors more general-

willingness to participate

a

-

he traces

the implications of a participatory-democratic
consciousness for leader-

ship within the democratized organization.
upon the interplay of structural

In

particular, he focuses

arrangements and attitudes necessary

to block the well -documented tendencies of leaders to
accumulate and

prolong the power granted to them.
Given this very basic introduction to Bernstein's model, we are now
in

a

position to briefly review its dynamics and also examine other com-

ponents which seem to facilitate the democratization process.

Bernstein's m odel in action.

Although the practical mechanics of any

single component are often complex, the overall logic of Bernstein's
model

is quite straightforward.

For the process of democratization to

develop over time, there must be employee participation (1), but for
this participation to be meaningful, it must be linked directly and fre-

quently to the economic performance of the organization (2), and requires that employees are supplied with both the appropriate information
and (increasingly) with the expertise to interpret it (3).

Participa-

tion also requires that employees are protected from reprisals when

voicing their opinions (4), and that this protection is irrevocably

guaranteed by an independent judiciary system (5).
pation requires what Bernstein terms
ousness.

a

And lastly, partici-

participatory/democratic consci-

From this summary, we can begin to see the interdependence of
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the six components

if any one is weak or lacking, then the
process of

democratization decays.

From Bernstein's perspective, the interactive

nature of his model can best be understood by focussing
upon the effects
of the first five components upon the sixth one:

Regarded as a whole, the interdependence of the components
operates through a positive or reinforcing cycle and a negative or extinguishing cycle. The negative cycle.
.is entered if any of the initial five components are absent, or if
experience confronts employees with too many rejections of
their attempts at participation. The positive reinforcement
cycle.
.is entered when each of the five initial components
are added (and so long as they continue to function effectively)
as well as when experience rewards employees with adoptions of their suggestions and criticisms.
.

.

,

The model reveals the important fact of simultaneity in
the dynamics of workplace management.
Some past attempts to
democratize the workplace have failed because their implementors failed to realize this need and did not introduce enough
components at once. At other times, failure occurred because
the implementors assumed that attention to one component was
sufficient when in reality the readjustment or coordination of
several components at once is required (Bernstein, 1976 pp.
112-113).
,

In

addition to identifying the six necessary components for demo-

cratization, Bernstein's research also uncovered five other components
which are not essential for democratization, but do appear to facilitate
or advance the process:

1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

Job-equalization
Status -equalization
Pay-equalization
Forbidding individual rewards, in favor of collective consumption, and,
Abolishing private ownership (Bernstein, 1976 p. 119).
,

Bernstein points out that the importance of these five additional components lies in their ability to reinforce the sixth component -- consci-

:
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ousness

Rotation of jobs.
.can foster attitudes of reciprocity
and equality, in particular, attitudes which we
found necessary for power-holders in a democratized firm.
Equalization of pay -- whereby all members receive the
same
pay regardless of their task
goes even further in erasing
distinctions among participants.
Differences in skill and responsibility are no longer taken as sufficient reason for differences in personal income.
In a similar vein, some collectives think it
is better to
distribute the surplus (that economic return which is above
the mini mum wage) in a group form rather than as payment to
individuals.
The argument behind this practice is that
individual payments weaken the consciousness component. They
break down group identity and group concern and foster selfish
motives with individualist orientations, which can interfere
with group activities required for participatory enterprise
and society.
.(Bernstein, 1976 p. 119).
.

—
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

From this view it should be evident that Bernstein's work in particular, and the workplace democratization movement more generally, have

immense value for those of us concerned with the creation of alternative

institutions.

Bernstein's enumeration of both the necessary and facil-

itative factors underlying successful democratization efforts not only
points to specific functions and practices critical for the maintenance
of democratic workplaces, but also prods us to reconsider the develop-

ment of alternative institutions from
shall

a

fresh perspective.

And, as we

soon see, the most significant aspect of this perspective derives

from Bernstein's treatment of individual consciousness in the democratization process.

Learning from Bernstein

.

In broad terms,

the Bernstein model

raises a

number of issues which are either neglected or oversimplified in the developmental scenario put forth by Holleb and Abrams (1975).

The first
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of these issues concerns the absence of "earlier choices"
for alterna-

tive institutions in the Holleb and Abrams model.

Despite their recog-

nition that the lack of organizational structure consistent
with consen-

sual/democratic ideals initially precipitates the process of bureaucratization within alternative institutions, these authors provide few
concrete clues that could point to ameliorative strategies.

In

this re-

gard, the Bernstein model is particularly appropriate.

Critical omissions

.

On the basis of the work of Holleb and Abrams

(1975) and others, it appears that alternative institutions often begin

with the intent of putting into practice some if not all of Bernstein's

facilitative components.

In the

process, however, they have failed to

lay the foundation of a democratic workplace as it is enumerated by

Bernstein's six necessary components.

Of these six, only participation

seems to be considered at all; the other components are often absent or

only assumed to be present (e.g.,
ness).

a

participatory/democratic conscious-

The Holleb and Abrams scenario of bureaucratization suggests

that the most glaring omission is represented by the absence of the

third component -- sharing of management-level information.

Without

formal mechanisms for communicating these vital data, participation
loses its meaning and an informal

become

a

clique of managers soon promises to

Thus

formal contradiction within an alternative institution.

we corne to see that Bernstein's model is a crucial one for alternative

institutions because it articulates the minimal internal conditions
wh i ch are necessary for the maintenance of

a^

democrati

c

workplace

.

And

recognizing that some of these minimal conditions are often weak or

missing in emergent alternative institutions, we now have

a

much more
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substantial basis for comprehending the process of
bureaucratization
as the

deterioration of an insufficiently democratic workplace.

-

Such a

realization implies one obvious "earlier choice" for the
members of
these organizations:

that the minimal features of

a

democratic work-

place need to be put in place at the outset of an
organization's devel-

opment, or some degree of bureaucratization will surely
follow.
sence, this choice is
man (1972/1973):

a

es-

In

refined version of the one pointed out by Free-

institute formal structure consistent with democratic

ideals, or suffer the "tyranny of structurelessness

."

The advantage of

drawing this same conclusion from Bernstein's model, however, is that it

specifies in very concrete terms the elements which require translation
into formal structure.

While the specific mechanisms for formalizing

each necessary component in alternative institutions may differ somewhat
from those appropriate to workplace democratization projects, there

should be little doubt that the functions represented by these components do need to be replicated.

Their importance, of course, is tied to

the last of Bernstein's necessary components --

ness

particular conscious-

.

Relating structure and consciousness
a

a

.

What Bernstein identifies as

participatory/democratic consciousness roughly parallels the notion of

political commitment which Holleb and Abrams single out as the critical

factor discriminating between alternative institutions which survive

bureaucratization and those which succumb to it.

We should recall

that

for Holleb and Abrams, the issue of political commitment is lodged solely at the individual

level; political commitment is seen as unaffected

by both time and changing structural arrangements of work and decision-
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making.

Within their view, alternative institutions
can change the

source of bureaucratization only if the individuals
populating them are

endowed with

a

sufficient amount of this single characteristic.

stein also focusses upon

a

Bern-

single membership characteristic, but does

so in a much more sophisticated manner.

The significance of his work

lies in the fact that it locates the issue of
consciousness within the

structural realities of an organization and not just within
individuals.
He argues convincingly that a participatory/democratic
consciousness is

not only

a

requirement for the development of

a

democratic workplace,

but also highly dependent upon the successful operation of other
structural features (his first five necessary components).

Put quite simply,

Bernstein's model suggests that the quality and consequences of members'
past participation serve as major determinants of their future participation.
is not

It also suggests that a participatory/democratic consciousness

just

a

trait which individuals either have or do not have, but

rather that it is

a

characteristic which can be developed or discour-

aged, depending upon the experiences of individuals within an organization.

The central features of Bernstein's model, then, are:

it acknowledges the directional

(1)

that

relationship between organizational

structure and consciousness -- that the ways in which our work is organized determines the ways in which we think about the organization of
our work; and (2) that it defines the structural conditions under which
the potential

reciprocity of this relationship can be realized.

In

this

definition, of course, lies the essence of the democratization process
-- increasingly empowering those who work in organizations to decide how

that work is organized.

The logic of Bernstein's model is not restricted

r
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to an analysis of workplace democratization,
however, and hints at the

dynamic nature of bureaucratization in alternative
institutions

as well.

More specifically, this perspective suggests that
bureaucratization rep-

resents

a

vicious circle of increasing non-participation.

The informal

but conventional arrangements which emerge to get
work done and decisions made in the absence of formal democratic structures
lead to

a

con-

centration of responsibility in fewer and fewer individuals within
the

organization.

This concentration may affect other members in ways which

diminish their willingness to participate -- their participation seems

increasingly unnecessary in certain work and decisions.

Reduced parti-

cipation on the part of these members, of course, leads in turn to both
a

rationale for conventional arrangements and an apparent need for more

of them.
informal
(1975, p.

Such dynamics, of course, set the stage for the emergence of

"managers" within the organization.

As Holleb and Abrams

145) point out, these "managers" experience a growing tension

between the amount of responsibility which they are accumulating and
their lack of formal, recognized authority.

Given the informal capacity

of such individuals to wield power in the organization, it does not seem

surprising that this tension
thei

is

commonly resolved in ways that meet

parti cul ar needs -- by increasingly formalizing the informal

structure which led to their empowerment in the first place, with clearcut but conventional

roles, titles, procedures, and the like.

In this

way we can appreciate how informal but conventional structures in alter-

native institutions can actually serve as the vehicles of their own in-

creasing formalization.

Such

a

recognition, of course, highlights once

again the crucial importance of "earlier choices" for alternative insti-
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tuitions

-- choices which translate
consensual/democratic ideals into

formal organizational structure.

While this analysis of bureaucratiza-

tion clearly underscores the appropriateness of the
conceptual side of

Bernstein's model for alternative institutions, we at the
same time cannot accept his model's practical implications uncritically.

It is es-

pecially important, then, that we recognize that differences
between

workplace democratization projects and alternative institutions may
place very real limitations on the applicability of his model for our

purposes.

Two such differences strongly suggest that alternative insti-

tutions may require some components in addition to the six set forth in

Bernstein's work.
Differences of setting and ambition

.

While workplace democratiza-

tion projects in conventional firms are set against

a

backdrop of estab-

lished and ongoing structures of both decision-making and work, alternative institutions are created within settings which usually have no pre-

existing structural definition.

Largely as

a

consequence of this dif-

ference, the two movements initially pursue somewhat different objectives.

Democratization projects place primary emphasis upon alterations

of the structure of decision-making, and focus less on the existing

structure of work itself -- the division of labor, the definitions of
jobs, and the conventional mechanisms of coordination.
course, is that workers will

in time

The hope, of

learn to use their formal influ-

ence to change the structure of their work, instituting job-rotation,

job-sharing, group pay systems, and other innovations.

This initial em-

phasis upon alterations in governance is clearly reflected in Bern-

stein's model of democratization.

He places participation in decision-
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making in the most central role, but relegates
changes in the structure
of work itself, such as job rotation, to the
category of "facili tative

components"

-

helpful, but not necessary at first.

Within alternative

institutions, on the other hand, the initial objectives
are much more
ambitious.

These organizations are typically begun with the
notion of

sharing both decision-making and work right from the
start.

Given such

objectives, we find Bernstein's model somewhat inadequate -it lacks
structural components which address the issue of participation in
shared

work arrangements.

At the same time, however, the structural analysis

which serves as the basis of Bernstein's model does provide us with
clear hints about what these additional components might be.

In

essence,

the two questions raised by Bernstein about participation in decision-

making

-- what structures define this activity, and what structures are

required to maintain it -- can also be asked in regard to participation
in shared work arrangements.

From the Holleb and Abrarns (1975) scenario, it is clear that the

deterioration of shared work arrangements in alternative institutions

is

very similar to, and often intertwined with, the decay of participation
in decision-making.

Without early formal structure which concretizes

ideals of shared work, an informal division of labor soon develops,

tending to place those members with more time, skills, and knowledge in
important organizational roles (Mansbridge, 1973).

Given the increasing

involvement and familiarity of these individuals with the work of the

organization, they tend to displace the participation of other members,
further encouraging the development of informal hierarchy.
is

In time,

usually these same individuals who emerge as the informal managers

it
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within an alternative institution, not only
performing more work, but

because of their increasing expertise and access
to information, playing
a

proportionally larger role in decision-making

as

well.

Formal structure which merely defines shared work
arrangements

(e.g., clear schedules of rotation, functional and
public job descrip-

tions, etc.) represents only a partial

however.

corrective for this scenario,

Informal managers often emerge because they perform

a

crucial

kind of work generally overlooked by the members of alternative institu-

tions -- coordination.

Committed to some form of consensual/democratic

decision-making, members often attempt to make all major decisions in
large meetings attended by the entire membership.

Due to the inherent

constraints of time and energy, however, these meetings rarely can occur

frequently enough or last long enough to meet the decision-making needs

of the organization.

What results, then, is

a

structural gap between

large group decision-making and the decision-making performed by members
in the

context of their individual roles -- an intermediate step of de-

cision-making which most often involves the day-to-day coordination of
the organization.

Actually

a

hybrid of work and decision-making, coor-

dination is absolutely critical for an organization to function effectively.

Circumstances and conditions frequently change on

a

daily ba-

sis, creating unique situations for which organizational policy is ei-

ther impractical or non-existent.

If the members of alternative insti-

tutions wish to create organizations in which work is shared, then it
seems necessary for them to develop formal structures for sharing coor-

dination responsibilities

position, or

a

as well

—

perhaps

a

slowly rotated coordinator

steering committee which meets on

a

regular basis.

Fail-
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ure to create such a mechanism not only
encourages the emergence of un-

appointed, informal managers, but also appears to
start in motion
general

a

more

cycle of non-participation within alternative
institutions.

Atthesame time, alternative institutions could also benefit
from
the examples set by larger democratic workplaces in
the area of coordina
tion.

In

these organizations, coordination, administration and other

"management" functions are often performed by one or more individuals
who are either hired or elected by the members of an organization
or

their representatives.

Such

a

mechanism may appear initially to be at

odds with one characteristic listed in Holleb and Abrams

tion of consensual democracy

shared by all staff."

:

1

(1975) descrip

"administrative and maintenance work

We must remember, however, that Holleb and

Abrams' model

is

ganizations.

What the workplace democratization literature demonstrates

is

based upon an examination of relatively small work or-

that the election or hiring of individuals to perform "management"

functions is consistent with other aspects of consensual
and only if these special positions exist within

work of member authority and control
In such

a

d emocracy

,

if

larger formal frame-

(e.g., a constitutional

democracy).

cases, the power and responsibility of individuals performing

"management" functions is formally delegated by the members of an orga-

nization or their elected representatives.

Consequently, it appears ap-

propriate to expand Holleb and Abrams' description of consensual democracy to include this possibility.

By making this small

change, the

consensual democracy label can be otherwise faithfully applied to those

alternative institutions which employ the mechanism of hiring or electing of individuals performing "management" functions as an important
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feature of their system of member control.

Recalling Bernstein's analysis, however, we should
recognize that
formal mechanisms for sharing work by themselves
are probably insuffi-

cient

—

that additional structural components may be
necessary in order

to maintain these arrangements once they have been
put in place.

Job

rotation schemes, for example, often falter because individuals
are in-

adequately prepared for

a

periodic shift in work roles.

Lacking the

appropriate training for their new roles, members are easily frustrated
by the long periods of adjustment that accompany each new
transition.

Continuity suffers and important tasks are performed poorly, if at all.
Given such

a

situation, we can understand why members of alternative in-

stitutions often conclude that job rotation is an unworkable ideal and

reluctantly accept more conventional work arrangements.
component obviously needed in this case
members for job and role transitions.

is

a

One structural

mechanism for preparing

Possible structures fulfilling

this function might include training prior to rotation, or partial rota-

tions, in which a person considering a new role has an extended oppor-

tunity to work under the guidance of the person currently holding this
position.

Federations of food coops in the Northeast, for example,

presently encourage the use of both of these mechanisms in order to
train food co-op coordinators and new members of boards of directors.

Other structural arrangements supporting job rotation might include financial incentives, such as pay scales which are based upon the number

of jobs or roles in the organization that an individual member has

learned, release-time for training, and so on.
In any event, it is clear that the ideal

of shared work in alterna-
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tive institutions requires at least two structural
components in addition to the six set forth in Bernstein's model:

(1)

formal

structures

for sharing work; and (2) formal structures which
are essential in order
to maintain shared work arrangements once they are
put in place, like

training programs or innovative incentive systems.

One other major dif-

ference between alternative institutions and workplace
democratization

projects suggests still more components, however.

Membership differences

acterized by

a

.

Alternative institutions are usually char-

high rate of turnover or "transiency" among their members

(Rothschild-Whitt, 1976; Hershberger, 1973).

As

Bernstein and others

point out, workplace democratization projects, on the other hand, are

generally known for turnover rates which are low by conventional manufacturing standards, a feature which is commonly highlighted
their major selling points within traditional industries.

as

one of

Given that

the rate at which individuals enter and exit differs in these two set-

tings, it appears that the task of developing and maintaining

a

democra-

tic workplace may differ somewhat as well.

Although Bernstein does discuss some examples of how democratized
firms integrate new employees, this area does not play
in his model.

a

prominent role

And in light of the relatively low turnover rates in such

projects, their size and structure, this inattention appears to be sensible.

New employees are low in frequency, and when they do enter

a

project, the formal mechanisms which bring about participation themselves serve as implicit vehicles of orientation and training.
a

Within

large manufacturing plant, for example, lower-level participation is

often direct, but

a

new employee is confronted by strong norms and the

.
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influential role-models provided by experienced
employees of long standing.

Upper-level participation, however, usually
entails representa-

tives elected throughout the plant.

Due to the nature of the election

process, new employees are effectively blocked
from taking on major re-

sponsibilities until they have demonstrated their worthiness
to older
employees over

a

course of time.

And lastly, plant-wide meetings in-

volve so many individuals that the potential impact
of

a

new employee

who may not fully understand the nature of issues or their
implications
is minimal

Within alternative institutions we usually find the opposite picture to be the case.

produces

a

The high rate of transiency in these organizations

low density of experienced members who might serve as role-

models and often results in vague and shifting norms as well.

The lack

of formalized structures of participation frequently combines with the

prevailing consensual/democratic ideals to create

a

situation in which

new members are expected to participate immediately in major policy de-

cisions affecting the organization without the requisite knowledge or

experience.
a

And given the typically small size of these organizations,

single vote or voice can often have

making process.

a

major effect upon the decision-

Although some alternative institutions have attempted

to circumvent these difficulties by establishing trial

new members are not allowed voting privileges for

a

periods in which

specified period of

time, such solutions have their own inherent limitations.

First of all,

high turnover rates mitigate against long trial periods -- if trial

periods are too long, then the organization may soon consist primarily

of trial members,

an

obviously awkward situation.

Secondly, long trial
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periods may act as

a

disincentive in attracting new members, making it

difficult to maintain the appropriate number of
members.
eral

On a more gen-

level, the transiency of members also tends to
weaken the relation-

ship between organizational structure and consciousness,
in that members

may not be members long enough to be affected by the
structures of work
and decision-making.

In short,

alternative institutions have

a

unique

need in terms of maintaining themselves as democratic organizations,
need to integrate new members rapidly and effectively.

from the issue of turnover for

a

a

Stepping back

moment, however, gives us an opportun-

ity to appreciate just how critical this need really is.
In

addition to the degree of political commitment, Holleb and

Abrams (1975) mention two other factors which seem to precipitate

bureaucratization initially -- lack of organizational structure consistent with democratic/ consensual ideals and external pressures for more

conventional internal arrangements.
model

is

maintain

Due to the fact that Bernstein's

explicitly concerned with the internal conditions necessary to
a

democratic workplace, we found it most relevant to the first

of these factors -- the lack of appropriate structure.
time, however, Bernstein does point out that external

likely to affect the consciousness component.

At the same

factors are most

More specifically, he

cites cultural norms, political climates, and the past organizational

experiences of participants as influences that can help or hinder the

development of

a

participatory/ democratic consciousness.

These external

influences are quite different from those mentioned by Holleb and
Abrams.

They argue that banks, funding sources and governmental agen-

cies exert pressures on alternative institutions for more conventional
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internal

arrangements.

Siding with Bernstein, however,

I

believe that

we can show that Holleb and Abrams may
have overlooked the major influence which impinges upon alternative
institutions

of new members into the organization

-

the constant flow

.

While the influx of new members into an
alternative institution may

appear as solely an internal problem at first,
it

is

important to recog-

nize that they are the most direct and frequent
vehicle by which pressures for more conventional arrangements enter an
organization.

Prob-

ably the most poignant example of this can be found in
food cooperatives

when new members complain about the quality and quantity
of produce as
if it were the co-op's problem and not theirs also.

these complaints is quite clear

ter service, they will

—

The message of

if the co-op cannot offer them bet-

take their business elsewhere.

What these new

members are doing, however, is more than merely raising complaints

—

they are acting on the basis of a buyer-seller relationship which is ap-

propriate in the supermarket but not appropriate within food cooperatives, where, in theory at least, members share responsibility and labor
in exchange for lower food prices.

If continually confronted with such

complaints, older members, especially those most central to the co-op's

operations, may be drawn into the conventional relationships upon which
the complaints are predicated, acting more and more like the managers

of small retail stores where concerns about the competitiveness of
produce line and about "pleasing the customer" are foremost.

a

Analogous

examples can be found in every type of alternative institution.

New

members, drawn by their ideals initially, enter these organizations acting on the basis of past relationships, roles and assumptions.

These
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actions, often representative of work
and decision-making in conventional

settings, start as external forces, but can
quickly mesh with the

internal pressures which both bring about
bureaucratization and then

maintain it.

What this line of reasoning suggests, then,
is that al-

ternative institutions may require an additional
component or components
in order to maintain

themselves as democratic workplaces

-

formal

structures whose function is the integration of new
members and perhaps
the retention of older members as well.

At the same time, however, we

may begin to ask how alternative institutions would ever
become aware of
the need for such functions, or, more generally, how
would these organi-

zations learn about their problems in ways that would lead to corrective
action.

We should recall

that in Holleb and Abrams

1

scenario, for exam-

ple, the members of alternative organizations were generally unaware

that bureaucratization was taking place until its latter stages.
a

Such

late discovery of organizational difficulties suggests that another

function may be of particular importance in alternative institutions --

one which assures an organizational level of consciousness in addition
to an individual

one.

Let us now move to

which focusses on this topic.

a

final

body of literature

CHAPTER

IV

THE NECESSITY OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

have collected a great many examples of
organizations or
institutions that have fallen on evil days because
of their
failure to renew themselves. And I want to place
before you
two curious facts that I draw from those examples.
First I
haven't yet encountered an organization or institution
that
wanted to go to seed or wanted to fall behind in the
parade
Second, in every case of organizational decline
that I know
anything about, there were ample warning signals long before
trouble struck. And I don't mean warning signals that
only a
Monday-morning quarterback could discern.
I
mean that before
trouble struck there were observers who had correctly diagnosed the difficulties to come.
I

Now if there are plenty of warning signals, and if no organization really wants to go to seed, why does it ever happen?
The answer is obvious:
eyes that see not, ears that hear not,
minds that deny the evidence before them.
When organizations
are not meeting the challenge of change, it is as a rule not
because they can't solve their problems but because they won't
see their problems; not because they don't know their faults,
but because they rationali ze them as vi rtues or necessities
(Gardner, 1965)7

Gardner's observations are based upon conventional organizations
but are clearly relevant to alternative institutions as well.

All

or-

ganizations need to be able to recognize their difficulties and shortcomings if they are to formulate and then implement corrective actions;
in turn,

they also need to be able to evaluate the effects of those cor-

rective actions.
for learning.

In short, organizations in general

require mechanisms

As we can see from Gardner's comments, however, organi-

zational "learning" may often be divorced from the level of "individual"
learning.

Individuals may have knowledge of impending problems (and
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even solutions) but are often inhibited
if not prohibited from translating that knowledge from the individual
to organizational levels.

The Concept

Argyris and Schbn (1978) have recently proposed

a

theory of organi-

zational "learning" in which they postulate relationships
between individual and organizational levels of learning.

Central to their theory

is a distinction between the espoused theories and
the actual

in-use employed by individuals within an organization.

theories-

Quite simply,

espoused theories are the system of beliefs which individuals claim is
the basis of their actions toward others, while theories-in-use are the

belief systems that can be inferred from their overt behavior in an organization; one's interpersonal theory versus one's interpersonal practice.

While the details of Argyris and Schbn'

s

theory are somewhat com-

plex, it should suffice to say that they trace many of the problems of

contemporary organizations to discrepancies between espoused theories
and theories-in-use at the individual

level

(e.g., the participatory

theory but autocratic practice of top managers).

These authors argue

that the quality of organizational learning is largely determined by the

quality of theories-in-use guiding the behavior of organizational members.
al

If,

for example, the interpersonal theory-in-use of organization-

members prevents them from recognizing discrepancies between their

own personal

theory and practice, then their behavior within the organi-

zation creates conditions under which certain forms of organizational

learning cannot occur (i.e., they will probably be unable to confront

effectively similar organizational discrepancies of theory and practice)
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In this way the actual

behavior and resulting learning styles
of indi-

viduals combine to set real limits on
the capacity of the organization
to learn as a whole.

Modes, of Organizational

Learning

Drawing upon the distinction between espoused
and in-use interpersonal

theories, Argyris and Schbn argue that there are
three distinct

varieties of organizational learning.

The first, "single loop learn-

ing," refers to the process by which an organization
becomes aware of
the discrepancies between its objectives and
activities, makes adjust-

ments, and then assesses the effectiveness of those adjustments
by re-

evaluating the match between objectives and activities.

The authors

liken this form of organizational learning to the action of
-- a simple feedback mechanism.

And like

learning is noted for its unreflecti veness

a

;

a

thermostat

thermostat, single loop
it represents corrective

action which is based upon an unquestioned set of objectives, norms and

assumptions.

As such, it is an inappropriate vehicle for examining dis-

crepancies between theory and practice at either the individual or organizational levels.
"Double loop learning," the second variety, represents organizational

learning in which the objectives, norms and assumptions of an

organization are themselves open to scrutiny, alteration and re-evaluation.

While Argyris and Schon note that most organizations are current-

ly incapable of employing this learning mode in a sustained way, Argyris

does point out elsewhere that double loop learning does often emerge

quite effectively during times of extreme organizational crisis, when
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the stakes are high and honesty is unavoidable
(Argyris, 1976,

Drawing upon

a

number of examples taken from

Argyris and Schbn built

a

a

p.

373).

range of organizations,

strong case for double-loop learning as

way

a

of preventing organizational difficulties from
reaching crisis proportions.

In their view,

the major preconditions for this form of organi-

zational learning lie in the capacity of individuals
within the organi-

zation who hold "enlightened" espoused theories of interpersonal
behavior to translate these espoused theories consistently into
actual behavior.

As we might expect, Argyris and Schbn argue that the route to ef-

fective double-loop learning usually demands extensive behavioral training of individuals and groups most influential in decision-making
within
an organization.

And lastly, Argyris and Schbn mention briefly

a

third variety of

organizational learning which they label as "deutero learning,"

which they borrow from Bateson (1972).

This mode represents

a

a

term

step be-

yond double-loop learning and occurs when an organization engages in
learning about the ways in which it learns, subjecting these modes once
again to evaluation, alteration, and re-evaluation.

For our purposes,

however, the distinction drawn by these authors between single-loop and

double-loop learning is most crucial.

Organizational Learning in A1 ternati ve Institutions

While Argyris and Schbn argue that most conventional organizations
could definitely employ double-loop learning to their advantage, it appears that for alternative institutions this mode of organizational

learning is absolutely essential.

Learning which examines, modifies,
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and re-examines organizational objectives,
norms and assumptions lies
at the very heart of the task of creating
alternative institutions.

As

Herbst (1976) points out, those who attempt
to create alternative institutions can only succeed if they can escape from
the basic assumptions

which generate the logic of bureaucratic hierarchy:

In the case of bureaucratic hierarchical
organizations an attempt to move out of this system may be perceived as
going in
the direction of the opposite, that is a chaotic
unstructured

state.

Alternatively transition from say a centralized to a
decentralized system produces the converse without necessarily
changing the basic mode of operation of the organization.
Here again then, the process of social change can become locked
within and unable to go beyond the inherent organizational
logic.
The steps required to find a way out are to:
(1) identify the basic assumptions which generate the organizational
logic; (2) search for an alternative set of assumptions; and
(3) derive the characteristics of alternative types of organization (Herbst, 1976, p. 30).

The deliberately reflective activity outlined by Herbst can only occur

through what Argyris and Schbn define as double-loop learning.
more, the absence of this type of organizational
a

Further-

learning appears to be

central feature of the developmental scenario of alternative institu-

tions depicted by Holleb and Abrams (1975).

Within their sample, the

progression of the bureaucratization process is marked by organizational
inattention -- members appear as if they are largely unaware of the in-

creasing bureaucratization of their own organization.
ner's

Recalling Gard-

(1965) comments, however, we may suspect that this apparent lack

of awareness in fact represents the inability of members to express in
a

public way their doubts and criticisms regarding the match of organi-

zational theory and practice.

According to Holleb and Abrams, the con-

tradiction between consensual /democratic values and an increasingly
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bureaucratic structure continues unexamined
until its blatantness precipitates a major organizational crisis.
view, then,

Quite in keeping with Argyris'

the alternative institutions which move
towards consensual

democrac .y d0 so onl y a fter

a

crisis which brings about an examination

and modification of organizational objectives,
norms and assumptions.

What such an analysis suggests, of course,

is

the necessity of deliber-

ate double-loop learning much earlier in the
development of alternative

institutions.

Put in other terms, we might say that double-loop learn-

ing represents another "earlier choice" for alternative
institutions.

While Argyris and Schon's diagnosis of the need for double-loop
learning
may be appropriate for alternative institutions, however, their
correc-

tive strategy can be shown to be quite inappropriate.
In their analysis, Argyris and Schon pinpoint individual

ings as the cause of deficits in organizational

shortcom-

learning; thus by train-

ing influential individuals to act and think in new ways, organizational

learning can be qualitatively improved.
is

"influential individuals."

The key phrase here, of course,

As Argyris and Schon make quite clear,

this training in conventional organizations focusses primarily upon the

chief executive officers and the next one or two layers of top management.

The authors defend this practice on the basis of what they claim

to be the structural

realities of conventional organizations -- that

significant change, if it is to be effectively sanctioned throughout an
entire organization, must begin with the top.

In short, Argyris and

Schon's strategy takes conventional structural arrangements for granted
and focusses instead upon changing the individuals within them.

What

these authors overlook, of course, is the likelihood that it is these

74

very "structural realities" which inhibit
double-loop learning in the

first place.

The superior-subordinate relationship, because
it sepa-

rates the work to be done from the decisions to
be made about that work,

obviously creates

a

climate in which the structure of authority prohi-

bits goals, norms, and assumptions from being
questioned or openly dis-

cussed in the first place.

In some ways,

analysis reminds us of Holleb and Abrams'

then, Argyris and SchSn's
(1975)

interpretation of the

role of political commitment in alternative institutions:

individual

characteristics are seen as the key to organizational renewal, and the

relationship between organizational structure and individual characteristics is ignored.

While this similarity points to obvious shortcomings

in Argyris and Schon's strategy for encouraging double-loop learning in

conventional organizations, it also hints at the ways in which such

learning might be encouraged in alternative institutions.
The capacity and willingness of alternative institutions to cre-

atively alter their own internal structures suggests that the route to

double-loop learning within these organizations
than the route proposed by Argyris and Schon.

is

markedly different

Given this inherent

structural flexibility, it appears that the equivalent of double-loop

learning can be brought about in alternative institutions by means of
formal structures which, over time, have the effect of "training" the

individual members of an organization.

In my own experience,

the cre-

ation of formal structures consistent with this end typically occurs
relatively late in the development of alternative institutions, if it
occurs at all, and is often incomplete.

For example, some alternative

institutions formalize this reflective function to

a

degree by creating
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roles which are explicitly concerned with
group process.

may begin large meetings with the assignment
of both
a

a

Organizations

chairperson and

"process-person"; the expectation is that the
chairperson will attend

to the content of the meeting, while the
process-person will attend to

the concurrent group process, offering corrective
comments and suggestions.

This "process" role

usually rotated among members from meet-

is

ing to meeting, but may also be formally assigned
to one individual or

group on

a

continuing basis.

The effect of such

a

role is to legitimize

the raising of issues regarding the meeting's goals,
objectives, norms

and assumptions, in ways which often profoundly influence the
quality
and direction of the meeting.

Rarely does this role extend beyond meet-

ings, however, and thus larger but parallel issues of organizational

process frequently go unexamined.

I

am aware of only one organization

in which the "process" role is more broadly and formally defined to in-

clude issues of organizational process.

position is explicitly allocated for

a

In this case, one paid staff

person who attends to group and

organizational process, and their relationship to organizational goals.
The individual who fills this position is expected to raise larger issues for the organization particularly in the area of goal
not to do so would be seen as
job.

a

redefinition;

failure to adequately perform his or her

From this singular example it is possible to see one route to

creating formal structures which encourage double-loop learning within
alternative institutions:

the domain of the "process" role is expanded

beyond the boundaries of meetings in themselves and then formalized as
an actual position within the organization.

Sarason (1972) points to

a

similar structure for formalizing re-
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flective functions in alternative institutions.

Concerned with the more

general problem of "the creation of new
settings," and then maintaining
them, Sarason suggests that unreflective
tendencies can also be coun-

tered by
a

a

critic who is external to the organization but
nonetheless

formal appendage of it:

By external critic I refer to someone (or
a group) who
at the earliest time possible, accepts the task

of understanding the responding to the purposes and values
of the setting,
the consistency between words and actions, and the
sources of
actual and potential problems.
He is not a member of the setting.
He is an outsider, independent, knowledgeable about,
and sympathetic to the purposes of the setting.
He makes a
long-term commitment and regularly spends time in the setting
in whatever ways he deems necessary to gain knowledge
and understanding.
His relationship to the setting is based on
agreement that his task is to contrast the reality as he sees
it with the way those in the setting see it, that his goal is
not to be loved or admired, and that his remuneration will not
depend on the cheeriness of his perceptions. He paints reality as he sees it.
He has no responsibilities except to observe, study, report.
He is not someone who waits for problems
to be brought to him; he seeks them out.
His obligation is
not to any individual, but to the purposes and values of the
setting (Sarason, 1972, p. 250).

Internal process roles and external critics clearly do not exhaust the

possible arrangements by which alternative institutions can formalize
reflective organizational learning.

Other possible modes might include

study groups, structures for conducting formative research, or even

regularly scheduled meetings or retreats whose sole purpose is organizational

reflection.

More important than the actual arrangements, how-

ever, is the way in which reflective organizational learning can be in-

tegrated into

a

larger scheme of organizational development for alter-

native institutions.

.
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Torbert

's

Model

Building on Erikson's (1959) stage theory
of individual development
and his own experiences within an alternative
education program, Torbert
(1974/1975) has proposed an eight-stage model of
organizational develop-

ment which is applicable to conventional organizations
and alternative
institutions alike.

As the title of his model

suggests

-

"Pre-bureau-

cratic and post-bureaucratic stages of organizational
development"

—

Torbert conceives of alternative institutions as attempts
to move beyond
the stage of development of which bureaucratic hierarchy
is but one com-

mon example.

In his view,

then, alternative institutions represent the

attempt to create qualitatively different forms of organization rather
than merely oppositional ones.

A brief outline of the characteristics

of the first six stages of his model helps us to appreciate this point:

Stage

I

(a)
(b)
(c)

(d)

Stage

II

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

(e)

--

Fantasies
Dreams, fantasies about future, initial visions;
informal conversations with friends, work associates;
diffuse collaboration -- discussing or working with
others on occasional, related projects to explore
shared interests;
episodic exploration of varied parts of the social
environment to see how they relate to fantasies,
where opportunities exist, what potential consequences
of action would be.
--

Investments
Organizers make definite commitment of enterprise;
"parent" organizations make financial, structural,
spiritual commitments to nurture;
early relationship-building among potential leaders,
members, clients, advisors;
leadership style negotiated;
issues arise about the validity, reliability, and
depth of the various personal and institutional cornmi tments
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Stage III -- Determinations
(a)
Specific goals, clients, staff, members
determined
(hiring, admissions);
(b)
recognizable physical territory delineated;
(c)
first common tasks and time commitments;
(d)
psychological contracts between parties and organization defined implicitly or explicitly;
(e)
persistence-unity exhibited in face of perceived privation or threat.
Stage IV -- Experiments
Alternative legal, governing, administrative, physical,
production, communication, planning, scheduling, celebratory, and/or interpersonal structures-processes
practiced
(modeled, role-played), tested in operation and reformed.

Stage

V --

(a)
(b)

(c)
(d)
(e)

(f)

Predefined productivity
Focus on doing the predefined task;
viability of product = single criterion of success;
standards and structures taken for granted (often
formalized, institutional ized);
roles stabilized, job descriptions written;
effort to quantify results based on defined standards;
reality conceived of as dichotomous and competitive:
success-failure, leader-follower, legitimate-illegitimate, work-play, reasonable-emotional.

Stage VI -- Openly chosen structure
(a)
Shared continual reflection about larger (wider,
deeper, more long term, more abstract) purposes of
the organization;
(b)
development of open interpersonal process, with disclosure, support and confrontation on value-stylisticemotional issues;
(c)
evaluation of effects of own behavior on others in
organization and formative research on effects of
organization on environment ("social accounting");
i.e., determining whether abstract purposes are being
realized in practice;
(d)
direct facing and resolution of paradoxes:
freedom
versus control, expert versus participatory decisionmaking, etc.;
(e)
creative, trans-conventional solutions to conflicts;
(f)
organizational his-story becomes my-story [individuals
integrate organizational history with personal history]
deliberately chosen structure with commitment to it,
(g)
over time, the structure unique in the experience of
the participants or among "similar" organizations;
(h)
primary emphasis on horizontal rather than vertical
role differentiation;
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0)
(J

J

development of symmetrical rather than
subordinate
relation with "parent" organization;
gaining of distinctive public repute based
on the
quality of collective action within the
organization
(Torbert, 1974/1975, pp. 5-6).

Torbert's model does include two more stages,
but they are largely irrel-

evant

to our attempt to see how both conventional
bureaucratic organi-

zations and alternative institutions are placed
within his framework.

From Torbert's perspective, bureaucratic hierarchy
"emerges as

a

pathological expression of the 'predefined productivity'
stage of organizational development" (Torbert, 1974/1975,
p. 8).
label,

Torbert uses the

"pathological," because of the apparent inability of bureaucratic

hierarchy to address effectively either the particular needs of individuals within it or changing external pressures:

.the bureaucratic system cannot respond creatively to
these disequilibria
It is open only at the behavioral level
and not at the structural level. That is, it can take in new
inputs, plants, or personnel and produce some product or service for the environment and it can expand its present structure, but it has no built-in process for restructuring the
quality of its goals and roles.
It does not possess the 'ulty
trastabili
necessary to sacrifice a given structure without
chaos (Calwal lader, 1968).
Consequently it tends to ignore
disequilibria, or to respond inappropriately, or to undergo a
traumatic crisis, or, the most recent popular tactic, to develop a leadership which attempts to leapfrog over crises by conglomerating organizations (Torbert, 1974/1975, p. 7).
.

.

.

'

Torbert then goes on to link this form of organizational behavior with
behavior at the group and individual levels, much like Argyris and Schon
(1978):

The tendency of bureaucratic organizations toward structural closedness can be illustrated by observing in a microscopic way how people characteristically work and make deci-
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cisions together. A decision-making
process that reflects
structural closedness can be one which does
not explicitly
acknowledge and experiment with alternative
possible ways of
structuring problems, nor with alternative
value systems that
alternative structures presuppose, and which
does not confront
openly and resolve the emotional commitment,
and reactions of
various participants to such alternatives.
... A decisionmaking process reflecting structural closedness
would also
create a climate encouraging conformity to implicit
values of
the unexamined structure (Torbert, 1974/1975,
pp. 7-8).

Alternative institutions, on the other hand, represent
in Torbert's
view the attempt to move from "Predefined productivity"
to the next
stage, "Openly chosen structure."

Comparing the characteristics of

these two stages, we find that one major element absent in
the former,

but noticeably present in the latter, is deliberate and reflective

learning on both individual and organizational levels.

According to

Torbert, an organization in the "Openly chosen structure" stage is

"structured as to make goal reconsideration and redefinition of roles

and role relations
(1974/1975, p. 8).

matter of regular, consensual negotiation.

a

."

.

Put in Argyris and Schbn's (1978) terms, then, we

find that "Predefined productivity" is characterized by single-loop

learning alone, while "Openly chosen structure" also incorporates

double-loop learning.

Examining the characteristics of "Openly chosen

structure" more closely, we can see that this stage parallels in
general way Holleb andAbrams

1

(1975) consensual democracy stage.

is one major discrepancy between

the two stages, however.

a

more

There

While the de-

scription of consensual democracy does allude to structures for individual

learning, it fails to mention organizational learning as spelled out

in characteristics

(a)

and (c) of "Openly chosen structure":

"shared

continual reflection about larger purposes of the organization"; and
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"evaluation of organizational effects with
regard to abstract purposes."

Torbert describes the essential nature of
these two characteristics as
well as the eight others in terms very similar
to those used by Bern-

stein (1976) in picturing the fully democratized
workplace:

According to this stage theory, the ten characteristics
of
Openly chosen structure' are mutually consistent
with one another and reinforce one another, creating a qualitatively
different kind of structure or gestalt from the 'Predefined
productivity' kind of structure.
If only some of the characteristics of 'Openly chosen structure' are implemented, then
the
organization will be unstable and will tend to regress back
to 'Predefined productivity.'
At the same time, it would obviously be a contradiction in terms to impose an 'Openly chosen
structure.'
Indeed, what begins to become evident in the transition to 'Openly chosen structure' is that organizational
structures are precisely not external realities which can be
imposed, but rather internal realities which are either shared
or not shared (Greenfield, 1973).
To say that 'Openly chosen
structure' is a qualitatively different kind of structure from
'Predefined productivity' is to say that persons come to
think, feel and behave in qualitatively different ways in such
an organization (Torbert, 1974/1975, p. 20).

In Torbert's thinking about alternative institutions,

then, we see at

least one element shared with Bernstein's (1976) treatment of workplace

democratization.

Torbert clearly argues for the simultaneity of the ten

characteristics of "Openly chosen structure" as

tablishing

a

durable organization at this stage.

a

prerequisite for esBernstein, of course,

used a similar argument to explain the conditions under which his seven

necessary components would lead to

a

fully democratized organization.

Despite Torbert's conceptual sophistication, however, his model leaves
much to be desired.

Evaluating Torbert's model

.

In terms of its practical

application, Tor-

bert's model is not as useful as Bernstein's (1976), or even Holleb and
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Abrams'

(1975).

Little is said about other specific
organizational con-

ditions which bring about

a

"Openly chosen structure."

transition from "Predefined productivity"
to
Similarly, Torbert provides few hints as to

the shape of formal structures which might
produce the ten characteristics he lists as essential

to "Openly chosen structure."

In addition,

Torbert's stage model suggests that alternative
institutions need to
pass through some form of "Predefined productivity"
while on their way
to

"Openly chosen structure," but is somewhat vague about how
this might

occur.

While he does intimate that the organization need not be bureau-

cratic in form while in the "Predefined productivity" stage, he at the
same time fails to specify what other forms might be substituted.

On a

more positive note, Torbert does identify organizational learning, par-

ticularly the double loop variety, as

a

structural feature which is

critical to the successful continuation of alternative institutions.

Without such
will

a

feature, according to Torbert, an alternative institution

tend to "regress" back to a more conventional

form of organization

typical of the "Predefined productivity" stage.

Summari zing Organizational Learning

Considering Torbert's work in conjunction with that of the other
authors reviewed in this chapter, it appears that we have identified

another variety of structural components necessary to keep alternative
institutions alternative -- those which ensure continued, shared reflection about an organization's goals and their relationship to both group

and organizational process.

While this conclusion can be derived some-

what indirectly from the work of Argyris and Schbn (1978), Herbst
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(1976), and Sarason (1972), only Torbert
(1974/1975) makes the case

straightforwardly.

In addition, we have also seen

that structural com-

ponents concerned with organizational learning
are undoubtedly the least

concrete of those components discussed so far.

Except for

a

few inno-

vative examples, the particular shape of structural
arrangements necessary for organizational
clear.

learning

is

at this point still somewhat un-

Still, we remain convinced of the necessity of the
functions

which such arrangements represent.

Given that we have seen the need for

organizational learning and placed this need within

a

developmental con-

text, it is now appropriate to place this particular component
within
a

!

larger, integrated structure for examining how to keep alternative

institutions alternative.

.

CHAPTER

V

A RECAPITULATION

At this point, we have covered

a

considerable amount of territory

in attempting to gain some perspective
on the central

alternative institutions alternative.

problem of keeping

A very brief summary of both the

literature considered and the accompanying
analyses not only crystalizes
the essential elements of the preceding chapters,
but also provides us

with an integrated view of the several structural
components we have
di

scussed

Revi ew

The work of Holleb and Abrams (1975) represents
to develop a detailed model

a

singular attempt

of organizational development which is di-

rectly relevant to alternative institutions.

The central feature of

their model is that it focusses primary attention upon the problem of

bureaucratization, the tendency of alternative institutions to slowly
replicate the bureaucratic and hierarchical structures which they ori-

ginally set out to avoid.

The Holleb and Abrams model, despite its de-

scriptive generality, however, falls short on two counts.

First of all,

the authors confuse a description of past organizational development

with a prescription for the future.

By viewing bureaucratization as a

"basic step" of organizational development for alternative institutions,

their model precludes earlier attempts to maintain the "al ternati veness"

of these organizations.

And secondly, their identification of members'
84
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political commitment as the single critical
factor in the recovery from

bureaucratization provides
tegies.

a

poor basis for predicating corrective stra-

Holleb and Abrams' person-centered interpretation
of bureaucra-

tization not only ignores the possible effects
of organizational structure over time, but also directs our attention
away from structural so-

lutions to the problem.

tization points to

a

Bernstein's (1976) model of workplace democra-

more sophisticated interpretation of bureaucratiza-

tion by emphasizing the relationship between organizational
structure

and individual consciousness.

In addition,

his model specifies the

structural components which are necessary for maintaining

a

democratized

workplace, components often overlooked in alternative institutions.
From Bernstein's work it is possible for us to develop

bureaucratization as
play between members'

a

a

sense of

dynamic process, understanding it as the inter-

declining participation in work and decisions,

and the increasingly conventional structure of the organization.

Close

examination of the differences between workplace democratization projects and alternative institutions, however, suggests that the latter

may require structural components in addition to those described by

Bernstein, particularly in the areas of work organization and integration of new members.

Focussing upon the work of Argyris and Schon

(1978), Sarason (1977), and that of Torbert (1974/1975), we can also

appreciate the unique requirements for organizational learning which

exist within alternative institutions.

This literature points to yet

another formal structural component which appears necessary for the continued survival of these organizations.
three chapters is more than

a

What emerges from the past

review of the relevant literature,
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however.

An Integration

On the basis of the literature, analysis
and personal experiences

related in the past three chapters, we can
begin to see the outlines of
a

larger analytic framework for both conceptualizing
and addressing the

problem of keeping alternative institutions alternative.

In attempting

to identify and understand the forces which
contribute to the bureaucra-

tization process, we have also generated

a

set of structural components

which point to specific areas of critical "early choices"
for alternative institutions.
(1)

Formal

These components fall into three general categories:

structures of work and decision-making consistent with

con sensual /democratic ideals.

The need for formalized vehicles for

sharing work and decision-making is mentioned by Holleb and Abrams
(1975) and underscored as essential by both Bernstein (1976) and Freeman

(1972/1973).

The absence of such structures creates a vacuum which in-

vites the reappearance of informal but more conventional arrangements,
the first step in the bureaucratization process.

Such formal structures

are important not only because they define primary organizational activities in a public way, but also because their formality tends to make
any alterations of decision-making or work structures
also formal) activity.

a

deliberate (and

Ranging from decision-making procedures to sche-

dules of job rotation, these arrangements are the consensual/democratic

counterparts of much of what is commonly considered to be organizational

structure in conventional organizations.
(2)

Formal structures of maintenance.

As Bernstein's

(1976) work
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makes clear, structures of shared decision-making
and work will decay if

other structural components are not also

in place.

stein points to structural components which:

particular, Bern-

In

connect participation in

work and decisions to the economic performance
of the organization; provide "management" level information and expertise
to members; insure in-

dividual political rights; and guarantee

a

fair resolution of disputes.

Recognizing the differences between alternative institutions
and demo-

cratization projects, it also became clear that alternative
institutions
may require formal structures in addition to those detailed by
Bern-

stein.

Given shared work arrangements in alternative institutions, such

as job rotation, we saw the need for formal

training structures.

And

finally, due to the high rate of member turnover in most alternative in-

stitutions, we also recognized the need for formal structures concerned
with the integration of new members into these organizations.

Formal

structures of maintenance are critical to alternative institutions because they directly address the question of how to preserve consensual/

democratic forms of organization once they have been created.
(3)

Formal structures of organizational

learning

.

Torbert's

(1974/1975) model of organizational development suggests that alternative institutions must engage in deliberate, continued reflection re-

garding their goals, norms and assumptions,

a

type of learning which

Argyris and Schbn (1978) argue is conspicuously absent in conventional

organizations.

Pressed by what an organization is doing, members of

alternative institutions can easily neglect how the organization is performing, unless this activity is formalized as an ongoing activity.

Fo-

cussing largely upon both group and organizational process and their re-
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lationship to organizational goals, these
formal components may range

from process-observer roles to formative
research or evaluation within
alternative institutions.
In essence,

these three categories outline first-order,
second-

order, and third-order varieties of formal
organizational structure

which appear

necessary to keep alternative institutions
alternative.

In the simplest terms,

the first spells out the modes of sharing
work

and decision-making; the second variety is necessary
to maintain the
first over time; and the third provides the means of
examining the ef-

fectiveness of the first two as well as itself.

possible that other categories may need

to be

While it is obviously

considered at

a

later

point, and that even these three may need some reordering, we nevertheless are provided with a more concrete basis for considering both the

problem of bureaucratization within alternative institutions and attempts to counter it.

The organizations examined by Holleb and Abrams

(1975), for example, initially lacked formal structural components in
all

three categories.

The onset of bureaucratization was marked by

a

growing reliance upon conventional structures of work and decision-making, the absence of maintenance structures and also by

awareness (or admission) that anything was amiss.

a

general lack of

The organizations

which recovered from bureaucratization moved in the direction of consensual democracy

,

a

stage of development which was characterized by

formal structures of work and decision-making, an emphasis upon mainten-

ance structures, and some concern for organizational learning.
Thus the three categories of structural components not only point
to areas of "early choices" for alternative institutions, but also rep-
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resent

a

paraphrasing of Holleb and Abrams'
cojisensual democracx stage

in more structural

terms.

In this way these three categories
frame both

an "ideal" for alternative institutions
and also the means for obtaining
it.

The important question at this point,
however, centers around the

question of creating

a

method of action-research which incorporates
this

larger analytic structure in examining the central
problem of bureaucratization in alternative institutions.

CHAPTER

VI

METHOD

Consideration both of the shortcomings of
previous research and of

action-research strategies in previous chapters
provides us with general
guidelines for conceptualizing how research concerned
with bureaucratization in alternative institutions should proceed.

The research should

be consistent with and directed at intervention
activity which produces

three levels of knowledge:
tions generally;

(1

)

knowledge regarding alternative institu-

(2) knowledge internal

to the organizations participat-

ing within the research; and (3) knowledge for the interventionist.

In

addition, the research should be comparative, descriptive and
analytic.

The research relationship should be

a

collaborative one, in that the re-

sources of the interventionist and the participating organizations
should be brought together in ways that ensure mutual control and benefit throughout the research process.

And lastly, the method of research

itself should emerge from the organizational phenomena under consideration rather than being applied to them.

further elaborate

a

The task of this chapter is to

method research which is consistent with these pre-

scriptions, but which also weds them to

a

logical system of inquiry.

The first step, however, is to examine some of the unique constraints

which affect research directed at intervention activity within organizations.
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Jhe Inte r yen ti on i s t/ Researcher Dijemma
For the interventionist concerned with
developing

more systematic

a

understanding of both bureaucratization in
alternative institutions and
its contributing factors, conventional
models of organizational

are problematic for

a

number of reasons.

research

First of all, these models

commonly presume that the research problem itself
is well-defined:

.the researcher is bound to start out with a set
of
precisely pre-formul ated hypotheses. He then specifies
the
variables he plans to measure:
independent, dependent and
moderating.
He develops measures of these variables and carries out statistical analyses of the relationships found.
He
concludes with statements regarding the confirmation or rejection of particular hypotheses.
.(Whyte, 1976, p. 50).
.

.

.

As Whyte

(1976) points out,

this model

is appropriate only

Where the researcher is on familiar territory, where the
variables are readily measurable, and where the variables one
can measure are also important.
.(Whyte, 1976, p. 50).
.

Given the current state of our knowledge regarding bureaucratization in

alternative institutions, this research model is unsuitable largely because we are unable to specify "important" variables in the first place.

Although the degree of bureaucratization in an alternative institution
can be viewed as a major dependent variable, at this point we have only
the broad outlines of the categories of other variables that may affect
it.

While conventional modes of social research often overlook the pro-

cess by which independent and moderating variables are initially con-

ceived (Knight, 1976), research which is concerned with organizational

intervention cannot afford such an oversight (Podgorecki

,

1975).

From
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an interventionist perspective the only
real

"tests" of the potency of

factors which contribute to or inhibit the
course of bureaucratization
are interventions which are predicated upon
these factors (Argyris,
1970; Levinson, 1972).

In these

the stakes are quite high.

"real

life" interventions, of course,

The well-being of an organization and the

individuals within it, as well as the credibility of
the interventionist, all

rest upon the adequacy of the factors considered
within the

tervention.

in.

Consequently, the selection of critical variables for both

understanding and changing organizations constitutes an element of
research whose importance cannot be overlooked.

Secondly, the actual conduct of conventional organizational re-

search often mitigates against its useful application.

As

pointed out

at some length in previous chapters, research directed at intervention

must be able to identify parameters of

a

problem which are amenable to

alteration by the members of an organization.
straints, as well.
ciulous

But there are other con-

To use an extreme example, we might consider a meti

longitudinal study of alternative institutions which takes ten

years to complete.

Although this research may generate

a

host of valid

answers to the problem of bureaucratization, many of the organizations
for which the research was intended may either have disappeared or

changed drastically by the time the research results are eventually
available.

The tension between conventional research methods and the

demands for workable answers to organizational difficulties also plays

itself out in another related way:

The technology of rigorous research works best when it
does not deal with real-time issues -- for example, when
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scholars take years to study a decision that
took several
hours to make.
This technology of rigorous research is
based
upon diagnostic techniques that ignore or cannot
cope with
the properties of effective action under real-time
conditionsdata may have to be ignored, feedback from the
environment may
be unavailable, and self-fulfilling prophecies
may need to be
accepted
they may, indeed, be the essence of action (Arqvris and Schon, 1974, p. 4).

—

The demands of real-time practicality arise not only from
the in-

terventionist, but also from the client organizations who are justifiably concerned about the benefits of investing time and effort in solving organizational problems.

While in conventional research, partici-

pants are often "hired" to work for the researcher, within intervention

activity, the situation is generally reversed.

The interventionist who

also wishes to conduct ongoing research may find client organizations

placing very real limits on the amount of time members of an organization can devote to combined intervention and research efforts as a

whole, and when they can devote it.

Consequently the interventionist

can often find that his or her ability to gather information is subor-

dinated to more pressing concerns of the organization.

In addition,

the

scope of the information-gathering is frequently restricted by its perceived relevance to intervention activity.

To complicate matters even

more, the organization usually determines in large part the timing of

both intervention and research, according to expected and unexpected

fluctuations of activity within the organization itself.

ventionist is often "on call" with

a

Thus an inter-

particular organization, waiting

for the organization to either find some slack time or accord his or

her efforts

a

higher priority.

The end result, of course, is that the

accumulation of cases relevant to the interventionist's interests occurs
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much more slowly than within conventional
organizational research.
The fact that organizations often "hire"
an interventionist can
have other major consequences for research
activity as well.

bility is that this relationship leads to
tion and intent of the research itself.

a

One possi-

redefinition of the direc-

In alternative institutions,

for example, there is often interest in how and why
bureaucratization
occurs, but the real concern revolves around attempts
to inhibit or alter its course.

Fortunately, this present research effort casts the

problem in a way which is amenable to either emphasis

—

by pointing to

structural features whose absence seems to precipitate bureaucratization

and whose presence at the same time suggests corrective strategies.

Another major consequence of the interventionist/client relationship revolves around the issue of sampling.

While the conduct of con-

ventional research commonly requires the "selection of

a

proper sample",

the interventionist/researcher usually finds the sample itself doing the

selecting.

True, different types of cases can be sorted out after the

fact, but the initial

pool of organizations is largely self-defined.

Although this situation may create

a

"sample" in ways which are seen as

undesirable from the perspective of conventional research methods, it
nevertheless has certain benefits for research aimed at improving intervention.

Since it is usually the organization that contacts the inter-

ventionist, there is generally some reassurance that its members acknowledge the need for self-examination.

In this way, certain research ef-

forts can become a recognized and justifiable part of the solicited in-

tervention activity.

From the interventionist's perspective, the self-

selection of organizations can in fact create

a

viable sample.

In

the
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case of alternative institutions, for
instance, the sample may not be

characteristic of all alternative institutions,
but is probably representative of those alternative institutions
which are concerned enough

about the state and direction of their
assistance.

"al ternati veness"

to seek outside

For the interventionist who works with
alternative institu-

tions, of course, this is precisely the
population of concern

-

re-

search promises to benefit both the interventionist
and the organizations in question by improving the quality of the
intervention activity.

The notion of "sample" for the interventionist/researcher
has at

least one other related characteristic as well.

Until

the intervention-

ist stops intervening, the "sample" remains open-ended.

The research

which accompanies intervention by necessity must be able to guide future
intervention activity, but at the same time remain open to constant ad-

justment and refinement as new cases emerge and old cases become clearer.

Due to the amount of time and energy required by intervention ac-

tivity, cases accumulate slowly; and furthermore, the time-lag between

intervention itself and the point at which its effectiveness can be

evaluated creates
clusions.

In

a

climate of tentati veness regarding results and con-

this sense,

the research activity which accompanies inter-

vention is always formative in nature -- the seminal study based upon

intervention research is virtually an impossibility.
sonable to set arbitrary bounds on

a

While it is rea-

given number of cases in order to

come to preliminary conclusions, it is essential that the research

method which is coupled to intervention activity also provides

a

sys-

tematic basis for including new cases in the future.
As we can see, research combined with intervention is subject to a
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number of constraints and concerns which
are not generally considered

within conventional social research.

While practicality in terms of

time and money stand as familiar research
restrictions, we find that the

word takes on additional meanings when research
is fused directly to action.

All

these considerations, far from making systematic
inquiry im-

possible, suggest the shape of

a

particularly appropriate research

method.

Diagnosis as Research

In order to develop a better understanding of both
bureaucratiza-

tion in alternative institutions, its contributing factors and possible

remedies, an appropriate approach at this point is one of diagnosis rather than research £er se.

Kwasniewki

(1976) refers to diagnosis as:

methodology of purposeful procedure.
.diagnosis
in its broad sense should consist not so much in explaining
the total causes of an existing state of affairs as in accurately establishing the social, psycho-social and institutional
mechanisms which produce in a given social system phenomena or
processes desirable in respect of the axilology [values and
axioms] of planned change.
It should be accepted.
.that the
substantiation of hypotheses regarding the propriety and effectiveness of the means of realization (manipulative independent variables) of planned change (dependent variables) should
be based chiefly on the generalized findings of diagnostic research and not on theoretical knowledge (Kwasniewski
1976, p.
.

.

.a

.

.

,

24).

The major advantage of diagnosis over most conventional research

strategies is that it is both consistent with and necessary for effective intervention activity.

identify

a

While conventional research models may

particular set of variables which seem to affect organiza-
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Metal life, they at the same time

fail

to provide a coherent
basis for

knowing whether or not this set
of variables is relevant to
the situation of a single organization.
A diagnostic strategy, on
the other
hand, itself models a procedure
for evaluating its own
appropriateness
in any particular organizational
setting.
Put another way, we might say
that a diagnostic approach begs to
have its results revised by the
same
method which originally produced them.

Such an approach not only pro-

mises to result in the accumulation
of general

information relevant to

alternative institutions, but also encourages
the re-examination of that
information with each new particular case.

Given the fluidity of orga-

nizational phenomena over time, the resulting
flexibility is both useful

and necessary.

lacks

Holleb and Abrams'

(1975) research, for example,

this flexibility; it makes a statement regarding
the organiza-

tional development of alternative institutions,
but lacks any clear

route, other than disconfi rmation

choices" for these organizations.

,

for including possible "earlier

What

a

strategy of diagnosis allows,

then, is not a "test" of the Holleb and Abrams' model,
but rather a

means to improving and elaborating it.

Let us turn now to

a

more spe-

cific discussion of method based upon diagnostic strategy.

Method Overvi ew

The central

feature of the diagnostic strategy employed in this re-

search is that it is built upon the diagnosis of individual organizations which then become an accumulated set of single cases amenable to

comparison

(Seashore, 1976).

single organization.

The basic unit of analysis, then, is the

The first step in diagnosis is to assess the cur-
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rent state of the individual
organization by means of generalized
stages
derived from the Holleb and Abrams
model.
The second step requires the

reconstruction of the organization's
structural development over time

in

terms of the three categories of
organi zational structure spelled out
in
the previous chapter:

1.

^.
3.

As a

Formal structures of
tion consistent with
Formal structures of
Formal structures of

work, decision-making, and coordinaconsensual/democratic idealsmaintenance; and
organizational learning.

third step, the structural development of
the organization is com-

pared with that of the Holleb and Abrams

model.

Their model, in es-

sence, maintains that essentially no formal
organizational structure

consistent with consensual/democratic ideals appears until
after the
formal differentiation stage, if at all.

As pointed out in previous

chapters, we have clear hints that contemporary alternative
institutions
could now lie in one of two classes:

(1)

those which follow the stages

of Holleb and Abrams' model with regard to bureaucratization

—

"first

wave" alternative institutions; and (2) those which do not follow their
model

due to earlier structural attempts to move toward consensual demo-

cracy prior to formal differentiation -- "second wave" alternative institutions.

Of the organizations which fall into this second class, we

should assume that some have been able to inhibit if not avoid the

bureaucratization process, while others have failed
tempts to move towards consensual

democracy

.

in

their early at-

Put in these terms, we see

that there are three possible categories of alternative institutions
relative to the Holleb and Abrams

model:
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Type

1.

Organizations which have followed
the Holleb and
Abrams' model of development.
These
have no formal consensual /democratic organizations
structure unless
88
haV fl all y reaChed the consensual
?h
H
stage
The decision
to move in~ThT~d^ctJcF^TTondejnpcracy_
figsual
occurs during the formal differed

Sp

-

de^^'

-

Ration stage.

-

Type 2:

Organizations which do not fol low the
Hoi leb and
Abrams model because of earlier
structural attempts
to move toward consensual
democracy but still evidence a degree of bureaucratization.

Type

Organizations which do not follow the Holleb
and
Abrams model because of early structure
attempts to
move toward consensual democracy and
which have been
relatively successful at either inhibiting
or avoiding bureaucratization.

3:

While the actual sorting of alternative
organizations by their developmental histories may not be as neat

a

task as the classification system

might imply, this tripartite division of organizations
allows for the

development of

a

logical basis for asking questions of comparison
re-

garding the organizations which fall in different
categories.
Initially, we are concerned in
structural
3

—

a

general way with the question of

features which separate Type

"first wave" from "second wave."

1

organizations from Types

2

and

That the development of organiza-

tions in these latter two categories initially diverges from the stages

outlined in the Holleb and Abrams

model

is significant.

We are drawn

to ask what these divergencies were and why they emerged in the first

place.

In essence, we are

identifying the "earlier choices" made by

some alternative institutions, even though some of these "choices" may

not have been successful.
And secondly, we need to contrast Type
in order to examine the structural

2

and Type

3

organizations

differences between alternative in-
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stitutions that were successful in their
attempt to make "earlier
choices" (and avoid bureaucratization),
and those that were not.

Such

a

comparison, when combined with the analytic
framework articulated in the
previous chapter, should begin to reveal
effective and ineffective ways
to move towards wnsjnsual democracy,
early in the development of alternative institutions.

Before we move to

a

more detailed description of

method, however, we need to also review very
briefly the nature of the

research relationship which accompanies the
diagnostic strategy.

Research Relationship

The research relationship in this study was
developed in

a

way con-

sistent with actual intervention activity, an approach
appropriate for
a

number of reasons.

First of all

,

one objective was to go about the

research with alternative institutions in

a

way which lent itself to

replication and refinement under conditions of intervention activity.
Secondly, this approach grew out of the recognition that the research

itself would represent intervention in

a

literal sense.

Gathering in-

formation directly from members about an organization's inner workings
could easily spark volatile internal discussions and even alter the
course of an organization's affairs in major ways.

Thirdly, this ap-

proach was consistent with both my past and present intervention activities within alternative institutions.

part legitimized

my

These past activities in large

requests for research participation, both with or-

ganizations which were past clients and even with those which were not.

And lastly, as we shall see, the specific shape of the research relationship was also appropriate because the research efforts could easily

101

develop into intervention activity solicited by the
participating organizations.

Given all

these considerations, it was essential

research relationship take

a

that the

form consistent with organizational inter-

vention right from the beginning of contact with an organization.

Specif i

c

Methods

Now that we have an overview of both the general strategy of the

research and an appreciation for the potentially delicate nature of the
research relationship, we can look more closely at the specific features

of the research method.

Participating organizations

.

Assuming that

a

set of eight alternative

institutions would be sufficient for case-study comparison,

I

approached

organizations in the local geographic area with the following three
guidelines in mind:

1.

2.
3.

that the eventual set of eight organizations would represent a variety of alternatives, not only in terms of their
organizational form (cooperatives, collectives, etc.), but
also according to the types of goods, services, or distribution which constituted their major activity;
that the organizations had been in operation for a minimum
of two years; and
that the organizations could reach agreement regarding research participation by means of their normal decisionmaking procedures, whatever form that took.

In all

but one case, initial contact with the organizations led

eventually to

a

meeting of myself and organizational members or their

representatives at which

I

briefly outlined the central research problem

-- keeping alternative institutions alternative

thods, time commitment, and overall time-frame.

—

and the research me-

If meeting members in-
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dicated an interest in research
participation,
lowing contract, emphasizing that
si on

then presented the fol-

did not need or expect

a

final deci-

at the meeting itself:

1.

I.

3.

4.

5.

6.

In

I

I

That in exchange for the organization's
participation in
research, I would offer my own skills and
experience in
the area of alternative institutions
on an hour-for-hour
basis equal to member involvement in research
activitiesThat I would provide timely feedback of the
information
gathered from the participating organization
to its members if they desired it;
That the content of my half of the exchange would
be
jointly determined by the participating organization
and
myself.
(One obvious possibility was that I would work
with the organization if it decided to act on any
of the
information resulting from the research activity.);
That the research relationship could be terminated'at any
point by either party provided a formal meeting was held
for this purpose;
That I would provide a presentation of the overall results
of the study when it was completed and make a final written copy available to the organization; and
That the members of the organization would define the degrees of individual and organizational anonymity which
they felt were necessary.
'

the single case where this procedure was not followed, members de-

cided that they had gleaned enough information from our initial contact
to bring the issue to a membership meeting, indicating that they saw no

need for my presence.
Initial contracting

.

In

general, my style of approaching the or-

ganizations worked well, with one major exception -- decision-making on
their part.

In some

cases, the organizations had

a

difficult time actu-

ally making a firm decision, often taking weeks before
sion could be reached.

In

a

final

other cases, the final decision fell to

board of directors who met only once each month to discuss
agenda.

conclu-

a

a

very full

Consequently, it would often take one or two months before the
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topic could even be discussed, and
in one case, two months
more before
a

decision could be reached.

Otherwise, the formality of the
contract-

ing process seemed quite appropriate.

Two organizations turned down my

request for research participation after
my initial meetings with them.
Members of one decided against
participation ostensibly because of their
dislike of "researchers."

Later discussions with one member,
however,

revealed that this position was held only by
tial members.

In

a

small number of influen-

the second organization, a feminist
collective, mem-

bers turned down my request explicitly because

was

I

a

male.

And in

a

third organization, research was discontinued
after the first three in-

terviews, after two members aoproached me privately.

They personally

liked the idea of the research at the start, but
later felt that the in-

terviews had begun to raise issues of power and control
which might

eventually "tear their organization apart.

"

In

particular, they were

concerned that open discussion of these issues might possibly lead to
the loss of one central but controversial member whose skills were

largely irreplaceable within the organization.

I

reluctantly agreed

with their analysis, terminated our relationship, and sought out one
additional organization.

In summary,

then, ten organizations were ap-

proached initially, and two of these decided against research participation.

Later on, research efforts were discontinued

in one

of the re-

maining eight, and one additional organization was located, bringing the
final

total

to eight participating organizations.

The exchange feature

worth noting.

.

One other facet of the research contract is

The notion of an exchange between myself and the parti-

cipating organizations proved to be very valuable in terms of establish-
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ing rapport with their members.

In two cases, organizations somewhat

reluctant about participation asked that

I

fulfill my part of the bar-

gain before they fulfilled theirs, explicitly testing my
sincerity.

both cases

In

am sure that the lack of such an exchange would have turned

I

the members against research participation.

For four other organiza-

tions, my exchange occurred simultaneously with research efforts, allowing me to become more familiar with members and with the internal dynamics of their organizations.

In the remaining two organizations,

members

were openly appreciative of the exchange notion, but have yet to deter-

mine how it might best be put to use.

Data sources

.

The primary sources of information in this research were

interviews conducted with past and present members of participating or-

ganizations between July 1978 and May 1980, and materials such as organizational histories, by-laws, articles of incorporation, policy

statements, job descriptions and other pertinent documents.

Three to

nine persons were interviewed in each organization, largely depending
upon organizational

size and to

ing relevant information.

a

lesser degree, the success in obtain-

Within any single organization, the effort

was made to interview individuals from a range of organizational roles

and membership categories who also represented differing degrees of

familiarity with the organization (old members, new members, etc.).
The interviews themselves were open-ended, lasting from one to two

hours in length.

The interview format began with a clarification of my

own role and a brief restatement of the research problem and my interest
in it.

Initial questions focussed on the person's present role within

105

the organization and his or her
opinions regarding its current
state of
affairs
what seems to be working andwhat needs
improvement or change.
Following a focus on the present, the
interviews then moved to questions

~

about the person's past involvement
within the organization, knowledge
of goals and history and significant
changes in either over tire, and

organizational successes and failures.

Throughout the interview the at-

tempt was made to ask specifically about various
structural features of
the organization, when they were instituted
or dropped and why, and the

apparent consequences that ensued.
views,

I

After the first two or three inter-

decided to conclude each interview by showing the
person

of the Holleb and Abrams'

a

copy

stages and asking what stage best typified the

organization at present, and then, what other stages seemed
to describe
the organization in the past.

Secondary sources of information often included direct observation
of organizational activities, and personal notes generated during my
own

past membership or during consulting experiences.

Data presentation and diagnosis

organization was compiled into

.

a

The information collected from each

summary along with the appropriate

analysis according to the following case study format:

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

8.

9.
10.

11.

organizational name,
background information,
current organizational practices,
membership,
informal structure,
additional notes,
research relationship,
interviews,
other sources of information,
current developmental state,
structural history, and
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categorization (Type

12.

1,

or 3).

2,

Taken all together, the eight case
studies based on this format comprise
the basic data of research.

Each case study not only describes the
or-

ganization in detail, but also diagnoses its
current developmental state
by employing a generalized version of
the Holleb and Abrams' stages.

Then, after a detailed organizational history
which highlights structural

changes, the last item

tion as

a

Type

1

,

2,

of the case study categorizes the organiza-

or 3 alternative institution.

Determining current developmental state.
terminology to the Holleb and Abrams
model

1

By applying a more general

model, we found that their stage

can be easily extended to organizations beyond those in the
social

services.

From Tables

1,

2,

3,

4,

and

5

we can see that the item-by-

item effects of this change in terminology are generally minimal.

In

essence, the term "staff" is changed to "member" in several places, and
terms like "clinical" and "services" are altered where appropriate.

In

Table 5, however, there is one small but significant change in one of
the "Characteristics" items of the consensual democracy stage.

In

Chap-

ter III, it was argued that the item reading "administrative and main-

tenance work shared by all staff" should be broadened

to

include situa-

tions in which persons performing "management" functions were performed
by hired or elected by organizational members or their formal

tatives.

represen-

Consequently, this added possibility is included in the "gen-

eralized version" of consensual democracy
leb and Abrams

1

.

In

condensed form, the Hol-

stages now look like the following:
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TABLE

1

ITEM CHANGES FOR CONSENSUAL ANARCHY STAGE

Holleb and Abrams version

Generalized version

Characteristics:
1

--

fluid membership and minimal entrance
requirements

2

--

undifferentiated tasks (everyone does
everything)

3

--

highly ideological

4

-- response to crises rather than

planning
high energy

5

Leadership:
6

_

-- small

group or single charismatic

leader
7

--

8 --

consensual decision-making with no
formal procedures

emphasis on individual autonomy

Rewards:

commitment to ideals

9

10 -- social

contact

11

--

personal

growth

12

--

autonomy

in

work

Problems and pressures:
13 -14

«

15 -16

--

17

—

18 --

little or no money

decision-making procedures unclear
power struggles

membership unclear; potential
members continually unsure
whether they are in or out
inconsistent delivery of services

inconsistent delivery of services,
production of goods

important work does not get done
because tasks are too loosely
delegated

19 -- sloppy public relations

20

--

high staff turnover

high member turnover

:

:
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TABLE

2

ITEM CHANGES FOR INFORMAL DIFFERENTIATION
STAGE

Holleb and Abrams version

Generalized version

Characteristics
1

--

de-emphasis of ideology

2

--

informal division of labor; first
job description

3

-- continued fluid

informal

membership but
boundaries tighten

4

--

membership based on friendship or
"good vibes"

b

--

organization in period of rapid
expansion and implementation of
services

\

organization in period of rapid
expansion/impl ernentation

Leadership:
6

--

formation of the core group

7

--

day-to-day decisions made by core
group with major decisions left
to entire membership

8 -- lack of formal

decision-making

procedures
Rewards
9

--

increasing effectiveness and
competence as helpers (learning
through skil
sharing)
1

increasing effectiveness and
competence (learning through
ski 1 1 -sharing)

10 -- sense of family in core group
11

--

autonomy in work

12

--

personal growth

Problems and pressures:
13 --

power struggles between core
group and other staff; jockeying for status and influence

14 -- core group feels responsibility
but none of the power
15

non-core staff feels left out of
important decisions

non-core members feel left out
of important decisions

-- organizational

rules and regulations
apparent but not formally recognized
or written down
-17
outside agencies, especially funders,
demand tigheter bookkeeping and
internal accountabi 1 i ty
16

services demand
more consistent services

18 -- clients and referral

clientele/customers demand more
consistent services

:

:
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TABLE

3

ITEM CHANGES FOR FORMAL DIFFERENTIATION
STAGE

Holleb and Abrams version

General ized version

Characteristics
--

creation of administrative hierarchies

2

--

staff positions filled by "qualified
outsiders"

3

«

4

—

1

administrative and clinical staff
differentiated
volunteer and client status and power
dimi ni shed

new member positions filled by
"qual ified outsiders"

administrative members differentiated
from production/service members
volunteer or customer status and
power dimini shed

5

--

energy directed toward service rather
than organizational experimentation

energy directed toward service/
production rather than organizational
experimentation

6

--

lower staff turnovers-

lower member turnover

Leadership:
7

.

-- program leadership formalized in core

group or one or two administrators
8

—

more efficient decision-making
procedures

Rewards
9

--

career training

10 -- more clearly delineated power relations
11

—

more clearly defined work

12

--

more recognition from outside world

Problems and pressures:
loss of iedological

13
14

--

15

«

16

--

purity

loss of family

breakdown of interpersonal and
intergroup communications

decreasing autonomy

in

work

:

:

:

no
TABLE

4

ITEM CHANGES FOR BUREAUCRACY STAGE

Holleb and Abrams version

Generalized version

Characteri sties
1

staff responsibilities and power
clearly defined

2

differential salaries

3

—

4

-- jobs filled by professionals
and

employee responsibilities and
power clearly defined

minimal involvement by volunteers

highly trained non-professionals
5

-- hiring and firing done by

administrators
Leadershi

p

6

--

administrators become Unquestioned
leaders and decision-makers on all
programmatic, financial and public
relations issues

7

--

individual staff members exercise
autonomy only in their specific job
areas and are carefully monitored
by supervisors

individual employees exercise autonomy
only in their specific job areas and are
carefully monitored by supervisors

Rewards
8

-- job security

9

--

10

^

competitive salary

--recognition from outside world

Problems and pressures:
11

-- decreasing autonomy in work

12 --

loss of personal commitment to job

13 --

formalization of relationships

14 -- staff excluded

from organizational

deci sion-making
15 -- competitive pressures from other

social

service agencies

employees excluded from organizational
decision-making

competitive pressures from conventional
organizations

:

:

m
TABLE

5

ITEM CHANGES FOR CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY
STAGE

Holleb and Abrams version

Generalized versi on

Characteristics
1

2

—
-

return to consensual

forms

constitutional democracy with clear
rules and procedures

clearly defined boundaries and
entrance requirements
structures for sharing work and
feel ings
5

--

6

administrative and maintenance work
by all staff

administrative and maintenance work
shared by all or by election/hiring

work contracts for staff

explicit contracts for members

Leadershi
7

--

p

leadership informal, shifting and
shared
v

8 -- subgroups, program components given
wide latitude in decision-making
9

--

representative groups employed for
overall program planning
all major decisions referred to
total staff

10

all major decisions referred to total
membershi p

^

Rewards:
11

--

autonomy

12

--

involvement in planning and
deci sion-making

13 -- community and support

increasing effectiveness and
competence

14

Problems and Pressures:
15 --

low salaries

16

decision-making slow and cumbersome

17

difficulty

in

hiring and firing

18 -- loss of clinical

time doing

administrative work

difficulty in accepting and removing
members
loss of directly productive time doing
admini strati ve work

19 -- difficulty in obtaining funding

20

21

—

licensing laws and other threats from
professional establ i shment

licensing laws and other threats from
con vent i onal establ i shment

limitations in scope of services and
target population

limitations in scope of services,
products or customers

22 -- difficulty in getting referrals from

and tying in with established agencies

difficulty in getting referrals from and
tying in with conventional organizations
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1.

2.

Within consensual anarchy, we find no managers,
only members.
Decision-making is consensual, but lacks formal
procedures.
Labor is undifferentiated, in that everyone
within the organization performs all the organizational
tasks at one time or another.
Bureaucratization begins with informal differentiation
where a core group of informal managers forms without
official recognition.
Day-to-day decisions are made by the
core group, and major policy decisions are still left to
the entire membership, although there are no formal decision-making procedures. At this stage there is informal
division of labor and usually the appearance of the first
job description.
This division of labor occurs initially
between members who perform "management" functions and
those who produce goods or services.
Individuals performing in managerial roles are sometimes given increased financial compensation.
Within formal differentiation, managers are officially recognized as such.
They not only hold legitimate responsibility for day-to-day operations, but also exert considerable
influence in broader policy issues as well.
Decisionmaking procedures become somewhat formalized, but in ways
that clearly reduce employee power and influence.
In both
decision-making and work, there is a recognized separation
of manager and member roles, resulting in the first appearance of explicit managerial hierarchies. Managerial "positions" emerge, and are often filled by "qualified outsiders."
Within bureaucracy managers are unquestioned in both dayto-day operations and overall policy.
Decision-making formally excludes employees or is limited to their minor involvement.
Division of labor is clear and distinct, with
managerial responsibilities formally separated from work
performed by members (who at this point have been fully
transformed into employees). This division of labor is
emphasized by differential salaries, not only between
managers and "employees," but also within the well-defined
managerial hierarchy.
Consensual democracy is marked by formal member control of
policy-making which may extend to the organization's dayDecision-making is consensual,
to-day operations as well.
but with formal rules and procedures (a constitutional
All major decisions are left to the entire
democracy).
"Management" work (administration, coordinamembership.
tion, etc.) is either shared by all members, or is the responsibility of one or more members who are formally hired
Division of labor is otheror elected by the membership.
wise minimized by means of clear structures for sharing
work such as job rotation.
,

3.

4.

5.

,

m
In order to evaluate the current developmental

state of an organi-

zation, the descriptive material in each case was
examined in light of
the generalized versions of the Holleb and Abrams'
stages, on an item-

by-item basis.

While no organization was characterized by alj_ the items

in a single stage, it was possible in six of the cases
to assign them to

one stage, explaining discrepancies in some detail.

In

two of the

cases, however, the organizations evidenced features of two stages si-

multaneously, although the direction of development was clear for both.
Special considerations.

In

the process of evaluating organizations

on an item-by-item basis according to the Holleb and Abrams

few minor inadequacies of their model became apparent.

1

stages,

a

First of all,

the language of some of the items is slightly awkward, in that it implies

a

change from

a

previous stage (e.g., "formation of the core

group", "return to consensual

organizational state.

form," etc.), in addition to a particular

For the sake of simplicity, most of these over-

tones were ignored in the item-by-item analysis, unless the implications

were strictly incorrect.

Secondly,

a

few of the items listed in the

various stages were clearly less important features than others.

For

example, items dealing with member autonomy and member competence appear
in both the informal

di

fferentiation and consensual democracy stages.

Since these items and occasional others were poor discriminators and

since they usually refer to structural effects rather than structural
features, such items were often referred to as "minor features" of
given stage.

a

Conversely, other items (e.g., "constitutional democracy",

"explicit contracts for members", etc.) were considered "major features"

of

a

given stage, since they referred to clearly discriminating charac-
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teristics; consequently, they are frequently labelled that way in the
case studies.

features" of

And finally, there were also instances where the "major
a

stage were absent, due to unique organizational circum-

stances, but an organization was nevertheless typical of the particular
stage.

cance

,

Whenever any of these discrepancies took on special signifihowever, they were explained in detail within the case studies.

Categorizing organizations

In sorting organizations into the final

.

three categories -- Type 1, Type 2, or Type
tions were used.

3

--

two basic discrimina-

As pointed out previously, the first discrimination

occurs between Type

1

and Types

2

and 3:

organizations which appeared

to develop along the lines of the Holleb and Abrams'

those which did not.

scenario versus

The basic difference, of course, is that "first

wave" organizations in the Holleb and Abrams
move towards consensual

1

scenario did not begin to

democracy until they reached

a

choice point in

the formal differentiation stage, while "second wave" organizations move
in this direction from an earlier developmental

stage.

In categorizing

the case study organizations, the criterion of formal consensual/demo-

cratic structure prior to the formal differentiation stage was used initially to separate Type
too vague.
a

1

from Type

It was possible,

2

and

3

organizations, but proved

for instance, for an organization to have

formalized job rotation system early in their development, but still

not be clearly member-controlled.
was devised:

Type

2

Instead, then, a stricter criterion

or Type 3 organizations were required to have clear

evidence of actions or procedures prior to formal differentiation which

represented formal attempts on the part of members to exercise final
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authority within the organization.
The criterion for separating Type

2

from Type

proved much more difficult to define, however.

3

organizations

In essence,

this dis-

crimination attempted to separate the less successful
from the more successful

"second wave" alternative institutions.

Although in most of the

cases the consequences of early attempts at formal
consensual/democratic

structures were evident from the structural histories,

discrimination can only be stated in general terms.

a

principle of

"More successful,"

Type 3 organizations were defined as those which showed
continuing evidence of moving in the direction of consensual democracy.
tural

As the struc-

histories show, however, some of this judgment is based on progno-

sis as well as diagnosis.

"Less successful," Type

2

organizations, on

the other hand, were then defined as those which demonstrated continuing

evidence of

not_

moving in the direction of consensual democr acy --al-

ternative institutions still caught in the bureaucratization process for
one reason or another.

From these basic definitions, then, it is clear

that "success" was defined in organizational rather than financial
terms.

While it was obvious that

success was

a

a

certain minimal level of financial

requirement for the continuation of an organization, be-

yond this point financial success and organizational success were assumed to be relatively independent of one another.

Comparative analysis

.

The different "types" of alternative institutions

were then subjected to comparisons based upon their structural features.

Of general interest were the differences between Type
3

1

and Types

2

organizations -- the instances of early formal structure which set

and
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"second wave" organizations apart from
their "first wave" counterparts.

Of particular interest, however, was
the comparison of Type
3

2

and Type

alternative institutions, trying to tease
out the reasons for relative

success of Type 3 organizations in moving
toward consensual democracy.
In these comparisons,

ly,

two types of factors were considered:

essential-

the analysis of earlier chapters suggested
that three different

categories of structural components are necessary
to keep alternative
institutions alternative.

Prior to the collection of data, examples of

each type of formal structure were defined, with the
expectation that
more specific instances of formal structures would
emerge from the research

:

1
.

Formal structures of work, decision-making and coordination consistent with consensual/democratic i deaTIT

— formal

written procedures, policies and guidelines
--schedules of work, explicit job rotation systems
--by-laws which specify decision-making procedures, representation schemes, length of terms, etc.
—written job descriptions, functional descriptions of
work groups, etc.
--formal "management" (administration, coordination) positions filled by persons through election or member-controlled hiring
2

.

Formal

structures of maintenance

.

--deliberate and regular mechanisms for providing members
with information regarding the economic performance of
the organization (reports, scheduled meetings, etc.)
--communication structures which provide members with
"management"- level information and expertise (newsletters, inservice skill training for members, etc.)
--clear formal statements of the rights, duties and obligations of membership (in by-laws, contracts, public
statements, etc.)
--formal mechanisms for resolving disputes within the organization (a judiciary, special meetings, etc.)
--regular orientation and training program for new members
--trial periods for new members
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--clear statements of membership boundaries
.

Formal

structures of organizational learning

.

—presence of legitimized process roles
--written task and process goals
--procedures by which goals are reviewed
—presence of ongoing research or evaluation activities
within the organization
—deliberate and specific attempts of the orqanization
to
compare itself with other similar organizations
—specific, regular meetings set aside for reflective consideration of the state and direction of the oraanization (retreats, workshops, etc.)
--formal use of external critics
--existence of study groups within the organization explicitly concerned with organizational self-analysis

Comparisons of Type
general

2

and Type

3

organizations were based upon these

categories of structural components, and also upon secondary

features of the organizations which emerged during the course of research.

CHAPTER

VII

RESULTS

Introduction

A few comments are necessary prior to the actual presentation
of
the eight case studies.

First of all, the cases are presented in no

particular order other than that which will hopefully maintain the
reader's interest.

Secondly, the level of detail varies somewhat from

case to case, largely depending upon the "al ternati veness" of the
or-

ganizations.

In cases

where the particular arrangements of an organiza-

tion might be generally uncommon or unknown, extra effort was taken to

explain them at some length.

In addition,

cases in which the process of

bureaucratization was particularly evident were often expanded in order
to elaborate upon crucial

volved.

turning points and the specific dynamics in-

In the third place,

the reader should be warned to pay special

attention to the definition of "membership" in each case, since the use

of the term varies somewhat from case to case.

Fourth, two literary

devices were applied throughout the eight cases in order to give the

reader the best sense of each organization and its past.

The cases are

described in temporal terms, eliminating the feeling of timelessness

which is often typical of case studies.

This device allows the reader

to place the development of these eight organizations within the chang-

ing cultural and political context of the last decade.

In addition,

brief quotes and phrases drawn from the interviews are periodically
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inserted within the cases in order to provide

a

sense of how members

perceive the internal dynamics and events in their organizations.
Fifth, several

non-essential features of each case study were delib-

erately altered in order to assure

organizations.

a

degree of anonymity for the sample

In particular, the pseudonyms assigned to the organiza-

tions bear little relation to their actual names.

And finally, the

case studies are accompanied by "structural history" tables which re-

quire

a

brief explanation.

In these tables,

a

approximate date at which an event occurred or
began.

(

a

particular activity

If the event or activity continued beyond the words that de-

scribe it in the table, this continuation
line

cross (+) marks the

).

indicated with

a

dashed

If the continuation was irregular or partial,

a

less

frequently dashed line

is

used (-

—

-).

is

With these comments in mind,

we can now examine each of the eight sample organizations in detail.

The Case Studies

Grocery Collective

.

Staffed by students at

a New

England college, the

Grocery Collective (GC) operates a small store which is dedicated to

providing high quality food items at the lowest possible cost.

The

$200,000-per-year business currently employs 22 part-time members
throughout the two semesters of the school year.

During the summer,

when the local student population diminishes considerably, GC reduces
its store hours and operates with a skeleton staff of only five or six

members.

At present, members are required to work a minimum of ten

hours each week, and earn slightly above minimum wage.

In order to keep

by offercosts low, GC also encourages volunteers to donate their time
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ing them a discount on their purchases at
the store.

Due to its status

as a student organization, GC is able
to obtain space for its store on
a

rent-free basis, an important financial feature
which is reflected in

its extremely low food prices.

Current organizational practices
eral categories:

(1)

.

Work at GC falls into three gen-

"floor work" consisting of receiving shipments,

restocking, cleaning and cashiering; (2) ordering from vendors,
which
also includes inventory; and (3) "clerk work," which refers to

a

number

of specific financial tasks which include bookkeeping, handling the payroll, and making deposits of daily receipts.

"Floor work" is informally

divided between those members who are scheduled for two-hour shifts

throughout the workweek.

The actual number of members allotted to

a

particular shift can vary from two up to six, depending upon the time
of day and patterns of customer traffic.

Ordering is assigned to indi-

vidual members on a one-member/one-wholesaler basis.
a

In

this fashion,

specific individual is held responsible for maintaining the stock of

each wholesaler.

"Clerk work" is assigned to five willing individuals

elected at the beginning of each semester:

two bookkeepers; one person

responsible for payroll matters; and two members who make deposits of
the daily receipts.

The five members who perform these financial tasks

do so in addition to ten hours of required "floor work," although they

are paid the same hourly rate for their extra tasks.

The intended pur-

pose of this arrangement is to prevent the clerks from becoming "traditional managers."

By keeping these individuals involved in the day-to-

day work of the store, the theory goes, they will be prevented from de-

veloping

a

"managerial" mentality, even though they perform administra-
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tive tasks.

Due to these requirements, however,
the clerks usually

spend two to three times as many hours as
other members at the store.
At the urging of

work on

a

a

college official, several members recently
began

procedural manual for GC which clearly outlines
the financial

tasks of the five clerks as well as other areas
of GC operations.

Al-

though the clerks' duties are defined by very minimal
job descriptions

currently no written procedures describe either the
work of clerks or

other members.
Once each week, GC holds

a

meeting of the entire membership for the

purposes of information-sharing, problem-solving, and coordination
of

scheduling of member work shifts.

Decision-making is by informal con-

sensus, but occasionally switches to majority rule, particularly with

volatile issues; no recognized procedures exist for this transition,
however.
agenda,
GC has

Rotated meeting roles include
a

co-facilitator,

a

a

facilitator who sets the

notetaker, and occasionally,

a

timekeeper.

two standing committees, one concerned with new products, the

other responsible for consumer education, but their meetings are held
infrequently.

Other than periodic social events, GC holds no other

meetings of the entire membership.

Hiring of new members occurs at the beginning of fall semester and
to a lesser degree, at the beginning of the spring semester.

Following

past written procedures, GC publicly advertises its openings, screens

applicants, and selects its members, all in

a

one-week period.

weekend following the hiring process, new members attend
tation session and then begin work the next week.

semester all members undergo

a

a

On the

brief orien-

Once during each

simple but formal review process which
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begins with written self-evaluations.

These self-evaluations are circu-

lated to all other members, who add written
comments if they wish.

Of

the entire membership, however, only the five
clerks have rudimentary

job descriptions.

A crude firing procedure does exist, but has
so many

pitfalls that it has been invoked once in the memory
of current members.
M embership

All

.

GC members are undergraduate students with little

or no prior experience in either food retailing or collective
workplaces.

While GC would like to maintain

a

balance between men and

women, over 80% of its applicants are women, creating
women outnumber men two to one.

world individuals, reflecting
required to work

weekly meetings.

a

a

membership where

In addition, some members are third-

progressive hiring policy.

a

Members are

minimum of ten hours per week and also to attend

Other than these two obligations, which are stated on

the hiring notices, there are no formal definitions of membershiD or

member contracts.

Turnover at GC is consistently high, usually falling

in the range of 65-75% annually.

Informal structure

.

At present, GC is "informally managed" by

a

core group of two of the five clerks,

a

organization's ideological grain.

interviews, one of these clerks

In

reality which runs against the

was quite open and articulate about being "trapped" into a position of

informal power as one of six members returning for

a

new school year.

Faced with incoming members who knew nothing about the most basic work
at the store, this clerk found himself immediately drawn into the position of training the newcomers and overseeing the more complex tasks.

Once this "managerial" relationship was begun with new members, however,
it seemed impossible to stop.

Confronted by problems or difficult tasks
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the new members would quickly seek out
the clerk for direction, sometimes even leaving the situation for the
clerk to resolve.

As

the cen-

trality of this member increased, so did the
criticism of other members

regarding his "acting like

a

manager."

What this situation and others

revealed is that there are several major tasks,
such as training new
members, negotiating with college officials, etc.,
that are never as-

signed as anyone's responsibility at GC.

Since the clerks spend more

time at the store than other members, their availability
during the day

places them in the position of performing these essential
tasks on

self-selected basis.

Given the taboo against "acting like

a

a

manager,"

however, clerks who perform these functions soon learn to do many of

them

in a

behind-the-scenes way.

What results is

a

situation in which

incoming clerks almost never know what essential tasks were performed by
previous clerks until they actually accept the job.

Additional notes

.

Other features of GC worth mentioning include

the following:

High member turnover at GC obviously sets the stage for
the emergence of informal managers, a situation which is further encouraged by the lack of adequate orientation and training for new members.
Quite often, those members on GC's summer skeleton staff become prime candidates for members of a
core group the following fall. Working within the small summer staff, these members develop close ties with each other,
as well as a detailed knowledge of GC's operations.
1.

Although the clerks at GC are in theory chosen by the membership at the beginning of each semester, the organization's
high turnover rate turns this selection process into a perfunctory affair. New members, who inevitably constitute the
organization's majority each fall, can never know very much
about the individuals they are selecting, or the nature of the
Consequently, even the
actual work these clerks will perform.
selection process is heavily influenced by the minority of reOnce installed, the same clerks are usually
turning members.
2.
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re-elected for the second semester,
due to the lack of time or
interest on the part of other members.

One of the specific dynamics which
encourages clerks to
become informal managers is particularly
evident at GC
Since
clerks spend much more time at the
store and unofficially perform several essential tasks and
functions, they generally
v el °P a ^nse of responsibility
for the organization not
shared kby the other members. As the
school year proceeds, and
academic pressures mount, this division
becomes even more pronounced.
Pressed by exams and papers, members periodically
fail to show up for their work shifts,
and often skip the
weekly membership meetings. Due to their
heightened sense of
responsibility, clerks are often tempted to fill
in these
gaps, performing extra floor work and making
an increasing
number of pressing decisions without the consent
of all members.
From the clerks' perspective, the only other choice
is
to leave important tasks undone and crucial
issues undecided,
both difficult options for members so invested in
the success
of the organization.
3.

Issues of power and control at GC are occasionally discussed in weekly membership meetings, usually in the form of
member criticism of clerks who are acting "too much like
managers." While these sessions have resulted in periodic
modifications of the clerk roles, members usually conclude
that in the final analysis, the conflict between worker and
student roles at GC stands as the major source of continuing
organizational difficulties.
4.

With the exception of a few senior individuals, it appears
that most GC members have only weak process skills.
In years
past, a "process-person" role was rotated among members at
weekly meetings, but the innovation faded quickly. None of
the current members interviewed knew what this role consisted
of, or what its function was.
5.

With the exception of the hiring procedure, few written
records exist at GC, obscuring past practices and minimizing
continuity from one year to the next.
Last year for example,
an outgoing bookkeeper never communicated to the new bookkeeper that GC had a deficit of $3,000, a fact that remained
undiscovered for almost a year.
In a similar fashion, members
recently began work on a procedural manual for GC, not realizing that one had already been developed four years previously.
6.

Current members at GC, especially new members, are quite
vocal in their opposition to "too much structure" within their
organization.
"Structure," as they see it, typifies the colPast
lege bureaucracy which engulfs their lives as students.
members, on the other hand, particularly past informal mana7.
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gers, usually take a pro-structure position,
indicating that
they now think that the presence of more
formality at GC would
have probably prevented them from "burning
out."
From their
perspective, the lack of structure at GC creates
a vacuum of
power and responsibility at the middle of the
organization
which they unwisely allowed themselves to enter.

Research relationship

participation.

In

Members of GC willingly agreed to research

.

exchange for their involvement,

I

assisted several

members in the development of more formal recruitment and
hiring procedures in the summer of 1979.

Previously, GC had employed

a

very general

hiring notice which highlighted the part-time income earned by members.
Usually 500 applicants would respond, making the screening and interview process

a

week-long nightmare.

In

essence, the hiring notice was

made more explicit, listing member responsibilities as well as benefits,

and

a

set of prioritized hiring criteria was established.

The refined

hiring notice was first used in the fall of 1979, and reduced applications by a factor of six.
pool,

With this large reduction of the applicant

the entire hiring process went much more smoothly, allowing GC to

be much more careful

about the members they finally selected.

In addi-

tion, the incoming members had more realistic expectations regarding GC

membership, reducing short-term turnover considerably.
Intervi ews

viewed:

.

In all,

nine past and present GC members were inter-

four past members, two men and two women, all of whom had be-

come informal managers; one woman member who is currently emerging as
an informal manager; two members with about one year's experience; and
two new members.

No founding members could be located.

Other sources of information

.

Supplementary information was ob-

tained from newspaper clippings in an organizational scrapbook, hiring

.
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documents, occasional meeting records found in GC's
files, and one member'

personal journal

s

Current developmental state.
Grocery Collective
stage.

Despite some discrepancies, the

best described by the irrfonnal differentiation

is

From Table 6, we can see that of the 18 features Holleb and

Abrams use to describe this stage, 15 apply to GC.

Two of the excep-

tions fall in the areas of membership boundaries (ID-3) and membership

criteria (ID-4).

Individuals become members after

a

formal hiring pro-

cess; when members are no longer paid by GC for working hours, their

membership terminates.

In

addition, the hiring process established

criteria for evaluating applicants, thus diminishing the influence of

"friendship or 'good vibes'" in the selection of new members.
these exceptions to informal differentiation

,

however, arose as

consequence of my consultation with GC in the summer of 1979.
third exception concerns rapid expansion (CD-5).

Both of

direct

a

The

For the past three

years, GC's volume has increased steadily, but slowly -- its period of
rapid growth is long past.

One other matter deserving attention is the organization's unsuccessful attempts to prevent the emergence of informal managers.

In

brief, GC places three restraints on the five persons who perform ad-

ministrative tasks.

First, these members go through the "election" pro-

cess explained earlier.

Secondly, the designation of "clerk" is chosen

very deliberately so as to avoid connotations of "coordinating" or

"managing."

And thirdly, the clerks are required to perform their ad-

ministrative work

in

addition to the normal floor work shared by all

other members, an attempt to keep them in touch with the day-to-day work

:

:
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TABLE

6

INFORMAL DIFFERENTIATION ITEMS FOR THE GROCERY COLLECTIVE
Characteri sties
1

2

—
—

3 -

4

5

-

de-emphasis of ideology

yes

informal division of labor; first job
description

yes; basic job descriptions for
"clerks"

mal

continued fluid membership but inforboundaries tighten

no; clear boundaries determined by
hiring process

membership based on friendship or
"good vibes"

to some degree

organization in period of rapid expan

no longer

s

Leadershi

i

on/ i mp 1

erne n ta t i on

p

6

-- formation of the core group

yes, yearly

7

-- day-to-day decisions made by core
group with major decisions left to
enti re membership

yes

8 --

lack of formal decision-making procedures

yes

increasing effectiveness and competence (learning through skill-sharing)

yes

10

sense of family in core group

yes

11

autonomy in work

yes

Rewards

12 -- personal

growth

yes

Problems and pressures:
13 -- power struggles between core group
and other members; jockeying for
status and influence

yes

14 -- core group feels responsibility but

yes

none of the power
15

—

non-core members feel
important decisions

left out of

yes

16 -- organizational

yes, with the exception of the hiring
procedure

17 -- outside agencies, especially funders,

yes

rules and regulations
apparent but not formally recognized
or written down

demand tighter bookkeeping and internal accountabi i ty
1

18

—

clientele/customers demand more consistent services

yes
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of the store.

As we have seen, however, these
measures are evidently

insufficient to prevent the rise of informal
managers.

While the delib-

erate member selection of individuals performing
administrative tasks

is

typical of consensual democracy rather than
informal differentiation

we

-

can see how this process fails at GC

,

the core grouo typically emerges

from wi thin the group of five chosen clerks.

In

other words, GC members

do not choose their "managers"; in reality they
only narrow the pool of

senior members from which informal managers will emerge.
Structural history.

Due to the unavailability of any founding mem-

bers, the first two years of the Grocery Collective were
reconstructed

primarily from newspaper clippings and other documents kept
book since the founding days.

in a

scrap-

These accounts indicate that GC was ori-

ginally started by two politically active undergraduate women in February of 1973, following six months of research, planning, and bickering

with college administrators.

By establishing GC as a student organiza-

tion, they were able to obtain space for the store on

a

rent-free basis.

During the first semester of operation, it appears that the two founders were the only paid staff (see Table 7).

Designated as coordinators

in basic job descriptions, the two founders operated the store with the

aid of several regular volunteers.

Meetings were held periodically and

were open to any interested parties.

Although the store was closed for

the summer,

financial records indicate that the first semester of opera-

tions was

success.

a

With the aid of

a

loan from the college's student

association, GC added equipment necessary to expand the line of food
items and remodeled the store over the summer.

After

a

whole summer of

planning, the two coordinators were able to hire several of the previous

<1

<

—

I
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year's volunteers on

a

part-time basis when the store re-opened
in Sep-

tember of 1973.

Throughout the 1973-74 and 1974-75 academic years,
both the volume
of business and the number of members grew rapidly,
even though the

store remained closed throughout the summers.

During these two years,

open meetings were held weekly, but voting rights were
eventually re-

stricted to the paid staff.

Although exact dates are impossible to de-

termine, GC did evolve a fundamental work structure during
this two-year
period.

Day-to-day work was divided into several

product line was expanded:
goods; and breads.

"departments" as the

cheeses; grains; dairy; yogurt; canned

When new members were hired at the beginning of each

semester, they "joined" one of these departments, learning the necessary
tasks while on the job.

In each

wholesalers, keeping inventories,

department, the tasks of ordering from
and

restocking were informally di-

vided among two to five other members throughout the workweek.

All

ad-

ministrative tasks (e.g., bookeeping, paying bills, etc.) were performed
by the coordinators who also filled in where needed at the store.

With

the graduation of the two women founders in the winter of 1975, the
first coordinator elections were held, followed some time later by the

first revision of their basic job descriptions.

While the decentralized "department" structure of work was far from
perfect, it was durable, remaining in essentially the same form until
the fall of 1979.

During this period of stable work arrangements, other

features of GC did change, however.
a

The weekly meetings slowly evolved

regular format and rotated meeting roles.

By 1978,

business volume

increased to the point where GC was able to operate their store continu-
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ously throughout the summer for the
first time.
1978, two other new elements were added.

Then, in the fall of

GC experimented with a verbal

review process held twice each semester
for all members.

And secondly,

the organization established the ten-hour
work requirements for members

apparently an attempt to establish

a

minimum level of member commit-

ment.

According to members, the period from 1975
to 1979 was marked by
one central problem which continued to plague
the organization:

at-

tempting to keep the coordinators from "acting like
managers."

From

a

member perspective, the coordinators would become largely
administrators, elevating themselves from the actual day-to-day
work of the mem-

bers, but "bossing them around" at the same time.

From the perspective

of the coordinators, on the other hand, it was quite

a

different situa-

They found themselves overburdened by the combination of adminis

tion.

trative work and the need to fill in for members who either neglected

essential tasks, or performed them poorly.

For example, if the members

of the yogurt department neglected to reorder

as stocks

ran low, angry

customers would confront the coordinator, who was usually at the store.
Unable to locate any members of the department, the coordinator would

place

a

new order on his or her own.

When members of the department

learned later of the coordinator's actions, they would feel that he or
she had "stepped in" inappropriately

the reordering had not occurred

when it should have, but that was their problem.

Similar incidents

would inevitably recur, precipitating major conflicts between the coordinators and other members.

Exhausted, frustrated, and "burned out,"

coordinators would rarely last more than one or two semesters, usually

.
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quitting GC altogether.

Another set of coordinators would
be elected,

and the cycle would begin again.

Throughout this entire span of time

(1974-1979), the membership repeatedly
attempted to remedy this central

problem by increasing the number of
coordinators.

The theory, of

course, was that with more coordinators,
responsibility would be dis-

tributed among more individuals, keeping
any one from assuming too much
power.

This assumption proved wrong, however.

One or two central fig-

ures would continue to emerge among the
coordinators, repeating the same

cycle

During the summer of 1979, GC members decided
to implement its current system, relabeling coordinators as "clerks"
and requiring them to

perform their administrative duties only
floor work.

in

As explained earlier, however,

addition to ten hours of
these changes still have not

solved GC's central problem and may have only compounded it.
same time, GC members also made two other changes.

At the

First, they altered

their personnel review process, starting the current system based upon
members' written self-evaluations.

And secondly, they discontinued the

longstanding department structure of ordering, inventory, and restocking.

Convinced that this structure did not adequately distribute re-

sponsibility for re-ordering stock from wholesalers, they instituted

a

new "vendor system," in which one particular member is responsible for
one and only one wholesaler.
the problem belongs to

a

"clerks" less frequently.

Now, for instance, if the yogurt runs out,

specific individual, and tends to fall to the
In summary,

then, we see that with the excep-

tion of some small alterations, GC has really changed very little since

1974.

Although it

is

too early to assess the impact of the new "vendor
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system" and the attempt to create procedural manuals,
it seems reason-

able to assume that GC will continue as it has in
the past.

Despite the

relabeling of the coordinators as "clerks," little has
been done to effectively address the central issue of re-emerging informal
managers

within the organization.
Categorization
2

organization.

As we shall

.

Its developmental

see, the Grocery Collective is

a

Type

path deviates significantly from that

described by Holleb and Abrams, but these differences have still resulted
in a recurrent process of bureaucratization from which GC has been
unable

to escape.

One striking feature of GC's development is that the organization
seems to have begun with a mix of features from both the consensual

anarchy and informal differentiation stages.

During the first semester

of operation, membership was entirely fluid, meetings were open to anyone, and there was to be no differentiation of tasks among the volunteers who staffed the store.

At the same time, however, GC also began

operations with two paid coordinators who had basic job descriptions.
These two coordinators (also the founders) were clearly self-appointed
informal managers.

Over the next eighteen months, GC moved further into

informal differentiation

.

The boundaries of the organization came to be

synonymous with the paid membership, and both non-members and volunteers
lost voting rights in the weekly meetings.

In addition, GC developed

its first work structure, an arrangement of departments which formally

delegated work to groups of members, but not to individuals.

Within de-

partments, the work of ordering, inventory and restocking was informally

divided among members.
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The second, and more significant, aspect of
GC's development involves the start of semester elections for
coordinators in the winter of
1975.
i

Holleb and Abrams

nformal

differentiation

1

,

scenario would lead

us

to expect that within

informal managers emerge in

a

self-appointed

fashion, but are never deliberately selected by the
membership.

In

fact, the periodic election of persons performing administrative
tasks

represents

step in the direction of consensual democracy

a

,

in that it

is an important vehicle by which members can assert their
right to final

authority in an organization.

As we have seen in GC's case, however,

the "election" of coordinators (and more recently, "clerks") has not

worked very well at all -- even in one or two semesters these elected
individuals have tended to accumulate an excess of power and responsibility.

In addition, coordinators and clerks have never been

"voted out

of office," apparently because the membership is highly dependent upon

their skills, knowledge, and willingness to put in long hours.

Instead,

these individuals typically "burn out" in one or two semesters and re-

sign from the organization, setting the stage for the next set of informal

managers.

Largely because of this recurrent pattern, GC has been

frozen in the informal differentiation stage for several years now.

Warehouse Collective

.

The seven members of the Warehouse Collective

(WC) provide bulk-food purchasing, warehousing and trucking for an in-

corporated Federation of over one-hundred food cooperatives located in
a

predominantly rural region of New England.

administers

a

In

addition, the WC also

food co-op loan fund and is partially responsible for the

expansion of the Federation, both in terms of the number of member co-
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ops and gross business volume.

Technically, the members of the Ware-

house Collective are the "employees" of
the Federation; the warehouse
operations are managed by WC, but "owned"
by all the member co-ops
the Federation.

in

A representative board of directors
(BoD) oversees all

the activities of WC, as well

as other Federation activities.

Four sub-

federations of co-ops and WC select two representatives
apiece, creating
a

ten-member BoD.

dinator (not

a

This BoD is assisted by a half-time information
coor-

member of WC) who is responsible for correspondence,

governance communications, and educational programs
within the Federation.

Specifically, the BoD is empowered to make decisions in the
areas

of bulk food pricing; employee salaries, benefits and new
positions; financial expenditures; and loans to member co-ops.

able to the BoD, but at the same time maintains

a

in the areas of day-to-day operations and internal

Thus WC is

a

WC is directly answer-

high degree of autonomy

personnel decisions.

small, salaried working group located within a much larger

cooperative organization.

Through BoD representation and functional

autonomy in certain areas, however, the Federation and WC are able to

strike

a

balance between cooperative control of

business and worker control of the workplace.
same salary:

a

1.5 million dollar

WC members all earn the

$10,000 plus benefits including two-weeks paid vacation,

for a four-day work week.

Cirrent organizational practices

.

All

the tasks at the Warehouse

Collective are rotated among the members with the single exception of
bookkeeping --

a

complex task for

a

1.5 million dollar business.

Book-

keeping is performed by one member of WC who does not participate in
other rotated tasks.

One major set of job areas is composed of truck-
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ing, warehousing and cleaning.

cept the bookkeeper) on

a

These are shared among the members (ex-

day-to-day basis by means of an informal but

deliberate rotational schedule.

Truck-driving is limited at present to

the four members who hold the appropriate license, but WC
encourages all

members, especially women, to learn this skill and obtain the
necessary
licensing.

A second job area involves purchasing and inventory control.

Every member but the bookkeeper performs a particular subset of these
tasks on an ongoing basis; rotations are formalized by specific areas

and are calculated in terms of months, according to staff vacations and
leaves, and the arrival of new members.

Lastly, there are a number of

routine daily tasks (e.g., making deposits, emptying the trash, etc.)
which are formally rotated among the members on

of

a

a

weekly basis by means

"job wheel" located in the warehouse office.

Decision-making occurs in four different types of meetings.

The

most central meeting for WC is their weekly staff meeting, which is devoted to the coordination and allocation of tasks, scheduling of work

and information-sharing.

Decision-making is consensual but without

written procedures, but the meetings are particularly well -organized for
seven people -- a prioritized agenda with time limits, a notetaker and
a

For issues that transcend day-to-day operations, the

facilitator.

members employ

a

second type of forum, the monthly meeting, which is

held in the evening at members' homes in order to create
tinctly different from the workplace.

a

setting dis-

These monthly meetings are delib-

erately employed to resolve interpersonal issues, conduct formal personnel evaluations, develop policy proposals and engage in long-range plan-

ning.

Despite the different purposes of the monthly meetings, they are
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organized in the same manner as the weekly
meetings.

meeting is that of the BoD, also held
monthly.

The third type of

As explained previously,

two of the ten directors are representatives
chosen by WC members.

The

BoD makes all major decisions involving
policy and finances, but is not

involved in WC personnel decisions, an area where
the WC has
gree of autonomy.

a

large de-

The meetings of the BoD are also structured in
the

same manner as the weekly staff meetings -- well
-organized, but without
formal decision-making procedures.

The fourth and last category of

meeting is an annual meeting of representatives from all the
co-ops who
are members of the Federation.

The annual meeting serves as a forum for

decisions deemed too important or controversial to be made by the BoD
(e.g., a change in the by-laws).

Decision-making is conducted by means

of formal consensus procedures, and if they fail, by majority rule (twothirds for by-law changes).

Detailed minutes are kept and distributed

for both the BoD and annual meetings; for the weekly and monthly WC

meetings, minutes are kept in

a

notebook, but not distributed.

At pres-

ent, WC is developing summaries of all policy decisions that have been

made in past weekly and monthly meetings.

Previously, members relied

largely on oral history, but with the passage of time and the influx of

new members, it has become evident to them that

a

more formal statement

of policies and procedures is necessary.
WC employs a one-month trial period for new members which ends with

the first personnel evaluation in an ongoing cycle.
a

New members undergo

formalized orientation and training period during the first two months

of working as a member.

Through normal rotation of job areas,

a

new

member will have learned to perform most jobs in an additional six to
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nine months.

Older members wishing to change or enlarge
job areas are

supported in their efforts to learn new skills
(e.g., truck-driving, or
a

complex part of inventory control),

a

workplace feature made possible

by the flexible rotational arrangements.

Membership
thirties, with

—

.

a

WC members range in age from early twenties
to early

balance of men and women.

about one person

a

Turnover of members is low

year for the past four, on the average.

No found-

ing members remain, but three of the members are entering their
fourth

year with WC.
Informal structure .

Although it appears on paper that the Ware-

house Collective is subordinated to the BoD in the areas of policy, new
positions and major expenditures, it is very clear that WC takes
active leardershio role in the Federation.
due to historical
this point.

reasons

—

a

very

Part of this situation is

the BoD has existed for less than a year at

The WC is wary of the degree of informal power and respon-

sibility which it has held in the past, and, in an attempt to remedy this
situation, played

a

dominant role in developing the proposal which es-

tablished the present BoD.

Secondly, it is evident that senior members

of WC, by virtue of their accumulated knowledge and experience, wield
considerable amount of informal power.

This informal

a

"hierarchy by

seniority" is openly acknowledged by members, and while recogizing its
value in certain matters, they have attempted to minimize its negative

features by increasingly improving the training and orientation process
for new members, by more extensive use of job rotation arrangements, and
by formalizing policies and procedures in

easily distributed to members.

a

written form which can be

.
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Additional notes_.

The

eVe

The following comments are also
relevant:

° f P rocess skil ls

is particularly high in WC.
formal process role exists in meetings
it is
evident that their informal use is openly
supported
The
structure and conduct of weekly meetings is
clearly a direct
result of the application of these skills.

li^
J no
Although

l

WC has expanded its staff rapidly over the past
three
years, adding one member per year on the average.
According
to the members, this increase in size has recently
led them to
recognize the need for more formal structure in all
facets of
the warehouse operations -- from more explicit systems
of job
rotation to efforts to create written summaries of procedures
and policies
as aids to the effective integration of new
members
2.

—

The development of WC as a workplace is confounded by the
fact that it is a small organization nested within (and responsible to) a larger organization.
For example, issues of internal accountability which are often resolved through the formal
articulation of the rights, duties and obligations of members,
in this case are resolved in part by the direct accountability
of WC to the larger Federation.
In this way, some issues common to an autonomous workplace take a different form for WC,
particularly in governance areas.
3.

The unrotated position of the bookkeeper is somewhat of an
anomaly in a collective workplace, but a common practice in
other Federation warehouses.
In the case of the WC, this specialization was the consequence of:
(1) growing organizational
demands for consistent bookkeeping; and (2) the reluctance of
the person filling the position to participate in other tasks
when bookkeeping itself represented such a major responsibility.
In larger warehouse operations elsewhere, an "accounting
department" often emerges, with a number of skilled members
hsaring accounting tasks according to a slow rotational system.
In this way, an area of specialization eventually becomes a "sub-collective" within the larger warehouse operations, mirroring the earlier development of the warehouse when
it was staffed by only one or two individuals.
4.

Research relationship

.

The Warehouse Collective was enthusiastic

about research participation, noting that their daily contact with food
co-ops in the Federation had convinced them of the critical need for
more information and knowledge regarding the development of alternative
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institutions.

exchange for their participation,

In

then facilitate a general

formal

helped plan and

(now annual) meeting attended by approximately

fifty representatives from member co-ops.
a

I

At that meeting,

I

introduced

procedure for consensual decision-making in large
groups,

a

de-

vice which the meeting employed in changing its
by-laws to establish the

first foard of Directors for the Federation.

Interviews

Five current members, ranging from most to least sen-

.

ior, were interviewed, as well

as one founding member who had left the

Collective two years previously after becoming disillusioned about the
political

viability of the food co-op movement.

Other sources of information

.

Supplementary materials include the

minutes of crucial meetings, various revisions of the by-laws, descriptive brochures and flyers, and two early attempts to capture the history

of both the Federation and the warehouse operations.

Current developmental state

.

Currently, the Warehouse Collective

is best characterized by the consensual

democr acy stage, although some

features typical of informal differentiation still linger.

Examining

Table 8, we find that WC lacks some elements of a "constitutional

demo-

cracy with clear rules and procedures" (CD-2), especially in those areas

not covered by the Federation governance procedures.
tion is a formal

While the Federa-

constitutional democracy, WC, strictly speaking, is

not -- there is no set of by-laws or workplace agreements which formalizes the internal

rules and procedures of the Collective.

In

this re-

spect we find WC still retains at least one feature of informal differ-

ent ation

:

"organizational

rules and regulations apparent, but not for-

mally recognized or written down" (ID-16).

Given the overall structure

:

:

:
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TABLE 8

CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY ITEMS FOR THE WAREHOUSE COLLECTIVE

Characteristics
1

«

return to consensual

forms

2 -- constitutional

yes

democracy with clear
rules and procedures

yes, but somewhat external
workplace

3

clearly defined boundaries and
entrance requirements

yes

4 --

structures for sharing work and

yes

to

the

feel in gs
-- administrative and maintenance work
shared by all or by election/hiring

yes, with the exception of the
bookkeeper

6

--

no

7

--

8

—

9

—

10

—

5

explicit contracts for members
Leadershi p
leadership informal, shifting and
shared

yes

subgroups, program components given
wide latitude in decision-making

yes

representative groups employed for
overall program planning

yes

all

major decisions referred to
total membership

yes, and then to BoD

autonomy

yes

involvement in planning and decicision-making

yes

,

but enti re group

Rewards
11

—

12 --

13 -- community and support

yes

14 --

yes

increasing effectiveness and competence

Problems and pressures:
15 --

low salaries

no, $10,000/yr.

16 --

decision-making slow and cumbersome

only when it goes before the BoD

17 -- difficulty in accepting and removing

no

members
18 -- loss of directly productive time do-

no

ing administrative work
19 --

difficulty

in

obtaining funding

20 -- licensing laws and other threats

no, self-capitalizing
n'o

from conventional establishment
21

--

limitations in scope of services,
products or customers

22 -- difficulty in getting referrals from
and tying in with conventional organi

zations

yes

no
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of the Federation governance system, however,
the lack of formalization
in WC is less of a problem than it
might appear at first.

decision-making powers only lie in two areas
nel.
fall

-

WC's current

operations and person-

Decisions regarding major expenditures, policy and
new positions
to the BoD,

tional

two of whom are WC members.

In this

way the constitu-

democracy of the Federation supplants WC's need for
separate

rules and procedures in several significant areas.

Furthermore, WC has

generally recognized procedures in the areas of personnel and operations, but until recently there was little interest in committing
these
to written form, probably due to the small size of the group.

In a re-

lated area, WC also lacks "explicit contracts for members" (CD-6) other
than the general job description which is applicable to all warehouse

workers.

There are, however, shared, informal expectations which form

the basis of the personnel review process -- once again explicit, but

not in writing.

Despite some vestiges of informal differentiation

,

the

WC shows no evidence of internal power struggles between core and non-

core members which are the hallmarks of this stage (ID-6,
15).

In fact,

7,

13, 14, and

the Collective has even circumvented most of the "pro-

blems and pressures" common to consensual democracy
areas of funding (due to

a

,

particularly in

unique capitalization program) and salaries

($10,000/year).
Structural history
traced to 1974,
in

the region.

a

.

The origins of the Warehouse Collective can be

time of rapid development and expansion of food co-ops

During this period, the coordinators of five established

co-ops began to meet informally to plan joint purchases in food areas

such as grains and cheeses, where large volumes are an absolute require-

—

'

«

—

1
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ment for low wholesale prices (see Table
9).
chases,

a

Through these pooled pur-

"co-op of co-ops" developed which sought not
only to create an

alternative to the conventional wholesale distributors
(by eliminating
the need for their services), but to expand the
number of regional food
co-ops as well.

Spurred by the availability of federal funds to begin

their own warehousing operations, this group began to
formalize itself
as a

"federation" of co-ops in the latter half of 1974, holding
"general

meetings" of representatives from the co-ops involved in the joint
purchases.

In

order to generate "up-front" funds for these purchases, and

to develop a revolving loan fund for newly established but under-capi-

talized food co-ops, the federation established
the fall of 1974.

This fund was financed by

a

a

"co-op equity fund" in

small

surcharge added to

the cost of each individual co-op's purchases from the federation.

Dur-

ing this period, all of the labor required for coordinating and distri-

buting the bulk purchases was donated by member co-ops.

In 1975, how-

ever, the volume of purchases grew to the point where this arrangement
was no longer satisfactory.

First of all, it became necessary to borrow

warehouse space from the larger co-ops.

And secondly, with the acquisi-

tion of warehouse space, it became evident that the operations required

regular (but part-time) staffing.
between two groups,

a

Initially, the operations were divided

warehouse staff of two individuals partially sup-

ported by VISTA volunteer funds, and

a

Bulk-Buying Collective of volun-

teers from local co-ops who rotated the task of ordering from whole-

salers.
As the volume of joint purchases continued to grow throughout the

winter of 1975-76, two major changes became necessary.

First of all,
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the members of the Bulk-Buying Collective began
to be reimbursed for

their increasing work- load by means of
der they negotiated with

a

a

$25 brokerage fee for each or-

wholesaler (March).

And secondly, the fed-

eration rented its own warehouse space for the first time in
May.
June of 1976, the Federation was incorporated as

a

In

non-profit corpora-

tion, with by-laws which formalized officers, decision-making and mem-

bership.

This formalization did not extend to the warehouse staff, how-

ever, and set the stage for recurring conflict between the staff and the
co-ops who were Federation members.

Although the Federation was governed

democratically through regular general meetings (one co-op, one vote),
the warehouse workers were essentially its employees, with no formal

mechanism of representation of their own in the general meeting.

Thus

the warehouse staff felt that they had little control over their work-

place, control which they believed to be a democratic right.
By September of 1976,

the brokerage fee system of reimbursing mem-

bers of the Bulk-Buying Collective proved too unwieldy, and first salaries

($25/week) were paid to three part-time staff located at the ware-

house.

These paid staff began to perform the bulk ordering work previ-

ously done by the volunteer Bulk-Buying Collective, and continued with

warehousing, bookkeeping and deliveries to member co-ops.

In creating

salaried positions, the Federation thoughtfully tied the salary levels
dollar volume of the warehouse operations, making it possi-

to the total

ble to gradually expand the positions to full-time, at

remuneration.
eral

In addition,

job descriptions and

the staff.

In

a

a

higher rate of

the Federation also developed the first gen-

rudimentary personnel review procedure for

the summer of 1977, this procedure received its first
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test as one staff member resigned as
the consequence of
sonnel evaluation.

negative per-

a

This resignation left the two remaining
staff (full-

time, by then) short-handed in the face
of ever-increasing business

volume, and in the late summer and fall
of 1977, three new full-time

staff and

half-time bookkeeper were added.

a

the two original staff resigned, leaving

a

During this period one of

total of four and one-half

staff positions at the warehouse.
The addition of new staff was significant in two
related ways.

The

job announcements for these new positions identified the
warehouse staff
as a "collective"

for the first time, a factor which had

a

considerable

impact on the workplace expectations of the new staff members

—

they

assumed that shared work and decision-making would be central features

of the warehouse operations.
a

Secondly, the warehouse experienced almost

complete turnover in membership, and more than doubled its staff size

at the same time.

Throughout the latter half of 1977, the new members

were instrumental in establishing

a

number of workplace structures which

were demanded by the increased size of WC.

Weekly meetings of WC were

begun and job rotation was initiated in several areas of the warehouse

operations.

along with

In addition, a hiring and firing procedure was
a

one-month trial period for new members.

implemented,

Despite the new

structures and procedures, however, the gap in skills and experience between the one remaining (male) founding member and the new arrivals was
di ffi cul t to

close.

The founding member functioned as an informal manager of the warehouse, apparently unable, and at times unwilling, to share his power,

expertise and responsibility with the others.

As a result, power strug-
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gles developed between the founding member
and the newer members.

One

new woman member was particularly upset by
the degree of informal influence held by the remaining founder.

According to other members, she

"wanted to write things down on pieces of paper
all over the warehouse

walls in order to reduce [his] power."

These conflicts were interrupted

by WC's move to a larger warehouse in December
of 1977, but resumed

shortly thereafter.

In the move,

all

the procedures written down on the

walls of the old warehouse were lost, the conflicts continued,
and the
woman member resigned two months later.

Despite her short tenure, cur-

rent members of the Collective attribute much of the initial discussion

of workplace issues (and their eventual resolution) to the impact of
this own woman member.

During 1978, conflicts over informal power continued, and WC began

related discussions of the need for

training for new members.,

hired

a

a

formal system of orientation and

During the same period, as the Federation

non-warehouse staff member in charge of educational programs, WC

defined its membership to include only those staff who worked directly

with the warehouse operations.

And in the Spring of 1978, WC members

"discovered" their first monthly meeting when all the members of
ation personnel committee failed to appear for
a

WC member.

sonal

a

a

Feder-

personnel evaluation of

The resulting meeting allowed WC members to air interper-

issues in

a

setting away from the warehouse for the first time;

the results were so dramatic that WC immediately institutionalized the

monthly meeting.

The conflicts regarding the founding member's informal

power were aired extensively in these meetings, although their final
resolution did not appear to occur until his resignation in December
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1978.

As the monthly meetings continued,

sonal

they moved beyond interper-

issues and began to include long-range
planning and discussions of

major policy issues.

In particular, WC used this forum
to plan the

structure of workplace in such
formal managers in the future.

a

way to circumvent the emergence of in-

Eventually, in the spring of 1979, the

monthly meeting also became the formal forum for
personnel matters, as
WC members gained autonomy in this area (previously

cern).

a

Federation con-

During the summer of 1979, WC expanded job rotation
possibilities

and made its first attempt at formal orientation and training
for
member.

And in October of 1979, at

a

a

new

general meeting of the Federation,

the member co-ops approved major by-law changes that had been
suggested
by WC.

The most significant feature of these changes involved the crea-

tion of a BoD for the Federation which would largely replace the general

meeting.

The BoD, consisting of ten members, has eight co-op members

and two members from WC,

a

feature which formalized the participation of

WC in Federation affairs for the first time by means of their formal

representation in the Federation's constitutional democracy.
Ca tegori zation

ganization:
mal

.

The Warehouse Collective stands as

Type

3

or-

it follows the Holleb and Abrams scenario as far as infor-

differentiation but then skips formal differentiation

clearly in the direction of consensual democracy
In

a

,

and moves

.

more detailed terms, we can see that WC began with the consen-

sual anarchy stage in 1974 with the informal

co-op coordinators.

joint purchases of the five

The informal differentiation stage began with the

first salaried positions and job descriptions, and fully emerged in 1977
and 1978 as power struggles developed between the sole founding member
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and newer members.

sual democracy

The end of this stage and the
beginning of consen-

is more difficult to define,
however.

of the last founding member certainly
represented

a

The resignation

symbolic turning

point, in that it signalled the end of
major power struggles characteristic of informal, d ifferentiat ion.

The actual

implementation of exten-

sive job rotation, WC autonomy in personnel
matters, and the first formal orientation and training did not occur
until

however.

the middle of 1979,

Taking the most conservative view, we might
argue that the

change of the Federation's by-laws in October
1979 officially marked the

beginning of consensual demoxracy_.

These changes allowed the Collective

to formally enter into the constitutional

tion is governed.

democracy by which the Federa-

As pointed out previously, WC has only recently en-

tered consensual democracy

,

and still needs to take further steps to

ensure continued development along these lines.

In

particular, it ap-

pears that explicit member contracts, more extensive training and
orien-

tation programs, and more formal rules and procedures are still necessary, especially in light of the probable increase in the size of the

warehouse operations in the future.

Literature Collecti ve

.

The Literature Collective (LC) is

a

self-pro-

claimed "alternative business" which sells books and periodicals related
to social

change both by mail order and by means of portable bookstores

set up at college campuses, food co-ops, fairs and conferences.

Gross-

ing close to $40,000 per year, LC has three part-time, paid members and
is assisted by several

volunteers who earn

book purchases in exchange for their labor.

a

20% discount on their own
The organization currently
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operates out of

a small

office, but is planning to rent
the space neces-

sary for an actual bookstore in the
near future.

Current organizational practices

.

The basic work flow of LC in-

volves acquiring books and periodicals,
evaluating the literature and

preparing catalogs, and, finally selling
the literature.

By breaking

these general areas into discrete tasks
and adding other specific ad-

ministrative duties (e.g., bookkeeping), the three
members of LC have
developed an elaborate job rotation system.

Based on "tours of duty" of

two, three, or six months,

this rotation system includes some job
areas

shared by two members at

time, although one member is deliberately
as-

a

signed major responsibility.

Volunteers usually work in

a

few well-

defined job areas, such as ordering, writing book reviews,
and staffing
the portable bookstores.

In addition,

work-study students from local

colleges occasionally serve as interns at LC, usually performing
tasks
that are more complex than those done by volunteers.

The three LC members hold weekly staff meetings which are, in theory at least, open to volunteers and other interested individuals
from

the surrounding community.

Since these meetings are held during working

hours, however, attendance by non-members is usually infrequent.

staff meetings are highly organized and include
tator, and notetaker.

a

The

prior agenda, facili-

Each meeting begins with time set aside for shar-

ing feelings, followed by

a

business meeting.

After

a

short break, the

second half of the meeting deliberately focuses on matters other than

day-to-day business, such as planning, personnel, or workplace issues.
Finally, the meeting concludes with a criticism/self-criticism session.

Decision-making is consensual, with recognized but not written procedures.
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Detailed minutes of each meeting are
typed and distributed to members
and other interested parties.
LC has formal

search and hiring procedures for new
members, and

parallel but more informal process for admitting
new volunteers.

a

On the

other hand, there are no trial periods,
personnel review procedures, or
firing procedures for members or any equivalent
steps for volunteers,

although all of these areas are the subjects
of current planning discussions.

Formal orientation and training programs are
provided for both

new members of the collective and new volunteers,
and in both cases, LC
employs

a

considerable amount of excellent written materials.

Membership.

The three members of LC, two men and

age from early twenties to early thirties.

woman, range in

The four or five volunteers

active within LC fall within the same age bracket.
cate an estimate of member turnover:

a

Two factors compli-

the current definition of mem-

1)

bership is only two years old; and 2) LC has steadily expanded during
this period.

Starting with only one paid member two years ago, the or-

ganization soon added second and third members, eventually replacing the
third individual.

straightforward.

Turnover among volunteers, on the other hand, is more
Volunteers usually remain associated with LC for only

six to eighteen months, resulting in a 60-70% annual

turnover rate.

Rudimentary written contracts are used to explain rights, duties and

obligations to volunteers, but no similar document has been developed
for paid members as yet.
Informal structure

creates

a

.

The presence of the founding member at LC

potential for his informal

influence in the organization,

factor which he readily acknowledges as

a

problem in the past.

The

a
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founder started the business, created
many of the prevailing business
procedures, and developed the first
contacts with publishers and book
wholesalers.

This issue continues to be an
open topic of discussion

within LC, but the founder and other
members are determined to distribute his knowledge and skills
throughout the organization.

Both the

elaborate rotational system and the training
and orientation documents

represent deliberate steps in this direction.

At the same time, how-

ever, the founding member's leadership
at LC is recognized and valued by
the other members.

Additional notes.

Other facets of the Literature Collective worthy

of mention include the following:

The high degree of work structuring at LC is atypical
for
such a small organization. Although the members now
see this
formalization as a way to promote member equality in skill and
knowledge areas, they suggest that the initial impetus for
these innovations can be traced to the recurring necessity to
explain LC operations to volunteers and work-study students,
and the larger size of LC when it was a volunteer organiza1.

tion

.

Salaries are low at LC because members see low salaries as
an essential device for capitalizing the organization.
The
only other option open to LC would be taking on commercial
bank loans to build their stock of literature, a path fraught
with demanding financial responsibilities that members would
like to avoid.
2.

The process skills of LC members are well developed, a
feature which appears to be intertwined with the sophisticated
format of their weekly meetings. Members claim that the
criticism/self-criticism sessions at the end of their meetings
have served as the major vehicle for improvement of meeting
structure over the years.
They maintain that this device also
encourages members to acquire and practice individual process
skills.
The time for sharing feelings at the beginning of
meetings also appears important in this regard as well, in
that it allows conflicts and issues to be named and often resolved early on in the meetings.
3.
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The separation in weekly
meetinas nf Haw +n a*
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anticipate ch
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LC members were very open to
research par-

ticipation, indicating that the central
question of the research was one
which was very important to themselves
as well.
Members could not pro-

pose an appropriate exchange at the time
of interviewing, but indicated
that they would certainly take advantage
of the arrangement at

a

future

date.

Interviews
interviewed.

.

Three past and present members and
two volunteers were

The members consisted of:

the founding member; one member

who had been at LC for one year; and one
member who recently left the
organ iza tion.

Other sources of information

.

Supplementary materials include sev-

eral written documents, minutes of significant
meetings, job rotation

charts, and written volunteer contracts.

Current developmental state.

The Literature Collective is an or-

ganization in the process of moving from Holleb and Abrams' informal

differentiation stage to consensual

democracy

.

From Table 10, we can

see that LC still has several features common to informal differentiation

,

but lacks dominant features such as the "core group" (ID-6, 7),

associated power and inclusion conflicts (ID-10, 13, 14, and 15), and
fluid membership boundaries (ID-3).
still

remaining include:

Traces of informal differentiation

rapid expansion of services (ID-5); the ab-

sence of formal decision-making procedures (ID-8); issues of external

:

:
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TABLE 10

INFORMAL

DIFFERENTIATION ITEMS FOR THE LITERATURE
COLLECTIVE

Characteristics
1

-- de-emphasis of ideology

informal division of labor; first job
description
3

-

4

5

continued fluid membership but informal boundaries tighten
menfcership based on friendship or
"good vibes"

--

organization in period of rapid expan
sion/implementation

no; re-emphasis guiding development
of elaborate job rotation system
no;

formal

division by rotation

no; membership no longer fluid, but
not yet formal ized
t(0 some degree;
commitment to organizational goals more important

yes

Leadership:
6

--

formation of the core group

none

7

--

day-to-day decisions made by core
group with major decisions left to
enti re membership

no

lack of formal
dures

yes, but highly organized meetings

8

decision-making proce

Rewards
9

—

increasing effectiveness and competence (learning through skill-sharing)

10 -- sense of family in core group
1 1

1

2

-- autonomy

i

n

work

yes, strikingly

no, within whole collective

yes

personal growth

yes

Problems and Pressures:
13 -- power struggles between core group
and other members; jockeying for
status and i nfl uence

no

14 -- core group feels

no

responsibility but

none of the power
15 -- non-core members feel

left out of

true of volunteers to

a

small degree

important decisions
16 -- organizational

work areas, no; decision-making and
membership boundaries, yes

17 -- outside agencies, especially funders,

yes

rules and regulations
apparent but not formally recognized
or written down

demand tighter bookkeeping and internal accountability
18 -- clientele/customers demand more con-

sistent services

yes
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accountability (ID-17); and

counts

about inconsistent services
(ID-

Examining Table 11, on the
other hand, we see that LC
also has
-any of the features of
consensual dejnocracy., especially
explicit structures "for sharing work and
feelings" (CD-4) and for sharing
administrative and maintenance work
(CD-5).
Some important components
of consen
sual democracy do not exist,
however.
The organization lacks an
explicit, democratic governance
system (CM), formal definitions
of membership (CD-3), and explicit member
contracts (CD-6), although these
latter
18).

two items do exist for volunteers.

Nonetheless, LC is certain to ad-

dress these deficient areas in
the near future.

Currently members are

on the verge of incorporating
LC as a non-profit, educational
organiza-

tion, an action which usually
precipitates the creation of formal bylaws.

If these by-laws are written in
a fashion consistent with current

practices at LC, the result is sure to be

a

"constitutional

democracy

with clear rules and procedures" (CD-2),
which formally defines membersrights, duties and obligations (CD-3).

Structural hjstorx.

The original business operations of the Liter-

ature Collective were begun in February 1976
(see Table 12) by one individual who was concerned about the lack of public
access to

social change literature.

a

range of

By purchasing literature at wholesale rates

and re-selling it at local campuses, conferences and
fairs, the founder
was able to recover his business expenses and then reinvest
in an ever-

increasing stock of literature.

established

a

By not drawing a salary,

financial precedent which was to later prove essential to

the capitalization of the business.

joined by

a

the founder

In June of 1976,

the founder was

second individual, and the two of them established the busi-

:

:
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TABLE

11

CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY ITEMS FOR

TF

LITERATURE COLLECTIVE

Characteri sties
1

—

2 --

3

—

4

—

5

—

return to consensual

forms

no

clearly defined boundaries and
entrance requirements

yes; recognized but not written

structures for sharing work and
feelings

yes

administrative and maintenance work
shared by all or by election/hiring

yes

6 --

explicit contracts for members
Leadership:
7

—

leadership informal, shifting and
shared

8 -- subgroups,

9

—

yes

constitutional democracy with clear
rules and procedures

no

yes

program components given
wide latitude in decision-making

yes

representative groups employed for
overall program planning

yes, but entire group

10 -- all

major decisions referred to

yes

total membership

Rewards
1 1

-- autonomy

yes

12 -- involvement in planning and decici sion-maki ng

yes

13 -- community and support

yes

increasing effectiveness and competence

14

yes

Problems and pressures:

15--

low salaries

yes, but deliberate

16 --

decision-making slow and cumbersome

not really; very structured meetings

difficulty in accepting and removing
members

yes, but only removing

loss of directly productive time doing administrative work

not really

17

—

18

—

19 -- difficulty in obtaining funding

20

—

21

--

NA; sel f-capital ized

licensing laws and other threats
from conventional establishment

yes

limitations in scope of services,
products or customers

not yet

22 -- difficulty in getting referrals from
and tying in with conventional organi

zations

no

»

—

i

i

i

I

I
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ness as a formal partnership.

As

the business volume and inventory
con-

tinued to grow over the next eighteen
months, several other individuals

would periodically donate their time
to the operations as well.

In or-

der to attract these volunteers, the
initial members of LC developed

a

system by which volunteers could earn discounts
on book purchases and,
eventually, formal equity in the business.

Although the discount part

of the system functioned well, the equity component
required volunteers
to keep detailed records of their work hours,
a feature which led to the

eventual

demise of the equity incentive in the fall of 1977.

February of 1978, the two partners called

In

a

meeting of volun-

teers and others associated with the business in order
to assess their

interest in

a

more formalized Literature Collective.

tion would consist of volunteer members coordinated by

staff member.

The new organizaa

part-time, paid

Twenty persons attended the meeting, much to the surprise

of the two original partners.

Those present voted to establish the new

version of LC and also agreed to hire the founding member as the organization's coordinator (at $100 per month).

Weekly meetings of the 20

members soon began, but promised to be unworkable because of their size.

During

a

criticism/ self-criticism session at the end of one of these

meetings, members responded to this problem by deciding to develop

meeting format and introduce facilitator and notetaker roles.
mands of the weekly meeting gradually proved too much of

a

a

The de-

burden for

several members, however, resulting in their eventual departure from LC.

Nonetheless, LC business thrived during the spring of 1978.
At a meeting which followed one particularly successful weekend at
a

large conference, the membership decided to suspend operations for the
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summer in order to develop both
an internal structure and
m0 re coherent
business procedures.
During this deliberate planning
period, members

met at least once each week,
delegating tasks to be done
sessions.

in

between work

By the end of the summer,
however, the long series of meet-

ings had further reduced the
membership, finally leaving only five
mem-

bers (including the coordinator).

As a partial

solution to their de-

clining numbers, the remaining members
decided to redefine LC as
smaller, but more committed group.

a

At the end of the planning period,

they limited the size of LC to no
more than ten members and began work
on a formal

membership agreement, which among other
things, would speci-

fy a minimum time commitment of one
year for incoming volunteer members.

By the fall

of 1978, work on the membership agreement
had been com-

pleted, and LC members publicly advertised for
five new members.
a

After

formal screening and "hiring" process, five new
volunteer members were

added to LC bringing the total membership to ten.

Later in the fall, LC rented its first office space and also
purchased

a

schoolbus which was converted into

a

mobile bookstore.

But by

February of 1978, it became distressingly obvious that LC was not func-

tioning very well as
financial

a

volunteer organization.

LC had taken on major

commitments and the coordinator felt that he could no longer

rely upon the irregular efforts of volunteers to perform the growing

number of day-to-day business tasks.

In addition,

power struggles be-

tween the coordinator and the unpaid members began to surface more fre-

quently.
crucial
In an

Members felt that the coordinator tended to make too many
decisions that should have been resolved in members' meetings.

attempt to relieve the overworked coordinator of some of his re-
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sponsibilities, LC hired another one
of its meters on a part-ti^
basis
to attend to the financial
affairs of the business, especially
bookkeeping.

Rather than improving the situation,
however, the new hiring made

things worse.

Now two paid members were making
an increasing number of

decisions, and volunteer energies waned
even further.
At one point in the spring of 1979,
it became evident to all LC

members that the paid staff
reaJJx
zation which led to

a

notion of membership.

a

a

reali

_

major revamping of both the organization
and the

What had begun as

ated by one paid member became
unteers" remained

constrt^

a

a

volunteer collective coordin-

collective of paid members only.

"Vol-

category of association at LC, but persons in
this

category no longer held voting rights.

Although volunteers were ex-

pected to participate in the regular meetings, the
two members constituting the "redefined" collective were to make all final
decisions re-

garding the business.

member

Shortly after these changes,

a

third part-time

was added and bi-weekly staff meetings of the three members began.

With the introduction of staff meetings, the longstanding
tradition of

regular meetings of paid staff and volunteers quickly faded due to volunteer disinterest.
Early in the summer of 1979, the three LC members implemented their

first job rotation system with mixed results.

Inspired by an article in

the alternative press on workplace organization, they also began to fur-

ther formalize the procedures and roles of the work process in written
form, creating basic documents which were to form the core of later ori-

entation programs for volunteers and new members.

Early in the spring

of 1980, LC members gave their job rotation system

a

needed overhaul,
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creating the elaborate system currently
in place.

Facing the need to

replace one member who was resigning,
the members also developed

a for-

mal orientation and training
program which they later implemented
with

the hiring of another new member.

And finally, efforts to incorporate

LC, begun in the fall of 1979,
have currently neared the stage of
actual
fi

ling.

Categori zation.

Since the Literature Collective has
inhibited the

process of bureaucratization, and followed

a

developmental path differ-

ent from that suggested by Holleb and Abrams,
it qualifies as

organization.

a

By attempting to move directly from the
informal

Type 3

differ-

entiation stage to consensual democracy , LC has
avoided the formal differentiation stage of the Holleb and Abrams' model.

Although the or-

ganization has not yet fulfilled all of the requirements of
consensual
democracy it is quickly moving in that direction.
In more detail, we can see

that the first two years of LC can be

characterized as consensual anarchy

Membership boundaries were very

.

fluid, few tasks were differentiated, and one or two individuals pro-

vided the initial leadership.

At the February 1978 meeting, LC entered

the informal differentiation stage.

As a result of this meeting, the

first job description (and salary) appeared, as did the first concrete

efforts aimed at tightening membership boundaries.

While the hiring of

the founding member may have looked as if the membership had formally

chosen their leadership, there was in fact little choice in the matter
-- he played a large part in creating the proposal and was definitely

the most qualified applicant give his experience with LC business.

reality, then, his hiring only brought

a

degree of formality (and

In
a
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salary) to

a

situation which had been in place
for some time.

With the creation of an explicit
coordinator position, the stage
was set for power conflicts between
the coordinator and the unpaid
members.

Over time, as

a

growing business volume increased
the responsi-

bilities of the coordinator, unpaid
members began to question his growing decision-making authority.
Due to the centrality of the single
coordinator, however,

a

consistent core group did not emerge until
very

late in the informal differentiation
stage,

a

issues of inclusion and exclusion within LC.

factor which diminished

With the hiring of the

second part-time member, however, these issues
suddenly flared as unpaid members felt excluded from the inner
workings at LC.

Issues of

inclusion/exclusion and the ongoing power conflicts were
quickly ended
by the transformation of LC from a volunteer collective
to

of Daid staff.

While such

a

a

collective

resolution might appear to be the grand

finale in an ongoing power struggle, as far as it can be determined,
this decision seemed to be agreeably accepted by all parties
involved --

based on the practicalities of

of volunteer labor.

a

growing business and the limitations

Defined as an organization of paid members, LC soon

began to move in the direction of consensual democracy

.

The members de-

veloped a job rotation structure and further refined their meeting
structure.

Later, a more elaborate rotational system and formal orien-

tation and training programs were implemented.

In short, then, we find

that LC is still attempting to develop its organization based on the
consensual ideals of earlier days.

Restaurant Collective

.

Located at

a

large New England university, the
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Restaurant Collective (RC) strives
to be an "alternative" in
two ways:
by serving nutritious vegetarian
meals in a setting where only
bland institutional fare is normally available;
and by structuring its restau-

rant as

a

worker collective.

Throughout the two semesters of the
aca-

demic year, RC serves about 350 lunches
per weekday, grossing over

$50,000 annually.

The members of RC consists of 25 to
30 undergraduate

students who schedule their working hours in
between their classes in

order to earn

a

part-time income and frequent free meals.

Due to a

unique arrangements with school officials,
RC avoids paying rent for
their kitchen and serving areas, a savings which
is passed on to customers in the form of very reasonable prices.

In

addition to serving

weekday lunches, RC also periodically caters conferences,
concerts, and
other large public events.

Current organizational practices

major categories:

1)

.

The work of RC falls into two

daily work, consisting of preparation and cooking,

"running" prepared food from the kitchen to

a

nearby serving area, serv-

ing, dishwashing, and cleaning; and 2) ongoing committee work, performed
in

the areas of ordering and menus, finances, administration and public

relations, and personnel.

In theory,

bers, but there is no formal

daily work is rotated among mem-

vehicle for rotation.

In practice,

the

specific work of members is highly determined by their individual course
schedules.

Preparation and cooking, by necessity, must begin early

the morning and continue until

in

lunch time, when "running" and serving be-

come the major jobs, followed by dishwashing and cleaning.

Consequent-

ly, members with heavy loads of morning courses never cook, while those

with afternoon labs rarely wash dishes or clean.

Scheduling of avail-
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able member hours with the job slots
throughout the week is established

at the beginning of each semester and
adjusted as needed on
sis.

a

weekly ba-

Preparation and cooking are the only jobs
for which any procedures

have been formally established.

Located in the

ki

tchen are time-tested

recipe manuals which detail the large-scale
preparation of each lunchtime
meal offered at RC.

Committee work is also divided between the members

at the beginning of each semester, on

a

combined basis of skills, inter-

est and experience, with the expectation that
members will continue on

a

committee for at least one semester's duration.
Once every week the members of RC hold

two-hour staff meeting in

a

order to share information, discuss current problems, and make
both policy and operational decisions.

Formal meeting roles rotated from one

meeting to the next include that of

a

facilitator and also

a

notetaker.

Decision-making is consensual without recognized procedures or back-up
provisions should members fail to reach consensus.

Special meetings for

planning or retreat purposes occur only very rarely, although RC social
events occur four to five times each semester.

Hiring is conducted at the beginning of each semester, tending to
be more of a task at the beginning of the school year when a large num-

ber of members need to be replaced.

Job notices are publicly posted de-

scribing the nature of work and obligations at RC, and after screening
and interviews, those accepted by RC undergo

before the first day of operations.
the first two weeks of each semester.

a

one-day orientation just

This entire process occurs within
A rudimentary firing process does

exist, but is awkward to initiate; in the entire history of RC, only one

member has ever been fired by this procedure.

There are no trial peri-
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ods, job descriptions, or formal
personnel review procedures.

Membershi P

-

Almost a11 RC members are undergraduate
students rang-

ing in age from eighteen to twentyfour.

They represent a wide spectrum

of academic majors and backgrounds, and
generally have little or no prior food service experience or experience
with other collectives.

Most

members were drawn initially to RC because
of the promise of part-time

employment, and only secondarily because of their
interest in
tive workplace.

year.

a

collec-

Turnover is extremely high, ranging from 60-80%
each

As a result, the small number of members remaining
from the pre-

vious school year must hire a majority of their
membership each fall.

While an attempt is made to hire only new members who
can work at least
two semesters, some invariably leave after one semester,
necessitating

another, smaller hiring in January.

Largely because women applicants

outnumber men, two-thirds of the members are usually women.
Informal structure

Restaurant

According to those members interviewed, the

.

Collective "has no managers," but it is obvious that

a

few

senior members, predominantly men, perform most of the day-to-day deci-

sion-making and coordination.

The reality of this informal hierarchy is

largely denied by members publicly but admitted in private.

The typical

informal manager is a male with some restaurant experience prior to

joining RC,

a

factor which tends to channel him into

Together, the informal managers form

organization, taking on
formal

power.

a

a

a

cooking role.

fairly distinct core group in the

lion's share of responsibility but lacking

Members of the core group are usually scattered among the

various committees at RC, where they also play dominant roles.

The cur-

rent core group is entirely composed of individuals who are returning

166

members from the previous school year.
A dditional

notes.

The Restaurant Collective has

a

number of other

characteristics worth mentioning:

the me

? 6rS

interviewed indicated

that working at
Ir
KL fulfills more than financial
needs.
Membership not only
al lows them to meet a large number
of like-minded people but
also gi ves them a needed sense of "belonging"
#

on a large camSome members commented that their involvement
has resulted in important personal development, largely
because it
experiences in filling leadership positions.
Still others pointed out that the organization gives them a very concrete educational
experience, in
that they are able to try out their social ideals
in a "realnfe business organization.
pus.

For most RC members, academic obligations clearly have
more priority than their obligations to the organization,
a
factor which sets real limits on their organizational involvement.
For members who serve as informal managers, on the
other hand, these priorities are often reversed, an inclination which they refer to as "commitment" to RC.
2.

The high degree of public denial surrounding the informal
hierarchy at RC is remarkable. The topic is never discussed
in weekly RC meetings, although the conflicts precipitated by
the informal structure are evident to most members.
Since the
"managers" are usually men and the majority of members are
women, these conflicts are seen by several women members as
examples of sexism at RC.
Even this perspective has never been
publicly aired within the organization, however.
3.

The high turnover rate at RC is obviously linked to the
emergence of the core group of informal managers. As one
women member expressed it, being one of the few returning members "puts you in an automatic position of authority relative
to the new members."
This woman felt "trapped" into an informal manager role -- if she didn't use her skills and experience, she felt that important tasks would be done poorly if at
all.
In order to eventually escape this "trap," she felt that
she had no choice but to resign from the organization altoge4.

ther.

The emergence of the core group at RC also seems related
to the lack of written records and policies within the organization.
For new members, the major source of information re-

5.
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garding past practices is the
informal oral history carried hv
members returning from the previous
*
school year
This
sense
of the past is rarely communicated
directly, however
Usually
trickles out from senior members
in com^nts like', "we've
always done it this way," or, "we
tried that two years ago and
it never worked."
In point of fact, most
current RC members
know very litt e about the
organization's history prev^us to
their membership.
For example, I found the founding
statement
of RC s mission and goals while leafing
through their files
one day, a document that only one or
two current members were
re
N ««"ess to say, this sta tenant
was somewhat
^;,
at odds with
the prevailing oral history.

^

'

tlZT

Research relationship.

The membership at RC was generally open
to

research participation with the exception of
several of the informal
managers, who were reluctant to become involved in
the actual interviews
My guess was that they were concerned about
being questioned about the

apparent contradiction between the organization's collective
ideals and
the reality of their actual

roles, a suspicion partially confirmed in

later interview with one of these individuals.
sisted of aiding

a

a

My exchange with RC con-

group of members plan and implement

a

problem-solving

meeting for the entire organization and assisting in the development
of

recruitment and hiring procedures.
Intervi ews

.

Nine interviews were conducted:

one founding member

no longer with RC; three past members who had functioned as informal

managers; one current informal manager; two members of longstanding; and
two more recent members.

Current developmental state

.

The current state of the Restaurant

Collective is best described by Holleb and Abrams' informal differentiation stage, although there are some deviations worth noting.
13, we can see the central

features of this stage --

a

From Table

"core group" of

informal managers and inclusion/exclusion issues -- are very evident at

:

:

TABLE 13

INFORMAL DIFFERENTIATION ITEMS FOR THE RESTAURANT
COLLECTIVE

Characteristics
de-emphasis of ideology

yes

informal

division of labor; first job
description

yes; but no job description

continued fluid membership but inforboundaires tighten

no -- distinct boundaries

membership based on friendship or
"good vibes"

to some degree

mal

organization in period of rapid expan
sion/implementation
Leadership:
6 -7

--

no longer

formation of the core group

yes

day-to-day decisions made by core
group with major decisions left to
entire membership

yes

lack of formal decision-making proce
dures

yes

increasing effectiveness and competence (learning through skill-sharing)

yes

sense of family in core group

yes

Rewards
9

-

10 -11

-- autonomy in work

yes

12

-

yes

personal growth

Problems and pressures:
13 -- power struggles between core group
and other members; jockeying for
status and influence
14

-

15 -

yes

core group feels responsibility but
none of the power

yes

non-core members feel left out of
important decisions

yes

16

-

organizational rules and regulations
apparent but not formally recognized
or written down

yes

17

-

outside agencies, especially funders,
demand tighter bookeeping and internal accountability

yes

18

-

clientele/customers demand more consistent servi ces

yes

,

yearly
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RC (ID-6,

7,

10,

and 15).

13, 14,

RC has no formal

decision-making pro-

cedures (ID-8), and the few rules and procedures
which do exist (e.g.,

weekly meetings, meeting roles, committee structure,
etc.) are maintained solely by means of oral history (ID-16).

In addition, school

of-

ficials continually raise issues of internal
accountability (ID-17),

while customers periodically complain about the quality
and quantity of
the lunches (ID-13).
istics.

There are, however, four inconsistent character-

Membership boundaries are fairly distinctly drawn on the
basis

of paid members, although some volunteers do take an active interest
the organization (ID-3).
dual

Division of labor is informal, but no indivi-

job descriptions exist at present (ID-2).

is based upon more

in

In addition,

than "friendship and 'good vibes'"

(ID-4).

membership
Though

these tendencies do color the hiring process to some extent there is a

very recent emphasis upon restaurant skills and interest in collective

workplaces.

And finally, the organization no longer appears to be ex-

panding, having reached

a

peak of growth about two years ago (ID-5).

These exceptions to informal differentiation seem relatively minor,

however, and may become more understandable as we look at RC's historical

development.
Structural history

.

The idea of the Restaurant Collective was

originated in the fall of 1975 by

a

group of undergraduate friends con-

cerned about the total absence of vegetarian lunches on the school's
large campus.

After lengthy and complex negotiations with school offi-

cials, this group was finally able to begin serving light lunches in the

last month of the 1976 spring semester (see Table 14).

Composed of

combination of paid workers and volunteers, RC first functioned in

a
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state of hectic confusion.

At the end of this first month
of operation,

the new organization held a short
series of evaluation meetings, at

which it was determined that they had
both made money and demonstrated
the demand for vegetarian lunches.

It also became evident, however,

that if the RC was to continue the following
fall, it would require more

structure in order to avoid the chaos of their
opening month.

After

lengthy debates about the pros and cons of more
organization, the group
finally decided to elect two coordinators who would
each take one major
area of day-to-day responsibility

-

ordering and menus on the other.

The two coordinators would perform

the financial side on one hand, and

these duties in addition to their normal paid hours
at RC.

At the time

of this election, members stressed that the coordinators would
not be
"traditional managers," however.

All major decisions were to be made by

the entire membership at weekly meetings to start in the
fall.

It was

also decided that only paid members could vote in the future, although

volunteers and other interested individuals could attend meetings.
the fall

In

semester of 1976, the new structure was implemented and even

formalized to some degree in

a

document required by school officials

(who wanted to identify "responsible" individuals for fiscal and insur-

ance reasons).

Submission of this document also required RC to define

membership boundaries, leading to the first formal statement that voting
rights in the organization were limited to paid members.

At the same

time, a very basic firing procedure was devised, as well.
In

general

terms, the two-coordinator structure worked fairly well

that fall, with the important exception that the coordinators, both men,

periodically overstepped the bounds of their authority, performing tasks
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and making major decisions which
should have been reserved for the
weekly meeting.
At issue, it seems, was the
definition of a "major decision."
The membership was predominantly
women, however, and the resulting tensions quickly divided the
organization between men who backed the

notion of coordinators, and the majority
of women who found the arrange-

ment oppressive.

Although the issue was actually phrased
as one of "bad

intepersonal dynamics," the membership finally
concluded at the end of
the fall

semester that the coordinator idea was not
working.

place they created

a

"core group"

In

its

(their term) of five elected individu-

als who would each take responsibility for

a

major area of RC operations

ordering, menus, personnel, finances, and public
relations.

The theory,

of course, was that by diffusing responsibilities
between more individuals, power-accumulating tendencies would be diminished.

This "core

group" structure was employed throughout the spring semester
of 1977,

but fared no better than the "coordinator" system which it
replaced.
The "core group" continued to be staffed largely by men who
overstepped

their bounds in the same ways.

decided to try

a

Late in the spring, the RC membership

third system, this time based on five committees which

would cover the same areas performed by the five "core group" members.
Implemented in the fall semester of 1977, this structure remains to the

present day.
Unfortunately, the committee structure has never worked as planned,
either.

In

theory, the committees would simultaneously spread major re-

sponsibilities among the entire membership and prevent
members from "running the show."

In

a small

group of

practice, however, the major share

of committee work has almost always fallen to

a

small number of return-
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ing members.

Since committee work is above and
beyond the paid hours at

RC, and because time is at a
premium for undergraduates, attendance
at

committee meetings usually falls off
quickly after the beginning of each
semester, usually leaving one or two senior
members to perform important

committee tasks.

As

these senior members devote more time
to the organ-

ization, they inevitably begin to make
decisions which infringe upon the

perceived but not explicit decision-making
powers of the weekly membership meeting (e.g., changing a pricing policy,
etc.).

The result, as we

might expect, is growing conflict throughout the year
between the core
of informal managers and the other members of the
organization, conflict
which is only resolved by the departure of most of the core
group at the
end of the school year.

At the same time, however, it should be pointed

out that not all returning members fall prey to automatic membership
in
the core group.

Some recognize the problem of being "trapped" at RC,

and resolve to minimize their involvement, even if it means that crucial
tasks go undone.

Recognizing that part of the problem with the committee structure
stems from new members' lack of knowledge and information, several members attempted to develop

a

detailed orientation program and

ganized meeting format in the fall of 1978.

a

more or-

Both of these innovations

worked very well throughout the 1978-79 academic year -- new members
were integrated into RC more quickly and the quality of weekly meetings
improved considerably.

The members who originated these innovations all

left RC in the spring of 1979, however, and both practices largely dis-

appeared over the summer.
Since the fall of 1977, then, little has changed at RC except the

174

faces of its members.
has repeated itself

For the past three years the

-

.

sarre

basic pattern

sub-group of returning members emerge
as

a

core

of informal managers for about one
year and then leave the organization,

usually due to academic pressures,
graduation, or frustration.

The only

noteworthy change since 1977 was an attempt
to revise the recruitment
and hiring process in the fall of
1979.

facilitated

a

Prompted by

a

consultant who

problem-solving meeting, RC went to great lengths
to de-

scribe the obligations of membership in hiring
notices and also formalized its hiring process.

As a result,

the number of applications for

the fall hiring plummeted, but the quality and
"commitment" of appli-

cants improved greatly over past years.

In the short run,

these new

procedures seem to have had some impact upon the turnover
rate as well

—

a

large proportion (50%) of new members plan to return to RC in
the

fall of 1980.

At this point, however, it is difficult to assess other

effects of the new recruitment and hiring procedures or even know if
they will be continued in the future.

Categorization

.

The Restaurant Collective is

a

Type 2 organiza-

tion, one whose development diverges significantly but unsuccessfully

from the Holleb and Abrams" scenario.

In

this case, RC members made

early attempts to structure their organization along consensual/demo-

cratic lines, but these efforts did not inhibit the process of bureauera tization.

Reviewing RC's development in more detail, it is clear that the

planning and first month of operations had all the earmarks of consensual anarchy

.

Energy levels were high, tasks were undifferentiated, and

membership boundaries were fluid.

On the basis of the model

described

-
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by Holleb and Abrams, we would expect
RC at some point to move next
to

infgnnajdi fferentiation,

a

group of informal managers.
tion evaluated its initial
tors_>

stage marked by the emergence of
a core
In

the case of RC, however, the organiza-

performance and then ejected two copxdina

deliberately choosing those members who were
to perform basic

management functions.

As we have seen, this deliberate arrangement

still led to power struggles, as did its
successor, the elected "core

group."

In both

instances, it appears that the necessary functions
were

performed, but that the membership was dissatisfied
with the power- and

task-accumulating behavior of the individuals (predominantly
men) who

held the elected positions.

Rather than refine these coordinating

structures, the membership chose instead to abandon them
altogether,

creating
tasks.

a

less- defined system of committees to perform the same set of

The committee structure, of course, has resulted in the same

problems regarding power and control in the organization, but has at the
same time made it more difficult to hold specific individuals account-

able for their actions.

In essence,

then, RC initially attempted to

control its leadership by election, but later created

a

committee struc-

ture which resulted in the emergence of informal managers on

selected basis.

In

sensual democracy

,

a

self-

this way the organization moved briefly towards con -

but later stabilized in the informal differentiation

stage, where it has remained for the past three years.

Magazine Group

.

One of several

projects within

a

larger non-profit or-

ganization known as Umbrella, the Magazine Group (MG) publishes

a

peri-

odical every two months which has combined paid and unpaid circulation
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of about 50,000 copies.

The central theme of MG's
magazine is self-

reliance, especially in the areas of
energy, agriculture, work and
the
environment.
Currently MG is rebuilding its
operations after a combined
financial and organizational crisis
reduced the ten-person staff to
three full-time and three part-time
workers.

In

order to weather the

continuing financial pinch, the remaining
staff members often forego and
share salaries, both common practices
when operating funds are low.

-

present plight of MG is not all that unusual
a

risky business.

publishing

a

magazine is

Competition with other publications for

a

stable

readership is both fierce and never-ending.

Considerable "up front" fi-

nancing is required, both for the business as
that is published.

The

a

whole and for each issue

At the same time, the invested funds trickle back

slowly, as paid circulation and advertising accounts
hopefully grow.
The result, of course, is an irregular and often unpredictable
cash
flow,

a

factor that is undesirable in any business.

three full-time staff members are completing

a

Currently, the

detailed business plan so

that they approach both investors and donors interested in financial

publication of the magazine in the future.

The staff members are confi-

dent that they will raise the needed funds, and although work on the

current issue has been halted, they plan to resume publication during
the next two-month cycle.

Current organizational practices

.

Since the recent staff reduction

at the Magazine Group, the work has been divided into three major areas:
1)

editorial; 2) production; and

3)

business, which includes advertis-

ing, circulation, distribution and finances.

Functioning as

a

"manage-

ment team," each of the three full-time staff members has both primary
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responsibility and considerable autonomy
in one of these three
areas.
Part-time staff members, along with
occasional stringers, fill in as
needed throughout the two-month
publication cycle.
be some informal

Although there may

job-sharing at times, the present system
does not in-

clude job rotation.

In

fact, work at the MG promises to
become even

more specialized of late, largely as

a

consequence of the tripartite

division of general responsibilities.

Decisions regarding policy and financial planning
are made, almost

exclusively, by the three full-time staff members
at weekly meetings.
In

theory, major changes in finances or policy
should go before the

Board of Directors of Umbrella, after consultation
with the staff members from other projects associated with Umbrella.

In practice,

how-

ever, the Umbrella Board tends to play an advisory role,
usually ratify
ing decisions made by combined staffs of Umbrella projects.

The meet-

ings of all staff members from Umbrella projects are held
irregularly;

decision-making follows

a

rudimentary but unwritten consensus procedure

Previous to the recent staff reductions, MG was characterized by
small degree of formalization.

Each staff member had

scription, decisions were made by means of

a

a

a

basic job de-

simple consensual proce-

dure, and the entire staff held periodic planning and problem-solving

retreats, often facilitated by paid consultants.

had

a

trial period for new members.

In

addition, MG also

At this point, however, it is un-

clear whether these formal structures will continue to be used at MG.
Members hi p

.

The full- and part-time staff members of the Magazine

Group are men and women ranging in age from mid- twenties to the early
thirties.

Only one of the current members had prior magazine experi-
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ence.
cial

The full-time members currently
remaining all have limited financommitments which allow them periodically
to work without pay.

Despite the apparent clarity of membership
boundaries, no formal definitions or membership agreements exist.

ficult to assess.

Turnover of staff members is dif-

the three years preceding the recent
staff reduc-

In

tion, only one member left the organization,
while slightly over one

half of the organization resigned in the past six
months.
Informal structure

.

In brief,

the informal structure of the Maga-

zine Group is largely synonymous with the
organization as described

under "current organizational practices."

The three full-time staff

members who remained wield the most influence in the
organization,

a

situation which they justify on the basis of the large amount
of unpaid
time and effort they have recently invested in MG.

Additional notes

.

Other features of the Magazine Group include the

fol lowing:

The remaining staff members at MG presently have serious
reservations about the viability of "collective" workplaces
given their experiences over the last three years. All three
have begun to express a common desire for some of the more
1.

positive aspects of conventional corporate structure -- clearly defined lines of communication and authority, more efficient decision-making, and so on.
One striking feature of MG in the recent past has been the
degree to which the organization is dominated by its two-month
publication cycle. Just after rushing the last issue to the
printer, work on the new issue begins, slowly at first, but
then quickening in pace in order to meet a multiple set of upcoming deadlines.
By the last two weeks of the cycle, the
press of deadlines and the need to attend to innumerable small
details creates an ever-dizzying amount of activity right up
to the trip to the printer.
Needless to say, the frenzied side
of the cycle is hardly conducive to creating an ideal working
environment.
In addition, this publishing cycle affects primarily the editorial and production ends of the organization,
2.

179

since much of the business tasks
occur at the start of the
C° n
different ends of the organization
are
5? d^fp
at
different levels of activity at any one
time, creating an
internal uneveness that is very evident
at meetings and dayto-day interpersonal exchanges between
staff members
For
example, in the past it has been nearly
impossible to schedule
a planning session for the
entire organization in which all
staff members could be relaxed and
reflective.

f

Process skills and meeting skills are
generally lacking in
MG, and attempts to introduce them
usually are either unsupp
ported or unrecognized.
3

Largely because Umbrella and MG developed
simultaneously
and have periodically shared personnel, the
boundary between
the two organizations is difficult to
define.
This lack of
clarity also extends to the financial area,
since their accounts have been co-mingled historically.
Boundaries between
the MG and the other, smaller projects within
Umbrella, on the
other hand, are quite distinct.
4

Research relationship

My first formal contact with the Magazine

.

Group occurred in the spring of 1979, when one member contacted me
about

possible consulting work with the organization.

colleague and myself facilitated

a

a

Research participation came

partial exchange for my consulting services.

this arrangement gave me

a

a

series of retreats and meetings for

MG which continued until January 1980.

about as

Later in the fall,

In

retrospect,

detailed view of the inner workings of the

organization, but also created

a

slightly negative side-effect.

participated primarily in order to pay

a

Members

debt, rather than because of

their inherent interest in the research itself.

Consequently, their

concern and involvement during interviews was somewhat less than in the
case of other organizations.

It should also be noted that much of the

formal structure which developed at MG during the early winter of 197980 came about as a direct result of our consultation.

Interviews

.

In all,

six past and present members were interviewed:
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two founding members no longer
with the organization; two more
recent
part-time managers, one of who has
left MG; and two of the three
remaining full-time staff.

0^

sources of information.

Supolementary materials include

*

notes from several consultations,
internal planning and organization
documents, and notes from conversations
with members who were not for-

mally interviewed and other individuals
familiar with the organization.

Current developmental state.
pears to be midway in

differentiation,
stages.

a

a

At present, the Magazine Group ap-

move from informal differentiation into
formal

situation which gives MG characteristics of
both

From Table 15, we can see that many of the major
features of

informa1 differentiation no longer exist at this
time.

The power strug-

gles characteristic of this stage (ID-7,
13, 14, and 15) largely disap-

peared with the recent resignations of five staff members.

In addition,

the boundaries of the organization are now drawn much more
sharply than

previously (ID-3).
remain.

Still, other features of informal differentiation

Most organizational rules and regulations are not written down

(ID-16), issues of accountability to outside funders and customers
con-

tinue to emerge (10-17 and 18), and most of the staff rewards still seem

present (ID-9, 10, 11, and 12).

From Table 16, however, we can see that

many of the major features of formal differentiation have begun to take
shape.

The three remaining full-time staff members have self-appointed

themselves to head the organization, referring to their triumvirate as
"the management team."

What they have created, of course, is the orga-

nization's first administrative hierarchy (FD-1) and many of its associ-

ated consequences (FD-3, 5,

7,

8,

10, 11, and 13).

At this point MG is

:

:

:
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TABLE 15
INFORMAL DIFFERENTIATION ITEMS FOR
THE MAGAZINE GROUP

Characteristics
-

1

2 -

de-emphasis of ideology
informal division of labor; first
job
description

continued fluid membership but inforboundaries tighten

no; much tighter boundaries

membership based on friendship or

much less so

-- organization in period of
rapid expan

sion/implementation
Leadershi p
6 -7

--

8

no, formal; no job descriptions at
present, but probably soon

mal

"good vibes"
5

yes

no; leveling off

formation of the core group

yes, and formalized

day-to-day decisions made by core
group with major decisions left to
enti re membership

no; most decisions made by core

lack of formal decision-making proce
dures

yes

group alone

Rewards
9

--

increasing effectiveness and competence (learning through skill-sharing)

10 -- sense of family in core group
1 1

-- autonomy in work

12 -- personal

growth

much less now

yes
yes

,

but less

yes

Problems and pressures:
13 -- power struggles between core group
and other members; jockeying for

status and

i

no longer

nfl uence

14

core group feels responsibility but
none of the power

no; feels both

15

non-core members feel left out of
important deci si ons

no; left out by general agreement

16 -- organizational

yes

17 -- outside agencies, especially funders,

yes

rules and regulations
apparent but not formally recognized
or wri tten down

demand tighter bookkeeping and internal accountability
18 -- clientele/customers demand more consistent servi ces

yes

1

:

TABLE 16
FORMAL DIFFERENTIATION ITEMS FOR THE
MAGAZINE GROUP

Characteristics
creation of administrative hier

1

archi es

3 --

yes

new member positions filled by
"qualified outsiders"

too early to tell

administrative members differentiated
from production/service members

yes, to

volunteer or customer status and power
diminished

too early to tell

4

—

5

-- energy directed toward service/pro-

a

large deqree

yes

duction rather than organizational

experimental

on

lower member turnover

6

too early to tell

Leadership:
7

8

—

program leadership formalized in core
group or one or two administrators

yes,

more efficient decision-making procedures

yes

career training

not yet

more clearly defined power relations

yes

three

Rewards
9 --

10

—

11

-- more clearly defined work

12 -- more recognition from outside world

yes
not yet, but promising

Problems and pressures:
13 --

loss of ideological

14 --

loss of family

purity

15 -- breakdown of interpersonal and

yes
not yet
too early to tel

intergroup communications
16

—

decreasing autonomy in work

too early to tell
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largely finished with collective experimentation
and has become solely

concerned with the creation of

a

viable business (FD-5 and 13).

in

short, the organization is rapidly developing
along the lines of formal

differentiation, but at present it is too early
to tell if the other
features associated with this stage will in
fact emerge (FD-2, 4, 6, 9,
12,

14,

15, and 16).

Structural history_.

In

the spring of 1977, the founders of Umbrel-

la submitted their first proposal

publication of
nology.

a

for a one-year federal grant to begin

regional newsletter concerned

with appropriate tech-

After the proposal was accepted in midsummer of that year, Um-

brella's founders hired two staff members to produce the newsletter,
but

without explicit job descriptions.
rive until March

1

Unfortunately, the funds did not ar-

978 (see Table 17) but the promise of funding allowed

both Umbrella and its newsletter project to locate themselves in a rentfree office at a local college during the fall of 1977.

In

the meantime,

however, the two designated but unpaid staff members generated consider-

able interest in the project, attracting several volunteers who were

willing to invest considerable amounts of time and energy.

One volun-

teer in particular became more involved than others in the project, and
by the time funds actually arrived he was established as a third (un-

paid) staff member.

Given all the preparation which preceded grant

funding, the project was well
in March 1978,

underway by the time money finally arrived

and produced its first issue two months later.

During

this period the third staff member was able to generate additional funds
to cover his own salary.

Throughout the summer of 1978, the newsletter was produced every

—
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two months, attracting considerable
attention and

a

growing readership.

Due to the increasing workload, the
project added

a

fourth staff member

in the fall

who also worked for

materialized.

a

few months before funds for her salary

Her hiring actually signalled the beginning
of an infor-

division of labor within the project.

mal

Two staffers came to be asso-

ciated primarily with the production of the
newsletter (which was quickly becoming a magazine in size and
appearance), while the other two be-

gan to spend more of their time attending
to the other business of Um-

brella, including the development of additional
projects.

In essence,

the two staffers concerned with the newsletter
first started to become

identified as the Magazine Group at this time; the remaining
two staff
members were seen as personnel shared by MG and Umbrella.

As MG devel-

oped an identity separate from Umbrella, it also began defining itself
as

a

"collective" more and more explicitly.

As

the "collective" iden-

tity solidified, MG began its first regular meetings, usually held every
two weeks.

This regular meeting, however, constituted the only formal

structure at MG.

No minutes were kept of the meetings, and although

agreement was developing in regard to the division of job responsibilities, no formal job descriptions existed.
As publication of the newsletter continued through the winter of

1978-79, it became more and more of

a

magazine, with an increased number

of pages and more professional-looking covers.

During this period,

a

growing number of interested volunteers and part-time stringers (paid
for periodic production assistance) became associated with MG.

In March

of 1979, the original grant funding expired, but with the support of

a

variety of other funding sources, publication was continued and MG added

186
a

third full-time staff member

to its collective.

time, Umbrella began another
project

-

a

At roughly the same

resource center

-

and hired

librarian for the center whose time
was to be shared to some degree
with ML
In April of 1979 weekly
staff meetings were begun and major
a

questions arose about who was "in" MG
and who was not, leading to several awkward exchanges where some
volunteers and stringers were deliberately and even forcibly excluded from
MG meetings.

By this point, Um-

brella and all of its projects were
evicted from their rent-free offices

provided by
New,

a

local

college for the duration of the original
grant.

larger office space was rented by Umbrella
early in the sunmer of

1979, allowing its individual projects to have their
own physically dis-

tinct work areas,

a

development parallelled by the reduction of shared

personnel between the various projects.

Located in

a

more spacious office and armed with several CETA sal-

aries, MG began to rapidly expand its staff, adding four
more full-time

and one half-time members.

As in the past, the new members were largely

friends and acquaintances, and no formal job searches were held.

With

the addition of several new members, MG organized itself
into a series

of departments:
finances.

editorial, advertising, distribution, circulation, and

The three senior full-time members became the editorial de-

partment and quickly began to function as the "core group" of the organization, usually referring to themselves as the "editorial sub-collective" within the larger MG collective.
mal

This concentration of infor-

power in the editorial department led to major conflicts over or-

ganizational power and control in the fall of 1979.

Typically, the com-

batants were the three members of the editorial department and various
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combinations of newer staff closer to
the business end of MG.

At the

heart of the conflict was the direction
of the magazine, and the degree
to which that direction was to
be shaped by editorial policy,
perceived
financial realities, or both.

The rapid expansion of staff also
highlighted the question of coordination within the magazine,

a

organization for several months.

thorny problem which was to plague the

Despite the increased number of mem-

bers, MG continued to hold weekly staff
meetings which were lacking any

sense of organization.

As expected,

the resulting meetings lasted too

long and accomplished too little, leading rapidly
to

tendance.

a

decline in at-

By October of 1979, tensions had reached an
unbearable point,

and MG called upon local consultants to plan and
facilitate the organi-

zation's first formal retreat.

During the retreat, staff members vented

their frustrations publicly for the first time.

One obvious problem was

the lack of clearly defined work responsibilities,
a deficit which led
to

frictions among the staff, particularly among those with overlapping

roles.

A process of developing coherent job descriptions was begun at

the retreat,

a

step which greatly clarified expectations, but surfaced

the problem of coordination once again.

ing,

Also during the retreat meet-

the founding male editor made an explicit bid for a job description

that would have essentially formalized his informal role as

manager" of MG.

a

"general

The other staff members resisted his proposal and in-

stead proposed that a "publishers' group" -- composed of one representative from each of the five departments -- should coordinate the affairs

of the magazine through weekly meetings.

adopted and the publishers'

This latter proposal was

group was quickly established following the
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retreat.

In

fact,

tempting to create

the proponents of the "publishers'
a

group" were at-

formal structure of coordination
within MG that

would counter the informal power of
the three senior members
editorial department.

in

the

Since the other four departments
consisted of

only one person apiece, the "representative"
feature of the "publishers'
group" was in effect

a

coordination meetings.
sisted of all

way to eliminate two of the three editors
from
In

other words, the "publishers' group" con.

;

the full-time members of MG, with the exception
of two of

the three editors.

This formal mechanism of coordination did prove
to

be somewhat effective, but never resolved
the underlying power struggles

at MG.
In

November of 1979, MG held another retreat with outside consul-

tants to examine issues of power in the organization,

a

topic which

proved too awkward to really discuss meaningfully, both for MG and
for
the consultants.

Forced by

a

financial crunch to relocate to

office in December, tensions at MG soon flared again.

a

cramped

A large donation

temporarily relieved the financial pressures, and allowed the organization to hire
in an

a

financial consultant and a part-time business manager,

attempt to improve their long-term financial situation.

Through-

out this period, power struggles continued -- over the magazine's direction,

the location of a new office, and financial strategy.

Decision-

making fell apart, as it became unclear which issues could be decided by
the representative "publishers' group" and which needed to be referred
to the entire staff.

lishers'

posed

a

By March of 1980, little had improved and the "pub-

group" meetings fell apart.

In

desperation, two members pro-

"dictatorship" plan to get MG through

a

series of difficult de-
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cisions and still continue publication
of the magazine.

MG literally

stopped work for five days as the
staff struggled with the proposal,

weighing their collective ideals against
the need to create an efficient
organization.

For some of the staff members, this
long series of meet-

ings represented the final straw in
terms of their tolerance for the

"collective process" at MG.
bers was established.

In

the end, a "management team" of two mem-

Together with the business consultant, the
manage

ment team would have authority for all day-to-day
decisions at MG.

The

founding editorial manager was deeply disappointed
by the fact that he
had not been chosen as a member of this "team";
his bid for power, ini-

tially made five or six months before, had been rejected
by the other

members, leading him to consider resignation.

At the same time, MG mem-

bers established a "planning and policy committee" consisting
of every

member not on the "management team" plus one member from the "management
team."

The purpose of this group would be to make all final policy and

financial decisions, thus counterbalancing the power of the "management
team."

The new arrangement did result in the publication of the next

issue, but little else.

A new office was found, but finances were so

low by the end of April that it was evident that money for salaries

would run out in May.

Frustrated and disillusioned by the state of MG

financial affairs, several members soon resigned, led by the founding

editorial member.
in the past,

Although many of them had weathered payless paydays

the combination of organizational and financial difficul-

ties proved too much for them.

Of the three full-time members who re-

main, two were elected as members of the "management team" prior to the

resignations.

As detailed earlier, these three full-time members are
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the current "management team"
at MG, making most decisions
and dividing
the essential work among
themsevles and three part-timers.

CltejpjMzaJion.

The Magazine Group is a Type

2

organization

-

its

development diverges from the Holleb
and Abrams' scenario, but the
bureaucratization process has continued.
typical of

wnjensuai

ajiarchy_.

The early days of MG were

It was difficult to know at that
time

who was part of the organization, energy
was high, and

work of the organization was shared by
everyone.
the informal differentiation stage had begun.

the essential

By the spring of 1979,

A "core group" started to

emerge and issues of inclusion and exclusion
surfaced for the first
time.

By the fall of 1979,

this stage had developed fully.

With the

addition of several new members, the "core group"
was firmly established
as the "editorial

sub-collective" within the staff.

associated with informal differentiation reached

a

The power struggles

peak first in October

of 1979, when MG members established the "publishers'

mechanism of shared coordination.

group" as a formal

This action on the part of MG members

is an anomaly in terms of the Holleb and Abrams' model

—

by creating a

representative mechanism of coordination, MG was beginning to shift
towards consensual

democracy which still located within the informal

differentiation stage.

In

March of 1980, MG members made

tempt in this same direction.

a

second at-

Dissatisfied by the performance of the

"publishers' group," they deliberately chose two members for the "man-

agement team,"

a

group whose day-to-day power was balanced by the final

authority of the "planning and policy committee."

While this reorgani-

zation clearly represented another step in the direction of consensual

democracy , in that

a

member-controlled organization selected its day-to-
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day managers, the whole arrangement
was soon undone by an impending
financial crisis.
Due to the lack of funds (and
dissatisfaction with num-

erous attempts to remedy the situation),
several members resigned from
MG, essentially leaving a "management
team" without a membership to control

it.

These resignations, in effect, signalled
the end of past power

struggles over the direction of MG.

Two of the three members remaining

at present are past members of the previous
core group represented by
the "editorial

sub-collective."

In addition,

the three full-time mem-

bers composing the current "management team" are
in essential agreement

about the need for

more conventional structure at MG, and appear de-

a

liberate about moving further towards formal differentiation

.

Although the financial and organizational crises are somewhat
difficult to disentangle in this case, it appears that the major
debate at
MG about consensual or bureaucratic versions of the organization
occurred at the end of the informal differentiation stage, contrary to
Holleb

and Abrams' model.

occurs during formal
it seems

They argue, of course, that the critical choicepoint

differentiation

At the Magazine Group, however,

.

that continuous financial pressures may have accelerated the

timing of this choicepoint.

Studio Collective

.

The Studio Collective (SC) is an incorporated organ-

ization of 16 craftspeople and artists located within

sort area.

a

New England re-

The major goal of SC is to provide its members with stable

and reasonably-priced studio space in an area where seasonal demand for
rental space creates fluctuating prices throughout the year.

of this goal, the organization rents

a

In

pursuit

large building which is subdi-
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vided into individual studios and

a

gallery.

Individual studios are

then sublet to members for a flat
monthly fee and

charge per square foot.

Financial benefits are not limited
to inexpen-

sive studio space, however.

duced gallery fees and

small additional

a

a

The Collective also offers its
members re-

group insurance plan.

In

addition, members are

able to sublet their studios to non-members
during periods of prolonged
absence, subject to the agreement of the membership.
Cuj^rent organizational practices.

Although most of the members of

the Studio Collective pursue their own crafts
and arts as individual

businesses, the organization as

a

whole requires

a

considerable amount

of ongoing work which is attended to by elected officers,
committees and

designated individuals.

The most central

role in the organization is

that of the treasurer, who is reimbursed for his or her efforts by
means
of a $20 monthly rent reduction.

In

addition to maintaining up-to-date

books, paying bills and projecting financial needs, the treasurer is also responsible for the all

important tasks of negotiating with the land-

lord and building good relationships with the local banks who occasion-

ally make loans to SC.

The other offices consist of a secretary, who

keeps records and handles correspondence, and

largely honorary position.

a

president, who fills

a

The positions of these three elected offi-

cers are deliberately but slowly rotated (1-2 years) among the membership, with special
ers.

attention given to the training of incoming treasur-

When the terms of these officers are about to expire, the member-

ship looks for willing and capable volunteers to fill the offices and
then formally elects them.

There are also

a

gallery committee,

a

safety

committee which monitors compliance with insurance requirements through-
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out the building (e.g., wood stove
installations, use of dangerous solvents, etc.), and certain individuals
who have been given other formal

responsibilities (e.g., maintaining the
health insurance plan, monitoring and maintaining the heating
plant).
Major maintenance projects like

landscaping or renovations are often
carried out by means of "work parties" which involve the entire membership,
or are contracted to non-

members.

The day-to-day general maintenance
of common spaces, hallways,

and bathrooms is rotated on
ing to

a

formal schedule.

a

weekly basis among the membership accord-

Staffing of the gallery during the business

season is currently contracted to two members of
the collective who

manage the gallery for

three-month season as their own separate busi-

a

ness, returning a certain percentage of the receipts
to the organizations

.

The formal rules of decision-making are set forth in
the by-laws of
the incorporated organization and specify that most
decisions are made

by majority rule, while certain types of decisions require

majority.

a

two-thirds

These decision-making rules, however, are only applied when

informal consensus among all members cannot be reached within a reason-

able amount of time.

Meetings of the entire membership, currently held

every week, provide SC with

a

forum for information-sharing (especially

regarding finances), operational and policy decision-making, and sharing
of feelings; meeting roles include
tary.

If interpersonal

a

chairperson (rotated), and

a

secre-

issues arise between two or more members, they

are encouraged by others within the meeting to resolve differences on

their own, but if this remedy fails, the weekly meeting often becomes
the forum for final

resolution.

Once or twice

a

year, the entire mem-
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bership holds

special retreat with the
explicit purpose of reflecting
on the state of their
organization and planning for
the future. Al
though no formal history of
the organization exists,
all the minutes of
past member meetings are kept
by the secretary in a
notebook which is
a

accessible to the members; these
minutes are frequently consulted,
particuarly when issues of past
and present policy arise.
And lastly, the unique rental
arrangement of SC deserves mention.
By design, members with large
space requirements (e.g., weavers)
are

subsidized to an extent by those with
smaller space needs.

By moderating

the costs of studio space in
this fashion, SC not only ensures
that

a

broad range of artists and craftspeople
are drawn to it, regardless of
their individual space requirements,
but also emphasizes the cooperative
nature of its organization.

In essence,

members view their monthly rent

as regular "membership fee" which
is affected somewhat by the size
of

their individual studios.

In

addition to subletting studios to members,

SC also realizes income from the rental
of its gallery space and peri-

odically sponsors courses and workshops which
are open to the surrounding community.

The resulting income from all these activities,
about

$18,000 per year, is used to rent the building, pay utilities
and associated maintenance, and cover insurance costs.
are deducted

from the income,

a small

sional and extraordinary expenses.

After all these expenses

"slush fund" remains for occa-

If incidental expenses arise which

cannot be covered by this cushion in any particular month, members may
be subject to a surcharge in addition to their monthly "membership
fee"

(rent).

This rental arrangement combined with the weekly membership

meetings, not only insures that all members are kept up-to-date regard-

.
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ing the financial status of the
organization, but also creates
a timely
and effective feedback loop for
decision-making, since the effects
of
policy and financial changes are
quickly reflected in members'
monthly
fees

^embershi P

Within th * Studio Collective, there is
presently only

-

one class of membership

-

the full,

voting members who rent studios.

The ages of members range from the
middle twenties through the fifties,

with the majority clustering in the middle
thirties; most members have
had prior experiences with other cooperative
and collective ventures.

Turnover of members is low

-

about 10% to 15% per year; of the original

seven founding members, five still remain.

When members leave SC, the

entire membership then interviews applicants for
the available studio
space and examines samples of their art or craft.

accepted as

a

new member, he or she enters

a

When an applicant is

three-month trial period

(without voting rights), which can be extended another three
months if

deemed necessary.

At the end of the trial period the total membership

must agree (by at least

a

two- thirds vote) before full membership rights

can be extended to the new individual.
the trial member feels
to base a final

If either the organization or

that there is insufficient information upon which

decision, the trial period can be extended by the mem-

bership for another three months.

The formality surrounding entry into

the organization is also present in the exit procedure.

A full

who neglects mandatory duties and obligations can be expelled by
thirds vote.

And finally, individuals who sublet

a

member
a

two-

studio from a member

are encouraged to participate in meetings of SC, but are not members,

and consequently have no voting rights.

.
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Informal structure
equal

.

Although the formal structure of
SC gives an

vote to each member in meetings,
every member interviewed empha-

sized that the founding "elders" of
the organization exert

a

measure of

informal influence which is generally
acceptable to the rest of the mem

bership.

The "elders" are most familiar with
the history and mechanics

of the organization, and often take
informal leadership roles, especial
ly in the areas of resolving intragroup
conflicts, planning and public

relations.

In

meetings, in particular, several of the "elders"
also

tend to assume informal

"process roles" -- raising issues of goals,

group process, and procedure -- roles which are clearly
valued by other
members
Additional notes.

Other items of interest regarding the Studio

Collective include the following:

A majority of founders and current "elders," who fill both
formal and informal leadership roles, are women.
1.

As an organization of artists and craftspeople, SC is
somewhat atypical in that it is firmly opposed to taking
grants from state, federal or foundation sources (despite
several offers).
SC does, however, obtain bank loans period2.

ically.
SC shares its building with

restaurant, a physical arrangement which encourages members to have lunch or coffee
with one another frequently.
The result is often a continuous
but informal meeting of various combinations of members
throughout the day, where organizational and personal concerns
are the common topics of discussion.
It is clear that the
restaurant offers an ongoing forum regarding the SC's activities; some members remarked that without the restaurant, SC's
membership meetings would certainly need to be held more frequently and last considerably longer.
3.

a

Most of the members who were interviewed strongly
sized the positive emotional aspects of membership in
They felt bound to the organization by close personal
cial ties, and generally agreed that the personal and
4.

emphaSC.

and soprofes-
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sional support that they received
as members was
tor in their continued membership.

a

large
ge fac "

Most members came to SC with
past experiences in other al
ternative institutions.
Members interviewed ind cated
that
thei r prior learning in these
organizations was very beneficial
to their attempts to make
SC a workable organization.
5.

Several of the members who were
6.
a type of goal redefinition
had

interviewed indicated that
taken place since 1977
Bv
that of providing stable'and
9 oa
Inl'rnl? studio
P******
J
low-cost
space
had been largely met, and a secondary
goal emerged to play a larger part
in the organization's decision-making. Although not formally
articulated (though clearn)i thiS s condary 9^1 might be paraphrased
as
fni?n
^
follows:
To promote the
individual and professional growth
of members.
Interviews revealed numerous examples of decisions regarding both general policy
and individual members
where this secondary goal was applied,
sometimes to the detriment of the primary goal of inexpensive
studio space.
To the
best of everyone's recollection, the secondary
goal first surfaced in discussions at a SC retreat.

-

"

T

Research relationship

.

This organization is one with which

consulted occasionally since 1975.

I

have

My efforts involved role-playing

rent negotiations with the landlord and providing
specific suggestions

regarding the structure of the organization and the boundaries
of membership.

Given the ongoing nature of our relationship, members willing-

ly agreed to my interviews and saw no need for a specific
exchange at

that time.

Interviews
interviewed:

.

In all, seven members of the Studio Collective were

three founders who have served in various officer roles at

one time or another; one founding member who had only recently taken an

active role in the organization; two recent members; and one founding

member who was finally in the process of leaving the organization after
repeatedly expressing doubts about the organization's long-term future.

Other sources of information

.

Documents include by-laws, written

5
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member and non-member agreements,
written liability releases, and
minutes of several meetings.

Curi^deve^^

According to the developmental
stages

outlined by Holleb and Abrams, the
current state of the Studio Collective is clearly categorized as one
of

c^ensual

democracy,.

Examining

the description of this stage (Table
18), we find that all the items

under "Characteristics," "Leadership,"
and "Rewards" generally describe
SC with one small exception

-

explicit contracts for members (CD-6).

Although signed membership agreements were
instituted in 1975, no new
members signed them after 1978 (although they
were sometimes shown the

contract prior to becoming members).

As of the spring of 1980, however,

SC was in the process of revising and reinsti
tuting these written agree-

ments, convinced by recent experiences that they
represent

device for defining member rights, duties and obligations.

a

necessary
other

In

areas, SC actually exceeds the requirements of consensual
democracy

.

Overall program planning is generally performed by the entire
membership, not just by representative groups

(CD-9).

In

addition, many of

the "Problems and Pressures" related to this stage have been either
rem-

edied or minimized.

While the absence of some of these can be attri^

buted to the nature of the organization's activities (i.e., CD-I

9

low

salaries, is largely irrelevant, since only one partial salary is paid),
SC has no diffi cul ty in obtaining funding (CD-19), has specific and time-

tested procedures which facilitate the acceptance and removal of members
(CD-I 7), and maintains an excellent reputation with governmental

arts agencies.

and

And finally, the presence of formal voting rules in-

creases the speed and effectiveness of decision-making (CD-I 6 )

.

Al-

:

:

:

199

TABLE 18

CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY ITEMS FOR

'

:

STUDIO COLLECTIVE

Cnaracteristics
1

2

—
—

3 --

return to consensual

forms

not

constitutional democracy with clear
rules and procedures

yes

clearly defined boundaries and
entrance requirements

yes

a

return really, but yes

4

—

structures for sharing work and
feelings

yes

5

—

administrative and maintenance work
shared by all or by election/hiring

yes; administered by slow rotation
of officers

6 --

explicit contracts for members
Leadershi p
7

--

subgroups, program components given
wide latitude in decision-making

8

9

leadership informal, shifting and
shared

--

representative groups employed for
overall program planning

10 -- all major decisions referred to
total membership

presently being reinstituted

yes, but "elders" play important and
acknowledged role
yes

sometimes, but more often by entire
membershi p
yes

Rewards
11

-- autonomy

12

involvement in planning and decicision-making

13 -- community and support
14

increasing effectiveness and compe tence

yes, but with accountability
yes

yes
yes

Problems and pressures:
15 --

low salaries

NA; only one small

salary paid to

treasurer
16 -- decision-making slow and cumbersome

not really, due to back-up rules

17 --

difficulty in accepting and removing
members

not really; clear procedures facilitate

18 --

loss of directly productive time doing administrative work

some, but seen as member obligation

19

difficulty in obtaining funding

no; several

20

licensing laws and other threats
from conventional establishment

yes; complications with insurance
regulations on occasion

21

limitations in scope of services,
products or customers

yes; courses and workshops for the
communi ty rare now

22

difficulty in getting referrals from
and tying in with conventional orga-

no; excellent reputation

nizations

loans from banks
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though most decisions are made by
informal consensus, the knowledge
that
a two- thirds rule can be
invoked has a moderating effect
upon those members with strong objections to a
decision
they would tend to compro-

-

mise on an issue sooner than in

a

situation of pure consensus, knowing

that their position would be lost altogether
if the lack of agreement
led to a formal

vote.

Structural history_.

Examining Table 19, we find initial discus-

sions regarding the formation of the
organization occurring in the fall
of 1973; the bankruptcy of

a

local

business had left

vacant and stirred the imaginations of

a

large building

a

friendly group of artists and

craftspeople seeking joint studio space.

After several weeks of some-

what disorganized but energetic discussions among themselves,
and finally, with

the landlord, this group decided to create an organization

which could rent

a

large portion of the building and then sublet indi-

vidual studio spaces to its members.

fortunate but somewhat ironic

In a

turn of events in 1974, the members of this group discovered an
ideal

organizational form for their purposes -tion originally incorporated in 1934.

a

defunct non-profit corpora-

Among other activities, this cor-

poration had also leased studio space for its members.

In the spring of

1974, the founding members of SC reactivated the corporation, paid its

back taxes, and proceeded to conduct their business according to the old

corporation's original by-laws, holding member meetings every week.
These by-laws defined the structure of offices (spelling out the essential

"work" of the organization and who was to perform it), clearly de-

marcated full and associate membership categories, and specified decision-making rules for

a

range of circumstances (e.g., 2/3 vote for re-

—
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moval of members).

In

essence, then, SC was formally defined as

a

"con-

stitutional democracy with clear rules and procedures"
(CD-2) right from
the start, even before it actually began operations.

incorporated SC obtained

a

Later in 1974, the

lease for the vacant building and began sub-

letting to members.
In

1975 SC developed written contracts which both outlined member

responsibilities and released SC from certain areas of liability (theft
of tools, personal

injury, etc.).

At the same time, similar contracts

were also developed for guests and students.
signed agreements reflected more than

however
to

—

a

The creation of these

concern for legal liability,

they represented deliberate attempts within the organization

clarify expectations regarding the rights, duties and obligations of

members and other individuals associated with SC.

Also in 1975, SC re-

vised its by-laws, attempting to solidify their organization even more.
First of all, the members substituted

a

previously subject to majority rule.

According to members, this change

two- thirds

vote in some areas

not only insured that controversial decisions would require strong

agreement for acceptance, but also guaranteed that no sizeable minority
would remain after such
in place.
--

a

decision to dispute the policy once it was put

Secondly, the category of associate membership was eliminated

it was felt that SC should be an organization of full

members only.

During the period in which the by-law changes and membership agreements

were instituted (1975), SC was composed of two major groups of

members.

One group,

a

majority, saw formal structure as

a

necessary

route to defining both the organization and the accountability of members within it.

The second,

siicYlilor

group of members were generally
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opposed to the increasing formalization
of the organization, arguing
that additional structure of any
kind was both unnecessary and
oppressive.
In the following year,
1976, the continuing conflict
between
these two groups grew into the
greatest internal crisis of SC's
history.
A significant sub-group of
those members opposed to increased
structure
and formalization repeatedly and
deliberately failed to honor the mem-

bership agreements ratified in the
previous year.

Just prior to the

signing of the first five-year lease on
the building, the crisis came to
a

head.

After

a

long series of traumatic meetings, SC
utilized the two-

thirds vote specified in its by-laws and
expelled the offending members.

With this major conflict and its resolution
foremost in their minds, the

remaining members of SC continued to formalize
their organization.
mal

For-

training of new treasurers (by outgoing treasurers)
was initiated in

the fall of 1976, as was the rotation of general
maintenance among all
members.

In 1977 members began to insist upon written
contracts between

SC and non-members who occasionally performed work
for the organization
(e.g., major landscaping, renovations, etc.).

In the same year, SC in-

stituted formal procedures for reviewing new applicants for membership
and

a

three-month extendible trial period for new members.

three months, the trial member

is

During the

expected to attend all membership

meetings, but does not hold voting rights.

This trial

period procedure

proved itself very effective over the years, frequently resulting in

negative decisions about membership, on both the part of the organization and trial members.

organization emerged.

Also in 1977, two other formal features of the
The first of what were to become periodic future-

planning retreats was held.

And secondly, member meetings began to be

.
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be employed as explicit forums
for resolving interpersonal
conflicts between members

Little of structural importance
has changed at SC since
1977, with
two small

exceptions.

Both the rotation of general
maintenance and the

use of formal member contracts
lapsed in 1978.

After considerable de-

liberation, the rotation scheme was
reinstituted in the summer of 1979.
The need for renewed member
contracts re-emerged in the fall of
1979,
and efforts are underway to revise
this document for use again in the

spring of 1980.

At this point, the members feel that
they have devel-

oped an organization which is both
durable and viable.

Most founding

members who were interviewed indicated
that they felt much more at ease
in recent years

than they did prior to 1977, noting that
it was now pos-

sible for them to take an extended leave
of absence without worrying

about the organization's capacity to carry on
without them.
Categorization.
zation

—

The Studio Collective

is

clearly

a

Type

3

organi-

it did not follow the developmental scenario
of Holleb and

Abrams, and it appears to have entirely avoided the
process of bureaucratization.

From the structural history we saw that very early on the

organization became

a

rudimentary consensual democracy

,

creating

a

pro-

cess which allowed continued refinement of the organization in ways
con-

sistent with consensual ideals of shared work and decision-making.
Given the extensive period of planning which preceded the formal start
(incorporation) of SC, it appears that the organization moved directly

from consensual anarchy

,

to incorporation,

form of consensual democracy

to a

which characterized the planning process prior
.

Informal differen-

tiation was either totally absent, or so brief in passing, that no found-
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ing member who was interviewed
could recall

a

period of the organiza-

tion's history which reflected
the characteristics of this
stage.

Mechanic' Collective.

Grossing approximately $50,000
each year, the

Mechanics"

Collective CMC) actually consists
of two different organizations sharing the same staff
and facilities.
For the first three days
of the workweek, MC operates
as a collectively-run car
reoair shop, but
on Thursday and Friday, MC
becomes a car repair "cooperative,"
where individuals can obtain space and tools
for $2/hour, and, if needed, the

assistance of MC staff for $6/hour.

Currently MC has two full-time and

one half-time collective members
who earn from five to six dollars per
hour.

Cooperative members pay

a

$15 yearly fee, which entitles them to

low-cost space, tools, and expertise,
as well as discount prices on

automotive parts.
The car repair "coooerati ve" operated by
MC members is

tive in name only.
al

coopera-

a

Cooperative members gain privileges by paying annu-

dues, but are not involved in any formal way
in the internal affairs

of MC.

In essence,

offered by MC to

a

the car repair "cooperative" is merely

a

service

group of individuals who pay an annual fee.

On occa-

sion, collective members at MC also offer inexpensive
auto repair work-

shops which are open to the public.

Current organizational practices

.

The Mechanics

ates with an absolute minimum of formal structure.

1

In

Collective operaddition to shar-

ing the scheduling of customers, the repair of cars, and the
supervision

of cooperative members, the two full-time collective members divide up
the administrative tasks on MC on an informal basis.

One member over-

sees the inventories of parts and supplies, and performs general shop
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maintenance, while the other
full-time .ember takes care
of the financial side of the business,
which includes bookkeeping,
paying bills and
making deposits. The part-time
member as yet performs none
of the administrative or financial tasks.
Meetings of collective members
are held only when needed,
which
tends to be at most once or
twice each month.
At these meetings, decision-making is by informal consensus,
except in the case of admitting
new members, where absolute
agreement is required. MC is
incorporated,
an action which is usually
followed by the creation of by-laws
outlining
a

governance process.

In MC's

case, however, no by-laws were
ever

filed.

Membershi

P--

The a 9 es of MC members, two men and

a

woman, range

from the mid- twenties to early thirties,
while "cooperative" members
tend to cluster in the early and middle
twenties.

At this point, no

founding members of MC remain, but one
member has been with MC for three

of its four years.

Turnover among MC members is difficult to
pinpoint

due to the lack of records and fluid
membership boundaries in the past,

but seems to lie in the 40-50% range on an
annual basis.
there are no trial periods, members contracts
or personnel

Currently
review proce-

dures at MC.
Informal structure

.

The two full-time members at MC both serve as

the informal managers of the organization, largely because
of their

seniority and complementary skill areas.

The male member derives his

influence from his mechanical skill, while the woman's basis of informal

power appears to lie in her knowledge of the financial side of the business.

To call

them

a

"core group" at this point sounds a bit grandiose,
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since there is only one other
member, who works half-time.
that MC were to take more
mentors

,

n

In the

event

the future, however, it is
very

likely that these members would
continue in their current roles,
raking
the use of the term more
appropriate.

Additional notes.

Other aspects of HC worth noting
include the

followi ng:

nt rVieWed re P ° rt that since a
recent financial
Mr
hl
K
MC has become
muchu more "business-like," looking
care6 USG of time
mone
and
labor.
>
y»
This tone is also
I a
1n
(bUt Sti11 inf° rma1)
of memberIhJl S?2r
?In "2?
snip
at MC.
the past, members often took extended
b

S

c;i^r
crisis

,

^nltlon

leaves

of absence, expecting that they could find
work at MC once
they returned.
The current MC members have recently
stopped
this practice, recognizing that it
creates both a large degree
of uncertainty about their pay levels and
considerable confusion about who s in and who's not."
In addition, MC has
started enforcing a longstanding but often
ignored policy
which prohibits past and present members
from using MC facilities to perform repair work for private
customers (thus using
collective resources for private gain). Both of
these actions
have angered past members who claim that this
sort of "tightening up" is contrary to the old "spirit" of MC.
These actions, and others, point to an increasing desire
for more formalization on the part of current MC members, particularly
in
the areas of membership boundaries and accountability.
At
this point, however, these concerns still remain at
the level
of informal discussion.
The emergence of the two full-time members as the informal managers of MC is largely due to the fact that they were
the only two members who remained at one point.
Consequently
they were forced to take over the various administrative tasks
if MC was to continue at all as a business.
2.

Once a car repair business reaches a certain volume level,
the appearance of a "service manager" function performed by
one person appears inevitable. At present, according to MC
members, this point has not been reached for them, although it
has in the past.
Evidently, when a garage's business attains
this point, mechanics feel that they could do a better job if
their work was not interrupted by a constant stream of phone
calls, customers, and orders for new parts.
In other collective garages, the service manager position is often slowly rotated between member mechanics, usually on a yearly basis.
3.

.
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Research re^tionshi^.

When

I

first approached MC, there
were six

meters, most of whom were very
skeptical of research participation,
to several

negative experiences with researchers
in the past.

due

After the

members finally agreed to
participation, they decided that my
half of
the exchange would consist of
buying them a case of beer. Over
the
course of my repeated visits, the
membership gradually dwindled to two

individuals, one of whom became particularly
interested in the research

because of its relevance to events at MC.
Interviews
terviewed:

.

In all,

five past and present members of MC were
in-

one founder, now dissatisfied with his
exclusion from the

organization; three members who left within the
past year; and the one
full-time male member who remains.

In addition,

two "cooperative" mem-

bers were also interviewed.

Other sources of information
cuments that could be located.

.

All

MC has no historical records or do-

information was obtained from the

intervi ews

Current developmental state.

The present state of the Mechanics'

Collective is best described as one of informal differentiation

,

al-

though three of the major features of this stage are minimized due to
the organization's small size

hired half-time member.

—

two full-time members, and one newly

The two full-time members do clearly function

as a core group, but the presence of only one non-core member minimizes

the issues of informal power.

Consequently, as Table 20 indicates,

power struggles (ID-13), feelings of powerless responsibility (ID-14),
and issues of inclusion/exclusion (ID-15) are absent at this time.

In

truth, it probably should be said that they are "dormant," rather than

:

:
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TABLE 20

INFORMAL DIFFERENTIATION ITEMS
FOR THE MECHANICS' COLLECTIVE

Characteristics
1

—

2

-

3 -

-

4

de-emphasis of ideology
informal division of labor; first
job
description

continued fluid membership but informal boundaries tighten
membership based on friendship or
"good vibes"

yes
yes, but no job descriptions cur
rently in use

yes

to a lesser extent now; growing
emphasis on skills

-

organization in period of rapid expan
sion/implementation
Leadershi p:
5

formation of the core group

6

--

7

day-to-day decisions made by core
group with major decisions left to
enti re membershi p
lack of formal
dures

8

decision-making proce

yes

yes
yes, but inconsequential

yes

Rewards
--

9

increasing effectiveness and competence (learning through ski 1 1 -sharing)

10 -- sense of family in core group
1 1

1

2

yes

yes

—

autonomy in work

yes

--

personal

yes

growth

Problems and pressures:
13

-

power struggles between core group
and other members; jockeying for
status and influence

14

-

15 -

NA:

"dormant" or absent

core group feels responsibility but
none of the Dower

NA:

"dormant" or absent

non-core members feel left out of
important decisions

NA:

"dormant" or absent

16

-

organizational rules and regulations
apparent but not formally recognized
or written down

yes, to an extreme

17

-

outside agencies, especially funders,
demand tighter bookkeeping and internal accountabi i ty

yes

clientele/customers demand more consistent servi ces

yes

1

18

-
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absent, with the potential
to re-emerge when and
if MC takes on more
new
meters. Two other minor exceptions
to inform, differentiation
should
also be noted:
(1) no job descriptions exist now,
although they have
appeared in the past (ID-3); and
(2) the hiring of new members
appears
to be based on skills at
this point, although friendship
is still a factor (ID-4).

Other than the five exceptions,
then, MC has all the other

features of irrfj)^

di

fferentia_tion.

Of the consistent features, the

absence of written rules, regulations,
and procedures is particularly

apparent (ID-16), as are the tightening
membership boundaries (ID-3).

^ory_.

S tructural

of the Mechanics'

From Table

21

,

we can see that the development

Collective has one very obvious theme

sence of enduring formal structure.

-

a

general ab-

Founded by two mechanics in the

winter of 1976, MC was originally conceived
as the automotive repair
counterpart of

a

food cooperative:

it would be a consumer- focused or-

ganization dedicated to providing low-cost facilities,
tools and expertise to members of the community who wanted
to repair (or learn to repair) their own cars.

Due to this consumer orientation, the early meet-

ings of MC were open to the public and were attended
by the two founders

who casually staffed MC, other interested mechanics, and

of "cooperative" members.

In

a

fair number

order to make ends meet, the two founders

not only charged co-op members minimal fees, but also performed
some
direct repair work themselves.

The job of service manager,

a

common co-

ordinating role in the car repair business, was rotated weekly between
the two founders initially, and later, as more part-time mechanics

joined MC, among them all.

Most of the members'

time, however, was

spent supervising "cooperative" members and teaching classes to would-be

i

•

—

'

1
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do-i t-your-sel fers

The first major crisis at MC
occurred when the landlord, who
shared
the same building, balked
at the introduction of
"women's day classes"
held on Wednesdays (without any
men present). As a consequence
of this
conflict, MC was forced to relocate
in

early in 1977.

a

more expensive rented building

During the crisis, however, the
founders came to

a

sig-

nificant conclusion regarding the
viability of the food co-op model they
had chosen.
When it was time to search for a
new building, and later,
when it became necessary to move
MC's equipment, cooperative members

were conspicuous by their absence.

Evidently cooperative members were

much more interested in an inexpensive
place to fix their cars, than
they were in maintaining an organization
which could provide this low-

cost option.

With the increased rental overhead of the new
building,

the founders were forced to perform

pairs in order to pay the bills.

a

larger proportion of direct re-

The only other option would have been

to raise the fees charged to "cooperative"
members, clearly a less de-

sirable alternative.
repairs

During the spring of 1977, the volume of direct

(called "commercial business" to distinguish it from
"coopera-

tive" business) had grown considerably, and MC added two
additional

part-time mechanics.

Meetings were held only when needed, and although

they were usually announced publicly, and in advance, "cooperative" mem-

bers almost never attended.
By the early spring of 1977, the volume of commercial business had

increased to the point that the rotation of the service manager role was
no longer working.

With increased volume, the job required more contin-

uity and an increasing number of financial skills.

Since none of the
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members at MC really wanted the
job, they decided to hire
a mechanic
more skilled than themselves
from outside the existing
membership. After a rudimentary job description
was drawn up, MC advertised
the position and hired its first
service manager in the spring
of 1977.
His
duties, in addition to occasional
help with repair work and
supervision
of "cooperative" members, essentially
encompassed the scheduling of customers, ordering parts, answering
the phone, customer relations,
and
several financial responsibilities
(e.g., basic bookkeeping,
paying
bills, making deposits, etc.).

While the service manager was to
play

a

major role at MC, the members made it
quite clear during his hiring that
all

major decisions were still

to be made by all

the members.

With the new service manager, MC
operations became smoother and

much better coordinated.

MC moved to a larger garage space in
the sum-

mer of 1977, and after defining its
membership as paid collective members, began to have regular meetings every
two weeks.
1978,

the organization had instituted

members and shortly after that began

a

a

By the winter of

two-week trial period for new

somewhat formalized training pro-

gram for new members, all of whom at this point were
women.

The intro-

duction of women members at MC surfaced power struggles
that had been

brewing for some time between the core group of the two MC
founders and
the service manager, on one hand, and newer members, on the
other.

The

new women members demanded equality within the collective's decision-

making process,

a

demand which was mirrored by their straightforward at-

tempt to learn skills in

members made

a

a

traditionally male area.

Although the male

number of compromises with the women, the underlying is-

sues of control and power were never resolved satisfactorily, resulting
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instead in an uneasy truce.

During this period, the
"cooperative" side

of MC was beginning to receive
even less emphasis, as
collective members
became increasingly concerned
about earning a decent week's
salary.
Supervising the "cooperative" members
as they repaired their cars
was
often enjoyable, but the fees
that were charged never kept
up with
costs, forcing MC to seek more
commercial work in order to subsidize
their "cooperative" operations.
In response to growing
financial pressures, MC expanded in the summer
of 1978 at the same location, allowing
the members to work on several

commercial volume, however,

more cars at once.

With the increased

the amount of administrative work
also

mounted, putting an increasing amount
of pressure on the service manager's time.

The continuing power struggles and
lack of help from other

members combined with the pressures of the
growing business to eventually "burn out"

the service manager, forcing him to resign
from the orga-

nization in the fall of 1978.
With the service manager's resignation, much of MC's
formal organization began to fall apart.

The regular meeti ngs

,

trial

periods, and

training programs all faded, and commercial volume
declined, putting MC
on shaky financial

ground.

A replacement service manager, also

a

;

skilled mechanic from outside MC, was hired at the end of 1978
with the

hope that his presence would help bring some order to MC's business
affairs.

By the late summer of 1979, unfortunately, the new service mana-

ger's lack of skills had started to become apparent.

willing or unable

to

handle MC's bookkeeping, and as

nances fell into complete disarray.

By

He was either una

result, the fi-

this time, three of the long-

time members also left the organization, all pursuing opportunities
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which looked financially more
rewarding than their jobs
at MC.
These
resignations reduced the membership
to three
the service manager and
two other members.
Later in the fall, one of the
members discovered
that the dishonesty of the
service manager was in large
part to blame

~

for the MC's poor financial

nation.

health, and successfully demanded
his resig-

The two remaining members developed

a

coherent plan for both

paying off their creditors and
revitalizing MC's commercial business

throughout the winter of 1979-80.

By the spring, they were able
to add

the present half-time member,
who should be working full-time in
the

near future.

At present, the volume of commercial
business has begun to

return to previous levels and the remaining
members take pride in the

increased quality of their repair work.

Currently they are contemplat-

ing the re-incorporation of MC with
by-laws which formalize the organi-

zation as

a

collectively-run workplace.

Categorization.

The Mechanics' Collective is

a

Type

2

organiza-

tion, in that its development deviates at an
early point from the Holleb

and Abrams' secnario, but in ways which apparently
failed to turn around
the process of bureaucratization.

Reviewing MC's development, we find that the early days seemed
typical of consensual anarchy

.

Membership boundaries were fluid, no

tasks were differentiated, and the initial conception of MC
was

politicized one.

a

very

A little more than a year later, with the appearance

of the first basic job description and

a

tightening of the membership

boundaries, the organization clearly moved into the informal differentiation stage.

There was, however, one major event which stands out as an

anomaly at this time:

the hiring of

a

"qualified outsider" as the serv-
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ice manager,

wi thi

n

informal

diffe^ejUi^

we would expect that ex-

isting members, probably one
or both of the founders,
would emerge as
the persons informally
performing these "management"
functions at MC.
Actually, the hiring of
"qualified outsiders" is a major
feature of fordifferentiation, according to Holleb
and Abrams, in that it begins
the creation of formal
administrative hierarchies. During
the first
service manager's stay at MC,
however, none of the other
features of

51

formal

dmej^ijti^

down authority

-

mos t typical of growing formalization
of top-

ever emerged.

As a matter of fact, MC has
never moved

beyond the informal differentiation
stage.
It is probably more reasonable,
however,

to

view the hiring of the

first service manager as an early
possible step in the direction of con-

sensual democracy,

in

that members deliberately hired

a

person for

a

crucial garage position while at the same
time emphasizing the one-member, one-vote nature of the organization.

Unfortunately, the job even-

tually proved to be too much for the service
manager, and because no

other members were willing to share in his growing
number of administrative and financial tasks, he eventually resigned.

His replacement, in

addition to being less than honest, also lacked the skills
of his predecessor, further contributing to

organization and business.

a

general decline in all aspects of MC's

The members who currently remain at MC are

now particularly wary of the service manager role, indicating that
they

would never reinstitute the position again without

a

more formal struc-

ture of accountability, and also some mechanisms for distributing the

burden of additional
posi

ti

on.

tasks that tend to engulf the person holding this
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County Food Co^.

Serving almost 400 members
from 140 households and
about 100 non-members, the Country
Food Co-op (CFC) provides
its membership with a 15-20% discount
on their purchases in exchange
for 3-1/2

hours of monthly labor from each
household.
food items and also carried

a

goods and cleaning supplies.

CFC offers a full range of

number of non-food items, such
as paper

Although the bulk of work at CFC
is per-

formed by members, the organization
is staffed by

a

half-time manager

and assistant who coordinate the
efforts of members and oversee the
ordering of goods at CFC's rented
building.
In addition to fulfilling

monthly work requirements, member
households must leave with CFC
posit equal

a

de-

to their average weekly purchases,
an arrangement which not

only provides needed cash flow, but
also has allowed CFC to develop the
capital

necessary for its considerable inventory.

CFC are covered by a small

Operating costs at

"mark-up" on the wholesale prices

distributed to the membership.

of items

The total business volume at CFC ap-

proaches $150,000 annually, making it the fourth
largest organization in
a regional

federation of over 100 co-ops.

Current organizational practices

Most of the work at CFC follows

.

the weekly cycle characteristic of other "pre-order"
co-ops:
bers'

(1)

mem-

individual orders are collected early in the week and tabulated

for the entire co-op;

(2)

the co-op places its orders with various

wholesalers who deliver one or two days later; and (3) members pick up
and pay for their individual orders on
end of the week.
pattern.

a

distribution day towards the

At CFC, however, there are two additions to this basic

First of all, CFC carries an inventory of over 100 items less

.
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perishable than fresh produce, thus
eliminating the need for members
to
"ore-order" them. And secondly, CFC
operates an "extras store" at the
very end of the week, for both
members and non-members alike.

The "ex-

tras store" is an important addition
to a pre-order co-op, since members'

orders rarely add up to exact case units
of fresh produce, result-

ing in "extra" perishables each week.
sell

By opening one day each week to

"extras," as well as inventoried items, CFC
is able to dispose of

produce that might otherwise spoil and sell
additional inventoried goods
as wel

1

The labor necessary for operating CFC comes from
two sources

—

the

largest proportion from members fulfilling their
work requirement, the

remainder falling to the half-time manager and her
assistant.

Members

begin the cycle by tabulating the orders of individual
households and

giving the results to the paid staff, who place the total orders
and arrange deliveries with wholesalers.

As the deliveries arrive, the paid

staff and members unload and then establish prices for the incoming
items.

Simultaneously, member work crews fill orders of cheese and dry

goods from CFC's inventories.
til

All

of this activity gradually builds un-

members arrive in the evening to pick up the distributed orders.

The distribution process itself is undoubtedly the busiest

week at CFC.

time of the

Coordinated by the paid staff, the members working during

that particular week perform

a

number of functions:

in which workers behind a counter fill

(1)

"counter work,"

parts of members' orders from

produce boxes and the shelves behind them; (2) staffing the "front
desk," where members' work records are checked to insure that they are

eligible for their discount; (3) "cashiering"; and

(4)

cleaning up.

A

.
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day later, the "extras store"
is opened, once again staffed
by members

under the direction of the manager
and assistant.

About the only func-

tions that do not follow this weekly
pattern are bookkeeping and production of the occasional newsletter,
both performed by members, and inventory, which is done by the paid staff.

Within the work performed by members, there
are two major modes of

organization.

Most of this work is distributed on

a

walk-in basis as

members appear for their scheduled hours at CFC;
"walk-in" tasks are not
very difficult or complicated.

Tabulating orders, cashiering, and one

or two other complex job areas, on the other hand,
are organized in a

"brigade" fashion, in which particular groups of
households specialize
in

these tasks.

week for

a

"Cashiering," for example, requires two persons each

3-1/2 hour shift.

The total

"brigade" is composed of eight

households, two of which each send a member to work once every
two
weeks.

The advantage of this system is that there are an abundance of

these specialized workers among the "brigade" households, allowing re-

placement workers to be found easily in the event of sudden absences or
vacati ons

According to CFC's by-laws, the organization is
tional

democracy.

a

formal

constitu-

While the paid staff make day-to-day decisions, an

elected board of directors (BoD) makes all policy and major financial
decisions.

This board consists of no less than eight directors who are

elected at an annual meeting,

and it has numerous powers and duties,

including the power to appoint both

a

secretary and

a

treasurer.

Look-

ing more closely at the by-laws, however, it is evident that any co-op

member has the right to attend BoD meetings and also vote

.

Furthermore,
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quorum of ten co-op members
(including the directors and the
two paid
staff) is required before a BoD
meeting can conduct business.
In esa

sence, then, what initially appears
as

membership meeting.

a

BoD meeting is in fact an open

Meetings are to be held at least
monthly and all

decisions are made by majority rule,
including amendments to the bylaws.

Further examination of the by-laws
indicates that duties of the

BoD include, among other things,
annual reviews of the paid staff
and

their job descriptions, and the hiring
and firing of paid staff.
Unfortunately, the by-laws of CFC do not
accurately describe the

realities of the organization's governance
system.

Elections for new

directors have not been held at annual meetings
for almost three years,

and the terms of any past directors have all
expired.

As a result, the

now infrequent "BoD" meetings are attended by the
two paid staff, and
10-12 of the more interested CFC members.

Due to the manager's famili-

arity with all aspects of CFC's operations, and its
history, she plays
a

dominant role in the meetings.

To make matters worse, co-op members

usually avoid opposing the manager too strongly on issues, out of
that she might resign, an action which she threatens on occasion.

a

fear
On a

day-to-day basis, the manager is largely an unquestioned decision-maker.
Job descriptions do exist for the manager and her assistant, but

are currently so out-of-date that they are of limited usefulness.

The

"BoD" has not only failed to revise them, but has also never instituted
an annual

review of the two paid staff.

On the other hand, members of

the "BoD" in past years have developed a general set of job descriptions

for the "walk-in" work performed by members.
On occasion,

two formal vehicles of communication are employed at
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CFC.

A newsletter appears
sporadically (2-3 times a year),
offering

a

mix of recent "BoD" decisions,
upcoming issues, financial
reports, and
recipes.
Orientations for new members do
occur periodically as well,
usually in the fall, when large
numbers of new households join
CFC.
With the recent creation of

a

detailed pamphlet describing CFC
opera-

tions, however, it appears that
the formal

orientations, which presented

essentially the same information,
will in all likelihood be
discontinued.

f^r^.

Although CFC's membership includes

a

broad spectrum of

people from surrounding communities,
almost half of the members are in
their twenties and often students from
local colleges.

bership is defined in two different ways
holds.

-

Actually

mem-

as individuals and as house-

The individual membership category is employed
to bestow voting

rights for most situations.

Household membership is used more frequent-

ly, however, because households represent
the basic unit of ordering,

financial responsibility and labor at CFC.

course, to be both an individual and

a

household.)

tions of membership are clearly stated in
to all new CFC members.

In brief,

membership include the following:
ship fee;

(2)

a

(It is entirely possible, of

a

The formal obliga-

descriptive brochure handed

the formal obligations of household
(1) a non- refundable,

initial

member-

deposit equal to the household's average weekly pur-

chases, refundable upon termination of household membership; and
(3)
3-1/2 hours of labor every four weeks.

If household members fail

to

meet any of these requirements, they can have their member privileges
revoked, meaning that they can still order through CFC, but must pay

non-member prices (about 20% higher than member prices).

The most com-
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mon infraction, of course, is the failure
of households to fulfill their

monthly work requirements.

While the sanction of imposing non-member

prices on such households does formally
exist, it tends to be enforced

only sporadically, due to the fact that
the CFC is unable to utilize the

surplus of member labor that often arises.

As a result of spotty en-

forcement of membership requirements, only about
50-60% of CFC's member

households actually work as often as they should,
if at all.

Despite

the formality surrounding CFC membership, no
equivalent statement,
mal

for-

or informal, exists for the paid staff.
Due

to the dual nature of membership at CFC, two different
varieties

of turnover also exist.

about 20-25% annually,

Turnover among households usually amounts to
a

figure which can be somewhat misleading.

Since

many of the member households are "cooperative households" with their
own relatively high internal
dual

turnover, the rate of turnover for indivi-

members at CFC is substantially higher than for household members

-- approximately 40-50% annually.

Informal structure

.

Without

a

doubt, the manager at CFC wields a

considerable amount of informal power.

Not only does she made

a

number

of day-to-day operational decisions which spill over into policy areas,
but her opinions at "BoD" meetings are usually decisive because of an

awkward set of dynamics which have developed over the years of her tenure.

Due to her longeveity at CFC, the manager has effectively "out-

lasted" most of the membership interested in CFC's internal affairs,

giving her an almost exclusive working knowledge of all aspects of CFC's
operations.

To make matters worse, she is fairly protective of her

knowledge, and continues to absorb new tasks, often exclaiming, "If you
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want something done right, you've
got to do it yourself."
quence, all these factors create

a

this point largely irreplaceable

-

As a conse-

situation in which the manager
is at
no one in the membership would
want

the long hours for her small
part-time salary.

If she were to leave

CFC, it would probably take the
membership at least a year to understand

how the organization operates.

Due to CFC's dependence on this
manager,

members are reluctant to challenge her
in "BoD" meetings for fear that
she might actually act on her periodic
threat to quit.

manager's centrality is

a

Although the

"taboo" topic in her presence, members do
oc-

casionally discuss it among themselves.

Among members interviewed,

opinion was mixed on the seriousness of this
problem to CFC.

While some

members express strong concerns about her
"undemocratic style," others
are content for her to continue in the position,
feeling that any exces-

sive attempts on her oart to control the organization
would probably be

met with strong member opposition.
In

addition, the manager and her assistant, along with two or three

long-term members, form
ings.

a

core group that is clearly evident at meet-

Generally, the members of this core group merely support the

manager in meetings by skewing discussion and votes in her favor.
Choosing to follow the manager's lead, they rarely take leadership positions themselves.
rect.

In

between meetings, their influence seems more di-

Most of these core group members visit with the manager at the

co-op during the week, helping with her tasks and discussing how certain
issues and problems facing CFC should be approached in the future.

This

dynamic surfaces with some obviousness in meetings, when the manager and
two or three others suddenly support a solution to a problem which has

.
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barely surfaced as

a

topic of discussion.

It should also be pointed
out that neither the
manager or her as-

sistant were ever formally elected
to these positions; instead,
they
literally "grew" into them over
the years.

Additional notes
.

Other unique features of the
Country Food Co-op

include the following:

The manager's informal power
and influence is Dartirularlv,
a
*
1'? 30 "1
t0 mnter
working\iy
FC ^rtri
*
'tlonX ""Ar'thp
P ressures mount towards the end of the
2S
l
day, tho
the manager !tends
to loudly criticize members
who make
innocent mistakes
The effect on some members is
so negative
that they purposely try to work their
scheduled hours in a way
as to avoid contact with the manager.
On the other hand, the
manager seems quite unaware of this
effect, often exclaiming
when workers are late or absent,
"People just don't know ow
to cooperate any more!"
1.

m^

Despite the central issue of an overbearing
manager, CFC
is known in its regional federation
as one of the better-run
co-ops.
The fairly elaborate work structure (which
has little
to do with the manager) has in fact
resulted from years of effort on the part of several generations
of devoted members
In fact, many of the work system
innovations are developed by
members who wanted to circumvent the "boss-like"
behavior of
the manager.
These efforts are usually implicit attempts to
circumvent the manager's tendency to accumulate sole
knowledge
of an increasing number of CFC tasks, especially
those relating to distribution days.
By developing basic job descriptions for tasks performed by members, not only can the
negative tone of subordination to the manager be diminished,
but
general knowledge of CFC's operations, previously the province
of the manager, can be passed on to members on an ongoing basis as well
2.

Other than fulfilling the work requirement, member participation at CFC is very low for a theoretically member-controlled organization.
Of the almost 400 members, only about
15-20 at most can be turned out for a "crucial" meeting -which amounts to no more than 5%. While such a low rate of
participation could be seen as a sign of general acceptance of
the current state of affairs at CFC, there is probably at
least one other important factor.
Meetings at CFC have a long
history of lasting for too long and being very poorly run.
In
addition, the few members who do have process skills are rare3.
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ly supported in their attempts
to establish a regular meetinn
format,
meeting roles,
, ,
^
,
or the
ui
uic utM
detailed deci s Ion-Ski ng proce
9 D rol & "
dures required
,

,

by large meetings.
meetinas

CFC while a disappointment as
a member-controlled organization, is undoubtedly a financial
success at present a com
bination of facts which has led some
newer members to 'con ?ude
that CFC s excel ent financial
condition to the presence of a
strong manager." Conversations with
older members, however
seem to suggest that the opposite may
be closer to the truth'
^at financial success leads to a "strong manager."
According to these members, when the
financial condition is good
member participation tends to be low
the co-op seems to 'be
operating properly and their participation
"doesn't really
seem to be needed." Lack of member
participation, of course
creates a vacuum of decision-making and
work that a manager is
likely to fill
creating a "strong" manager. On the other
hand, when the finances deteriorate to the
point where members
food prices rise, member participation invariably
increases
they wonder where their money is going and
suddenly
begin to attend meetings again; thus "weakening"
the manager.
4.

"

-

-

—

Research relationship

.

My original

request for CFC research parti-

cipation was willingly cleared by 18 members present at
an annual meeting, despite some concerns raised by the manager.
in large part due to the fact that

I

had been

a

This willingness was

member of CFC from 1971-

76, and had served as one of its first directors towards the end of my

membership.

My part of the exchange consisted of delivering a talk at

the same meeting regarding the existing literature in my research area
and its particular relevance to food co-ops.

Largely as

a

of this talk, several members at the meeting later compiled

consequence
a

basic docu-

ment for CFC which outlines the organization's history, basic member job

descriptions and member obligations.
out to new members joining CFC.

One other part of my past relationship

with CFC should also be mentioned.
self and others at

a

Currently, this document is handed

Largely due to issues raised by my-

membership meeting in the late summer of 1975,

I
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was asked to serve on
tional difficulties.

study group to look into

a

a

number of organiza-

Among other changes, this
committee proposed the

idea of formal by-laws and an elected
BoD for the not so implicit
purpose of countering the current manager's
growing informal power.
During
this period, the committee became
entangled in a long series of power

struggles with the manager

-

she was fairly aware of our intent.

As a

result of our work, virtually all of the
study committee was elected to
the new BoD in the early spring of
1976.

months,

I

After serving for several

relocated that fall and consequently resigned
from the BoD and

also terminated my membership.
Interviews.
terviewed:

In

all, eight past and present members of
CFC were in-

the manager, somewhat briefly; three past
members of the

BoD, two of whom are still members; two new members;
one long-term mem-

ber who recently left the area; and one of the original
founders.
Other ^ojjrce s of info rma t i on
of several

.

Other materials included the minutes

meetings, two versions of the by-laws, the report of the

study committee, the newly produced documents describing CFC to
incoming
members, several newsletters, and an extensive personal file

while

I

was a member and later,

a

Current developmental state.
Holleb and Abrams

,

I

developed

director.

According to the stages described by

the present state of CFC is best described as one of

informal differentiation

,

although it leans somewhat ambiguously in the

direction of both consensual democracy and formal differentiation

.

Part

of this apparent complexity stems from the fact that CFC has both members and a paid staff, with different features characteristic of the two

groups.

Other complications arise from two prominent factors at CFC.
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Nominally, the organization
is

a

constitutional

democracy which formal-

izes member authority by
means of an elected BoD
and written by-laws.
While such an arrangement is
typically a major feature of
consensual

democracy we find that at CFC this
governance structure rarely
functions as it should, if at all.

At present there are no
elected direc-

tors and consequently, no one
to hold responsible for
performing the

duties of the BoD, such as
conducting personnel reviews of
the paid
staff.
Secondly, CFC has a "manager", a
feature which could be typical

casual

of either

<Wj^ or

fomn

which way the authority structure
works
spectively.

ambiguous.

differentiation : depending upon

-

bottom-up or top-down, re-

At present, the actual structure
of authority at CFC is
If the members wanted to assert
their authority,

reconstitute the BoD as spelled out in the
by-laws.

they could

On the other hand,

if they continue to ignore the formal
structure set by the by-laws, the

manager could end up directing the organization
to
she does now.

entiation stage

In short,

—

the central

a

greater extent than

issues within the informal differ-

those of power and inclusion/exclusion in the deci-

sion-making group -- have never been resolved successfully
at CFC.
Power struggles, particularly regarding decision-making,
still continue

within the organization, largely between members who attend
"BoD" meetings, and the manager, her assistant and two or three
core group members.

In sum,

it might be said that CFC currently lies in an "advanced

stage" of in forma 1 d i f f ere n ti

a ti on

,

in

that some features of the organi-

zation seem to be consistent with other stages, but the central

of informal differentiation have yet
With

issues

to find their resolution.

this overview of CFC in mind, and with the recognition that

228

there are really two levels
of organization

-

remb ers and paid staff

the items in Table 22 become
more understandable.

-

Examining the items

carefully, we see that the major
features relating to power and
inclusion/exclusion issues still remain
at CFC ( I D- 7 10, 13, 14, and
15).

,

On the other hand, several
other characteristics are either
absent or

only partially true,

a

situation requiring

of the other items in this stage.

member labor is informal

a

detailed review of several

Although much of the division of

(ID-2), it is clear that

a

large degree of for-

mal division of labor separates
the tasks of the coordinator and
her as-

sistant from those of the membership.
ically formal

Boundaries for members are atyp-

(ID-3), while membership boundaries
for the staff are un-

stated at this time.

Similarly, membership at CFC is open to anyone

willing to assume clearly stated responsibilities,
while membership in
the core group is based entirely on friendship
with the manager (ID-4).
CFC has formal decision-making procedures
as specified in the by-laws,

but they are often ignored or casually reinvented
as if they did not exist (ID-8).

Several formal

rules and regulations exist for members (ID-

16), which are enforced somewhat haphazardly, but no equivalent
proce-

dures govern the paid staff, with one exception.

The by-laws do contain

certain sections (i.e., hiring, firing, and review) which clearly subordinate the paid staff to the "BoD", but they have never been implemented

And finally, issues of accountability raised by outside agencies (i.e.,
banks, town officials, etc.) have diminished considerably at this point
(ID-17), as have member demands for more consistent services from the

co-op (ID-18).

In summary,

then, we can see that CFC has the mechanisms

in place for asserting the final authority of the membership, but for

:

:
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TABLE 22
INFORMAL DIFFERENTIATION ITEMS
FOR THE COUNTRY FOOD CO-OP
Characteri sties

de-emphasis of ideology
informal division of labor;
descri ption

yes
first job

mal

continued fluid membership but inforboundaries tighten

staff, yes; members, no

membership based on friendship or
"good vibes"

members, no; core group, yes

-

organization in period of rapid expansion/implementation
Leadership:
5

6

7

yes, for staff and members;
some
formal divison of labor

--

8 --

yes, still expanding rapidly

formation of the core group

yes

day-to-day decisions made by core
group with major decisions left to
entire membership

yes, although core group exerts
strong influence on all decisions

lack of formal decision-making
proce-

no, but rarely used

dures
Rewards
9

--

10 --

1

increasing effectiveness and compettence (learning through skill-sharing)

yes

sense of family in core group

yes

autonomy in work

1

staff, yes; members, no but increasing

12 --

personal growth
Problems and pressures:

staff, yes; only involved members

13 -- power struggles between core group
and other members; jockeying for

yes

status and influence
14

- core group feels responsibility but
none of the power

15

-

non-core members feel
important decisions

16

-

organizational rules and regulations
apparent but not formally recognized

left out of

or wri tten down
17

-

yes, but manager obviously feels
some power
yes, periodically

exist for members, but not usually
enforced; do not exist for staff

outside agencies, especially funders,
demand tighter bookkeeping and internal accountabi i ty

yes, but less now

clientele/customers demand more consi stent servi ces

less often now

1

18

-
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several reasons, these mechanisms
either do not work or are
not used.
Consequently, CFC still remains
in the informal
d^entUtion stage,
wavering between possible futures
of formal
or

affiwsaH^

sual

democracy

con^

.

Stn^cj^

country Food Co-op was started

in

the spring

of 1971 by two men who decided
that the town of Country needed
and could
support its own co-op (see Table
23).
Previously, many town residents
had traveled to a large co-op
located in a neighboring town, but
had
been somewhat dissatisfied by the
distance, the co-op's large size, and
its continual

state of disorganization.

the two founders located a building
with

rent on

a

After surveying local interest,
a

large room which they could

once-a-week basis and established CFC as

erder food co-op.

a

very basic pre-

Instead of buying directly from wholesalers,
however,

CFC initially placed one large order at
the large neighboring co-op, and
then trucked the order back to Country for
distribution to CFC members.
Due

to the rental

arrangement, the co-op would be set up for distribu-

tion on one day each week and then be completely
dismantled until the

following week.

During this period, CFC operated in an atmosphere of

complete confusion and chaos, with 30 member households
sharing in all
the tasks.

Orders would be lost, the produce was of unpredictable qual-

ity, and there was always too much or too little of every food
item or-

dered.

Despite these shortcomings, CFC's first term of operation was

moderate success.

Common to most small pre-order co-ops, CFC then

closed for the summer -- both the volume of orders and the prices of
fresh produce declined to the point where it was unreasonable to oper-

ate

.
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For the first three years,
CFC operated on this
seasonal cycle,

dosing every
meant

a

sunuier, but nonetheless
attracting more members, which

greater dollar volume, and

of food items.

a

slowly but steadily expanding
range

Meetings of the membership were
held on an occasional

basis throughout the operati
ng year, but because of their reputation
for
disorganization, were usually attended
sparsely.
All the necessary labor was still provided by members,
in exchange for their lower
food
prices, but one of the remaining
founders, along with two or three
other
members, began to emerge as a
consistent core group within CFC.
This
group invested

a

disproportionate amount of weekly time and
energy in

keeping CFC alive and growing.

In

fact, by the end of 1973, the
remain-

ing founder began to be referred
to by other members as CFC's
"coordin-

ator.

"

In many ways,

the formation of the core group was
both a cause and

result of the erratic way in which most member
households fulfilled
their monthly work requirements.

Although the requirement was

a

recog-

nized obligation of CFC members, the work records
were poorly kept, and
no sanctions other than social pressure were
brought to bear if the re-

quirement was not met.
on distribution days,

Due to the unpredictable number of member work
the "coordinator" and other core group members

gradually emerged as the only individuals who could be counted
on from

week to week.

When members repeatedly failed to perform

a

specific

task or perform it poorly, core group members would often step in and
do
the task themselves.

In

this way, many tasks originally shared by the

members became the regular domain of the core group.

At this time, CFC

was growing, of course, resulting in brand new tasks which also fell to
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core group meters.

With the increasing
centrality of the core group

however, the initial problem
with member labor gradually
worsened. Over
time, members became even
more lax at fulfilling
their work requirement,
realizing that a few regulars
and the coordinator would
always be at the
co-op to do what was needed
on distribution day.
In this fashion, a
vicious circle began:
members were erratic in working,
which gave more
tasks to the core group; but
as the core group took more
obvious responsibility for co-op tasks, members
saw their participation as less
essential.
During this same period, a similar
dynamic seemed to develop in
regard to CFC membership meetings.

As one member said,

disorganized meeting when you know that
will make the decisions anyway?"

a

small

"Why go to a

group of people can and

After joining CFC, new members gener-

ally seemed to come to the same
conclusion after their first one or two

membership meetings.

Consequently, most meetings were sparsely
attended

and the core group usually constituted
ity of members present.

On several

a

strong minority if not

a

major-

occasions, no members would come to

meetings, placing the core group in the
position of making decisions by
themselves or delaying them until

a

new meeting could be called.

Re-;

peatedly frustrated by the lack of member attendance,
the core group

often chose to make decisions by themselves, further
convincing members
that their participation in meetings was unnecessary
for CFC to operate.

After

a

long series of conflicts with the rented building's land-

lord, CFC discovered in the spring of 1974 that it would be
evicted dur-

ing the summer.

continuously,

a

Another building was soon located which could be used
significant improvement over the one-day-a-week rental

basis of the first building.

With continuous occupancy, CFC was able to

create

permanent distribution point
for their ore-order
arrangement
complete with permanent counters,
scales, coolers, and even
shelves for
an inventory.
After two months of preparation,
CFC moved to the new
location in the summer of
1974, which was also their
first year of summer operations.
The new facility not only
gave CFC a permanent and
identifiable location, but also
the space necessary to expand
its produce line.
As the membership and volume
of CFC continued to grow, an
a

increasing amount of work fell
to members in the core group.

extensive time commitment, the
"coordinator" asked at

a

Due to his

general meeting

that he be reimbursed at the rate
of $25 each week, and the few
members

present agreed.

With this first salary, another
vicious circle began.

Other core groups members began to feel
somewhat slighted by the decision; they, too, put in long hours
without reimbursement.
fall

During the

of 1974, three other core group members
also began receiving small

salaries as "coordinators."

With the arrival of these salaried posi-

tions, however, members became even less
responsible about fulfilling

the work requirement, sometimes saying, "Why
should we do such and such

work, when we already have four paid people to
do it?"

Again, as a re-

sult of continuing expansion and declining member
efforts, the work of
the paid coordinators continued to grow,
pushing some of them to ask for

either salary increases or additional paid staff, both of
which were
agreed to at meetings

(bringing the paid staff to

total of five).

a

As CFC entered its second summer of continuous operation in
1975,

it became clear that the organization was entering

a

financial crisis.

Checks bounced, bills went upaid, and wholesalers became reluctant to
deliver.

In

desperation,

the paid staff decided on their own to raise
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the "mark-up" on member
purchases in order to generate
the needed cash
flow, not once but twice.
Since these crucial decisions
were made without formally announcing a
membership meeting, a large
proportion of the
members were enraged
the cost of their food
had climbed rapidly and
the crucial decisions had
been made by only a small
group.
To make matters worse, the paid staff had
also altered the work requirements
in a

-

clearly inequitable way.
in

Due to these volatile issues,
member meetings

the late summer of 1975 were
very well attended.

Throughout the dis-

cussions, however, it continually
appeared that the core group was
withholding vital information from the
members.
In reaction, the membership

established

a

"study group" of seven members which
was to make

ed examination of all aspects of
CFC and produce

findings and recommendations.

a

a

detail-

report detailing

This study group met throughout the fall

and winter of 1975-76, finally presenting
their work in the spring.
While they uncovered several questionable
financial arrangements which
were to prove embarrassing to the core group
of paid staff, their major

conclusion was that CFC was paying too many salaried
staff for it to
keep food prices significantly lower than
the supermarkets.

In fact,

paid staff were performing several tasks previously
taken care of by

members.
tions:

The study group then presented two major areas of recommenda(1)

that CFC accept

a

set of by-laws establishing an elected BoD

with policy-making and personnel review powers; and
(2) that CFC imple-

ment

a

"brigade" labor system which would allow members to reliably per-

form much of the work previously done by paid staff.

The meetings at

which both the report and recommendations were discussed openly surfaced
the struggle for control that had been brewing for some time between the
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paid staff and the study
group.

In

the end,

the study group prevailed

and three members of the
paid staff left CFC
altogether,

m

addition,

all

the members of the study
group were elected to CFC's
first BoD,
largely because of their
obvious knowledge of the co-op
and the disinterest of other members. At
the same time , however, one
of the two

women remaining from the
previous (paid) core group was
also elected,
precipitating a major debate over
whether or not she should have
voting
rights on the BoD as a paid
staffer.
Eventually she was granted voting
rights and the new BoD set about
implementing the study group's remaining recommendations as well as
other new policies.
For example, the new
BoD developed the first formal
sanction at CFC for members who failed
to
fulfill

their work requirements.

If member households neglected
their

monthly work hours, they promptly lost
their member food discount, paying supermarket prices at CFC instead.

During this period the one woman

coordinator who served on the BoD began to emerge
as the cental figure
at CFC, overshadowing the other remaining
coordinator.

Although the new

labor system for members reduced the overall
amount of work falling to
paid coordinators, the remaining tasks had to
be divided now between two

coordinators instead of five.
a

Since one of the coordinators now played

major role at CFC, her salary was raised to reflect her
very busy

half-time commitment.
Over the summer of 1976, the "brigade" system was slowly expanded
to a number of CFC tasks.

Many of these innovations promised to under-

mine the job areas performed by the dominant coordinator, however, and
she repeatedly stalled their implementation.

With the reduced number of

salaries, CFC's financial health rapidly improved, making it possible to
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lower the

W-up,"

a

fact which pleased the
existing rubers and at-

tracted new ones.
During the winter of 1976-77,
the new BoD began to
develop its
first serious difficulties.
Several of the original
directors left the
area, creating vacancies
faster than replaces could
be found and
voted in.
By the summer of 1977,
several new and vocal nepers
decided
that the problem could be
remedied by altering the
by-laws to allow any
individual CFC member to vote
at BoD meetings, in addition
to the re-

maining directors.

The effect, of course, was to
dilute the intent of

the original by-laws:

to create a stable body of
elected policy-makers

at CFC who could, among other things,
counter the possible abuses of
power by paid staff. After this change,
the BoD meetings were largely

indistinguishable from the sparsely attended
membership meetings which
preceded them.

Members at the new "BoD" meetings tended
to turn over

at roughly the same 40-50% annual

bers at CFC, creating

a

rate characteristic of individual mem-

situation in which the dominant coordinator
came

to be one of the few original

BoD members always in attendance.

In

addition, the turnover of meeting members
gradually enhanced the informal

power of the dominant coordinator

-

her detailed and continuous

knowledge of CFC's history and operations gave her
opinions
able air of authority.

As

a

justifi-

the other original BoD structure fell apart,

the implementation of the "brigade" system, the
work requirement sanctions, and the personnel review process also deteriorated
to

—

largely due

the influence of the dominant coordinator, who never really
approved

of any of these innovations.
"BoD" meetings,

As new members became involved in the

they did take some positive steps, however.

Although

238

much of the

"Mgade" system

was soon forgotten,

rangements for members were
made more explicit.

the existing wor k ar-

The first set of gen-

eral job descriptions
for members were created
in the spring of 1978
And, in the fall of
1979, on the advice of a
speaker at their annual

meting, roughly the same group
of interested members created
tation document which included
menfcer job descriptions,

obligations, and

a

a

an orien-

list of member

history of the organization.

Since the demise of the original
BoD structure in the summer
of
1977, however, little else has changed
at CFC except for the dominant

coordinator's title.

Sometime during the winter of
1978-79, her title

shifted from "coordinator" to
"manager", an informal change with
no
clearcut origins. At this point,
the future direction of CFC is
some-

what unclear.

Although CFC is

a

financial success, the fate of its

governance process continues to vacillate
uneasily between control by
the membership and control by its
manager.

Categorization.

The Country Food Co-op is a Type

2

organization

-

its pattern of development deviates
signi ficantly from the Holleb and

Abrams' model, but still

failed to stop the process of bureaucratiza-

tion.

CFC's founding days in the spring of 1971 were
very typical of the

consensual ajiarchy, stage.

Loosely organized by the two founders, CFC

was characterized by relatively fluid boundaries,
undifferentiated labor, and general confusion.

During the next two years, however,

a

dis-

tinct core group and "coordinator" began to emerge, both
features of the
informal differentiation stage.

By the time that CFC had moved to its

new location in 1974, this stage had developed more fully.

The core

.
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group became largely synonymous
with CFC's "coordinators",
individuals
who never were formally elected
or hired, but simply grew
into their positions at CFC. After hearing
the report of the study
group in the
early spring of 1976, the
mentership voted to establish
a set of by-laws
and an elected BoD in order
to formalize member control
at CFC.
These
arrangements, of course, created
a constitutional democracy,
one major
step in the direction of
consejnsual dejmcrac^.
According to the Holleb
and Abrams' scenario, we would
not expect to see such changes
until a
crucial choicepoint had been reached
in the formal ^Ij^rejUijtion
stage.

At the time that CFC members decided
to implement

constitu-

a

tional democracy, however, the
organization was still in the

differentia tion stage.

As we have seen, however,

normal

the constitutional

democracy was not in place very long before
new members effectively dis-

mantled the structure, diluting formal member
control.

In summary,

then, the attempt to move towards
consensual dejnocracy_ at CFC apparently

failed, leaving in place to the present day
the unresolved issues of

power and control so typical of informal
differentiation

.

Summary of Cases

From Table 24, we can see

a

general summary of the eight individu-

al

cases, arranged by "Type" and indicating their current developmental

s ta

te

The absence of
tion.

a

single Type

1

organization deserves an explana-

Despite repeated attempts on my part, no true Type

1

organiza-

tions could be found -- organizations whose development faithfully follows the progression of stages outlined by Holleb and Abrams.

Although
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TABLE 24

GENERAL SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Organization Type
Type

1

Type

2

Type

3

Name

Grocery Collective

informal differentiation
since 1974

Restaurant Collective

informal differentiation
since 1977

Magazine Group

beginning formal differen
tiation 1980

Mechanics' Collective

informal differentiation
since 1977

Country Food Co-op

informal differentiation
since 1974

Warehouse Collective

consensual democracy since
1979 but some features of
informal differentiation
remaining

Literature Col lecti ve

moving from informal differentiation to consensual
democracy 1980

Studio Col lecti ve

consensual democracy since
1974
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number of the organizations
appeared initially to be
likely candidates
for this category, close
scrutiny of their developmental
histories invariably revealed that there
had been at least brief,
formal attests
a

to

move towards

consensu

democracy, prior to the
formal

^erentiation_

stage.
In all,

there were five Type

the Holleb and Abrams
'

2

organizations which deviated from

scenario, but failed to either
stop or inhibit

the process of bureaucratization:

Grocery Collective, Restaurant
Col-

lective, Magazine Group, Country
Food Co-op, and Mechanics'
Collective.
In all

but one of the cases, these
organizations still remain in the
in-

formal

dmej^nt^

The one exception, of course,
is the

Magazine Group, which at this point
appears to be moving rapidly from

Morml

differentiation to formal differentiation

it should be pointed out that all

have been Type
two,

1

five of the Type

At the same time,

.

2

organizations would

organizations, had it not been for one, or
sometimes

formal attempts to create organizational
structure characteristic

of consensual ,demc^racy_.

If we were to ignore these attempts, all
five

cases would then seem to follow the Holleb
and Abrams' scenario quite

closely.

And finally, there are three Type

3

whose development was not only anomalous
Abrams

organizations
in

-

organizations

terms of the Holleb and

progression, but also relatively successful, given their
appar-

ent recovery from or avoidance of the bureaucratization
process.
ly,

Clear-

the Studio Collective stands as an exemplary alternative
institu-

tion, moving directly from consensual anarchy to consensual
democracy

.

The other two cases in this category are also promising, although
less
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clear-cut.

The Warehouse Collective,
largely because of its
i„ cl usion
in the Federation's
constitutional democracy,
q ualifies as a consensual
^ocracj,, although see elements
are either still lacking
process of being put in place.
,„ the case of the
Literature Collective, the organization is
currently midway between info™!
differentiation and consent democracy,
but quickly moving towards
the latter.

or^hT^

Altogether, then, we find that
none of the eight cases
include
"first wave" alternative institutions
typical of those studied by
Holleb
and Abrams. All the organizations
are apparently "second wave"
alternative institutions, although only
three have successfully developed
in
ways which reflect their original
consensual/democratic ideals.

CHAPTER

VIII

DISCUSSION

Introduction
This discussion of the eight
case studies presented in the
previous
chapter has three major sections.
First, we will briefly review
the

general characteristics of the
eight cases.

Since all eight organiza-

tions are "second wave" alternative
institutions, we should also comment
on the differences between
these organizations and the "first
wave" al-

ternative institutions examined by
Holleb and Abrams.

of Type

1

While the absence

organizations in the sample prevents detailed
comparisons of

this sort, some overall

contrasts are still possible.

Secondly, we will

look at the structural factors which
differentiate the Type

tions from the less successful Type
will

2

organizations.

In

3

organiza-

particular, we

attempt to evaluate the proposition that there
are three major

areas of structural components that are
necessary to keep alternative

institutions alternative.

And lastly, we will briefly consider some of

the non-structural features of the eight sample
organizations.

Before

we begin, however, there are three important
considerations to bear in
mind.

Reducing the case study data to manageable proportions

.

As we have

seen, the case study approach of this research has generated
a set of
data which is incredibly rich, but at the same time, potentially over-
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whelming.

Had time and space allowed,
of course, even more material

could have been included in the
case studies.

In

order to make the task

of comparative analysis reasonable
under such conditions, two
devices
were used.
First, some small

details and supplementary
information not

included in the case studies are
occasionally employed in both the comparisons and their interpretation.
Wherever such material is introduced,
however, it is clearly noted. And
secondly, the comparisons are kept
at
a

level of analysis

that allows patterns to become
recognizable, but not

mired in unnecessary detail.

This approach is quite appropriate
given

the next consideration.

Recognizing the limitations of the sample

Despite the richness of the

.

case studies, it is important to recognize
that the sample includes only

eight organizations from
set real

a

particular geographic region, factors which

limits on both the validity of possible findings,
and the de-

gree to which these findings can be generalized.

Furthermore, we need

to acknowledge that the sample is limited not
only in size and geogra-

phy, but in time as well.

from

a

As we have seen,

the sample organizations are

different "generation" than those studied by Holleb and Abrams,

and undoubtedly promise to change even more
words, the data are very time-bound.

as

time passes.

In

other

What was true of these organiza-

tions yesterday may not be true tomorrow

—

they can collapse, expand,

or even drastically reorganize themselves in previously unexpected ways.

And finally, all these limitations point to the necessity of one last
consi deration.

Maintaining an interventionist perspective

.

In essence,

the immensity

245

of the data and their limited
representativeness, in term, of
numbers
and time, re-create fairly
accurately the conditions which
the interventionist concerned with alternative
institutions must endure in real
life.
There are always a huge number
of details from a limited number
of tentative cases, all of which
can become rapidly outdated.
Despite
these conditions, the interventionist
is nonetheless constantly
forced
by client organizations to
generate practical

and temporary data set.

answers from this unwieldy

Thus the interventionist must
quickly come to

at least tentative conclusions about
what works and what does not work,

and be ready to apply these conclusions
to real organizations in

a

state

of need.
I

as

invite the reader to take the perspective
of an interventionist

we discuss the results of this research,
pretending that this treat-

ment of the data must be the basis of tomorrow's
consultation with one

of the less successful alternative institutions
As we will

see, such

a

in

the research sample.

perspective is not only helpful in understanding

the results, but also very necessary for their
interpretation.

With all

these considerations in mind, let us now turn to discussion
of the case

studies.

General

Samp! e Characteristics

The most obvious feature shared by all eight organizations

is

their

deviation from the developmental scenario described by Holleb and Abrams.
In

their model, of course, no formal structures consistent with consen-

sual/democratic ideals emerge until an alternative institution enters
the formal differentiation stage.

In

each of the eight sample organiza-
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tions, however, there were
distinct attempts to establish
formal, con-

sensual/democratic structures ^rior
to the formal
From Table 25, we can see that
in four of the cas

differejiU^

stage

es^^sT^empt

.

to

move in the direction of
consensual democracy occurred during
infp_rmal

dll^renti^,
occurred during

while in the four remaining instances,
these attempts
c onsensua

l

anarchy.

As we should recall, the
criterion

for these early structures is
that they were either actions
or sets of

procedures which first represented the
formal expression of final authority on the part of an organization's
members.
Examining Table 25
more closely, we see that the attempts
at formal structure fall into two
general categories.

In

five of the cases, the first formal
structure

was largely one of coordination, in
which the persons performing this

function were either representatives of
departments, or elected or hired
by the entire membership.

In the

remaining three cases, the first at-

tempts at formal structure consisted of the
implementation of various

constitutional democracies, arrangements which largely
affected the
areas of decision-making and membership boundaries.

Due to "early" attempts to move in the direction of
consensual de-

mocracy, then, all eight organizations qualify as "second
wave" alter-

native institutions.

The inability to locate "first wave" alternative

institutions typical of the Holleb and Abrams sample could, of course,
be due to the possibility that such organizations are merely
more diffi-

cult to identify or less willing to engage in research participation.
In my

opinion, however, this was not the case.

only eight organizations in rural

way constitute

a

While an examination of

regions of New England does not in any

comprehensive survey of existing alternative institu-
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TABLE 25

DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF SAMPLE
ORGANIZATIONS DURING FIRST
ATTEMPT AT CONSENSUAL/DEMOCRATIC
STRUCTURE

Organization
Grocery
Col

1

informal

ecti ve

Wa rehouse
Col 1 ecti ve

Li

terature

Col

1

^elopjrient^^
differentiation
informal
differentiation

(1975)
formal

inclusion in
larger constitutional
democracy (1979)

member hiring of coordinator (1978)

consensual anarchy

election of coordinators

Coll ecti ve

Magazine Group

election of coordinators

consensual anarchy

ecti ve

Restaurant

Structure

(1976)
i

n fo rma

1

differentiation

representative "publisher's group" (1979)

Studio Collective

consensual anarchy

constitutional democracy
with by-laws and elected
officers (1974)

Mechanics

consensual anarchy

member hiring of service
manager (1977)

informal
differentiation

constitutional democracy
with by-laws and elected
Board of Di rectors

Col

1

1

ecti ve

Country Food Co-op

(1976)
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tions,

think it is safe to say that
these results, at least
in the
particular geographical regions,
indicate the current predominance
of
"second wave" alternative
institutions.
And, as a consequence of
several years of consultation
with alternative institutions,
I would say in
addition that this trend is
generally true not only in greater
New England, but nationally as well.
In one way, however, the
term "predominance" can be somewhat misleading.
I

While many of the "first wave"
alternative institutions of the type
studied by Holleb and Abrams have
disappeared altogether, others have

been transformed into "second wave"
organizations by later structural

innovations consistent with consensual/democratic
ideals.
Co-op, for example, appears to be one
such organization.

Country Food
Recalling that

CFC was founded in 1971, we can see
that based on its first five years
alone, it clearly qualified as
it had no formal

a

"first wave" alternative institution

structures consistent with consensual democracy.

-

Fur-

thermore, CFC progressed very slowly through the
Holleb and Abrams

stages during this period, never moving beyond informal
differentiation
In

.

1976, however, member attempts to establish a formal
constitutional

democracy at CFC "transformed" it into

a

"second wave" organization.

This pattern, incidently, is not uncommon among food
co-ops elsewhere.
In

CFC's Federation in 1979, for instance, members at two other food
co-

ops were engaged in almost identical attempts to create formal constitutional

democracies under the same conditions.

As we can see then,

the

distinction between "first wave" and "second wave" alternative institutions can be merely a function of passing time -- and it should be.

As

structural innovations become known, and as internal crises demand reso-
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lution,

enters of alternative institutions
often attempt

to improve and

refine their organizations in
ways consistent with founding
ideals.
As
we can see, then, the
"predominance" of "second wave"
alternative institutions is not only due to the
emergence of new, more structurally
sophisticated organizations, but
also to the re-definition of
older,
"first wave" organizations that
had not progressed beyond
irrformai dif-

ferenttati °" bGf0re thei> first attempts
to create consensual /democratic
structures.
Although the "predominance" of
"second wave" organizations
in

the research sample can be easily
explained, the reasons for their

relative structural sophistication
are much more difficult to identify.
In

essence, we are asking not how, but
why the eight sample organiza-

tions differ from those studied by
Holleb and Abrams.

Although analyses

later in the chapter will shed some light
on this question, answers at
this point can only be framed in general

terms.

Bearing in mind the fact that all eight sample
organizations attempted to create consensual/democratic structures
prior to informal

differentiation, it appears that the major "choicepoint"
in the Holleb

—

and Abrams model

between bureaucracy and consensual democracy

-

may

be occurring earlier in the sample organizations
than in those examined

by Holleb and Abrams.

As pointed out in previous chapters, the organi-

zations studied by Holleb and Abrams seemed largely unaware of this
crucial

choice unti

1

the formal differentiation stage.

Apparently, the mem-

bers of the eight organizations in the present study were cognizant
of

these two options at an earlier stage of development.

At this point,

however, we can only speculate about the reasons for their relatively
"early" awareness.

For example, we would assume that members in the

250

present sample may have
learned f r0 m past experiences
with other alternative institutions. As
a matter of fact, a
large proportion of members
from the sample organizations
had also lived in
"cooperative households"
during the 1970V
These living arrangers,
of course, can be quite
instructive about attempts to
put the theories of shared
work and decision-making into practice. At
the Warehouse Collective,
for example,
members indicated that the
"job wheel" used to rotate
routine maintenance tasks was a direct result
of the success of this
device in their
individual cooperative households.
Similarly, when queried about the
source of their consensual
decision-making, members from several
of the
sample organizations were able to
point to their past involvement
with
the Clamshell Alliance, a large
New England anti-nuclear coalition,

which explicitly trained its members
in the use of consensus as

sion-making device.

a

deci-

At other times, the "early awareness"
was due to

widely distributed articles on alternative
institutions within the alternative press.
tial

The Literature Collective, for instance,
received ini-

inspiration for their elaborate system of job
rotation from an ar-

ticle read by its members (Bernstein &
Bowers, 1977).

And in some of

the sample organizations, problems of size,
scope and scale not shared

Holleb and Abrams' organizations literally forced
members to consider
formal consensual/democratic structures.

In

the situations of the Ware-

house Collective and the Country Food Co-op, these issues
demanded resolution in order to make democratic notions workable at
all, leading in

both cases to the creation of constitutional democracies.
In

general

terms, then, we can see that past experiences, cultural

milieu and problems of growth and size all seem to be factors which led
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the sample organizations
to move in the direction
of consensual democracy at an earlier developmental
stage than their predecessors
studied
by Holleb and Abrams.
In many ways, all these
factors led to the devel-

opment of an informal working
knowledge of alternative
institutions
what seemed to work, what to
avoid, what not to worry
about.
Spread by
word-of-mouth, direct experience
and occasional books and
articles, this
working knowledge clearly made an
impact on the development of the
or-

~

ganizations in our sample, and undoubtedly
elsewhere as well.
In summary,

then, we can see that the sample
organizations appar-

ently had the benefit of information
and perspectives not available
to
"first wave" organizations like those
studied by Holleb and Abrams.

Consequently, the sample organizations
made various "earlier" choices to
move in the direction of consensual
democracy, choices which have had

mixed results.

While

a

comparison of the present sample with that
of

Holleb and Abrams may be of historical
interest, however, it does not

directly address the fundamental issue of this
research
ternative institutions alternative.

tions.

—

less successful

keeping al-

This issue can only be addressed by

examining the differences between Type
sample

-

2 and

Type

3

organizations in our

versus more successful alternative institu-

As we might expect,

the major area of comparison concerns the

structural features of these organizations.

Structural Differences

The central proposition of this research is that three areas of

structural components are necessary to keep alternative institutions
ternative:

(1)

al

formal structures of work, decision-making, and coordi-

.
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nation consistent wi th
consensual/democratic ideals;
(2) formal structures of maintenance; and
(3) formal structures of
organizational learning.

order to examine this assertion,

In

a

fairly complete list of the

formal

structures falling in each of the
three component areas was required.
In creating such a list,
the first step involved the
recon-

struction of the

ter VI, Method.

a

priori list of example structures
presented in Chap-

In the course of the interviews,

meters were specific-

ally asked about which of the
example structures existed or had
existed
in their organizations and
which did not.

On the basis of their an-

swers, the a priori list was revised
to reflect onl^ those formal
structures employed by the sample
organizations at one time or another.

The

resulting list of structural components,
divided into the three major
areas, can be seen in Table 26.

In addition,

the present number of or-

ganizational members was included in the
comparisons in order to comple-

ment other information.

In

the case of the Country Food Co-op, two

figures were used, the first indicating
household members, the second

indicating individual members.

Before we consider possible comparisons,

however, we need first to comment on the structural
components and the
procedures involved in assessing their presence or absence
in the sample

organizations

The items

.

The only two items in Table 26 which may not be familiar

from the case studies are "economic feedback mechanisms" (111-13), and

"'management level' information-sharing" (111-14), both items taken from
Bernstein's (1976) model.
found in Chapter III,

a

While the meaning of both phrases can be

brief review

is

appropriate at this point.

In

s
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TABLE 26

REVISED LIST OF FORMAL
STRUCTURE BY COMPONENT AREA
I.

1.

2.

3-

4.
5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

10.
11.
12.

recognized work procedures
written work procedures
group job descriptions
individual job descriptions
member work schedules
job rotation systems
regular member meetings
recognized decision-making procedures
written decision-making procedures
regular meeting roles
representative, hired, or elected
"management" mechanisms
onanisms
management" position job descriptions

II.
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

10.
11.

12.
13.
14.

1.

3.

4.
5.

Maintenance

clear member boundaries
written rights, duties, obligations
member contracts/agreements
new member trial periods
new member orientation/training
ongoing member training
training/orientation material
mechanism for resolving disputes
regular personnel review process
acqepting/hiring procedures
removing/firing procedures
vehicles for sharing feelings
economic feedback mechanisms
"management level" information-sharing

III.

2.

Work, Decision-making and
Coordination

Organizational Learning

regular, reflective meetings/retreats
study groups
formal process roles
consultants/external critics
criticism/self-criticism sessions
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essence, the first term
refers to mechanisms
which directly connect
.embers' remuneration levels
with the financial
performance of their organization, like frequent
monetary rewards based on
productivity, efficiency, and so on.
The second term points to
mechanisms by which persons
in "management"
positions share infection
relevant to their position
with organizational members.
Examples could include a section
of meetings devoted to this topic,
special meetings, or even regular
memoranda.
All the remaining items
should be sel f-exolanatory
Another item worthy
of mention is "consultants/external
critics" (III-4).
If I exchanged
consultation time with a sample
organization, this was not counted
as an
instance of formal structure, since
I
initiated the original contact.
However, in
0 cases
Studio Collective (SC) and Magazine
Group (MG)
.

*

-

-- my consultation activities
were initiated by the organization
and

proceded the research, so both these
instances were considered typical

of the item.

Deasjon cnteria.

In order to decide whether a
particular organization

could be characterized as employing

a

given structural

component, a sim-

ple present/absent criterion was used, and
the effectiveness or quality

of the component was not considered.
the same structural

In many of the cases, for example,

component might have varying purposes or expecta-

tions attached to it, making relative measures of
effectiveness or quality unwieldy.

In addition, some structural

components, such as "remov-

ing/firing procedures" (11-11) might exist but never had been
used also

making evaluation difficult.

As we shall

see, however, the complexity

of the data and the level of comparative analyses to which they are
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subjected both appear to justify
the use of such
terion.

In general,

a

straightforward cri-

the minimum requirement
for the presence of

a

structural component was that
most members interviewed
could point to
its existence within the
organization presently or in the
past.
In
those cases where current
members knew little or nothing
of the early
history of their organization,
however, the presence of certain
structures was ascertained from
records, documents and historical
accounts.

Information sources,.

In

all

but

a

very few instances, the relevant
in-

formation for determining the presence
or absence of individual structural components at any time in
the history of
is

a

oarticular organization

directly available from the case
studies or easily inferred from

them.

The only exceptions are

a

few minor features of organizations

which were not included in the case
studies for the sake of brevity.
In these

few instances, the relevant information
was taken from the

original

research notes or from memory.

Cpjgpjnson of £resent formal structures
comparison of Type

2

.

Examining Table 27, we see

a

and Type 3 organizations by the three areas of

present structural components.

While we may be drawn to examine the

particular structures characteristic of each organization,
the overall
pattern of results

Type

3

is

most striking.

In general

terms, we find that

organizations have formal structures in all three categories,

while Type

2

organizations fail to have any structural components in the

organizational

learning area.

Furthermore, it is also clear that Type

organizations currently have more formal structures in the second area

of components -- maintenance -- and roughly the same number in the area

3
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TABLE 27

STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF TYPE

2

AND TYPE

ORGANIZATIONS

3

AT PRESENT

Type

Formal Structures

GC

2

RC

Type

MG

MC

CFC

WC

Work, Decision-making and
Coordination
recognize d work procedures
written work procedure:
3
group .job descri ptions
individual job descri ptive
i:
5.
member work schedul es
Job rotation systems
7.
regular member meeting
^
8
recognized decision-making
procedures
written d ecision-making
&rflcedure§
10.
regular meeting roles
11.
representative, hired, or elected
"manage ment" mechanic
12.
"management" position job
descriptions

LC

3

SC

—

II

X

Maintenance
clear member boundariPQ
written rights, duties,
obi igations
member contracts/agreements
4.
new membe r trial periods
new member orientation/training
6.
ongoing member training
training/orientation material s
mechanism for resolving dis putes
9
regular personnel review pmrps<;
10.
accepting/hiring procedures
11.
removing/firing pror.pdurp^
vehicles
for sharing feelings
1|
13
economic feedback mechanisms
14
'management level" information
sharing
-L

^
-

III

Organizational Learning
regular, reflective meetings/
retreats
2.
study groups
3.
formal process roles
consultants/external critics
Ai
5.
criticism/ self-criticism sessions
members

22

28

6

3

140/400

7

3

15

.
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of work, decision-making,
and coordination.

This comparison, then,
ap-

parently supports our major
contention that successful
alternative institutions require forma,
structural components in each
of the three
different areas. The logic of
this comparison, however,
does have a
major shortcoming.

While it is possible that the
more successful organizations
are
successful because they currently
have structural components in
all
three areas, this also suggests
the converse
that no organizations
with components in all three
areas at any_ time in their oast
would be

-

less successful

presently.

In

other words,

a

second test of our major

proposition would involve the examination
of the unsuccessful organizations to see if at any point in
their developmental history they
too had
components in all

three areas.

If this were the case, then we
would be

drawn to conclude that some other
factor than formal structure in the
three areas really contributed to
success or failure

-

that formal

structure was perhaps helpful, but certainly
not necessary for success.
In

order to make an appropriate comparison, let
us now look at struc-

tures that may have existed at any point
during each organization's

history

Comparison of formal structure present at
we see
mal

a

comparison of Type

2

any_ time.

Examining Table 28,

and Type 3 organizations in terms of for-

structures that may have existed at any point in their
development.

The striking features of the last comparison now are
diminished -- all

but one of the Type

2

organizations had at least one instance of formal

structure in the organizational learning area.

At the same time, how-
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TABLE 28

STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF TYPE

AND TYPE

2

ORGANIZATIONS

3

AT ANY TIME IN THEIR
HISTORIES

Formal Structures

—

-

Work, Dec 1S1 on-making and
Coordination
ii_ recoqmzed work procedures
^.
written work procedure;
yroup job descriptions
±t
4.
individual ioh Hac^in^^
o.
member work schedules
o.
job rotation systems
regular member meetinqs
recognized decision-making
procedures
y.
written decision-makina procedure
1U.
regular meetinq roles
il.
representative, hired, or elecT^
"management" mechanisms
"management" position job
description

I.

—

«

1.

L
J.

4.
3.

/.

B.
y.

1U.

11.
12.
13.
14.

III.
1.

d.
3.

4.
b.

—

1

Mr

MP,

rrr

WC

v

~

——

y

v

*
9

—

y

j

&

-j

y

v

a

n

S

5

2

*

V

v
-

5

x

X

XX

a

X

x

X

X
;
A

>

x

A

-

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

V
5

>

X

xxx

x

1

clear member boundaries
written rights, duties,
obi igations
member contracts/aqreements
new member trial periods
new member orientation/tra ininq
ongoing member training
training/orientation materials
mechanism for resolvinq disputes
regular personnel review process
accepting/hirinq procedures
removing/tiring procedures
vehicles for sharinq feelinqs
economic feedback mechanisms
management
level" informationsharing

~y

y

v
5

~"

5

Y
;

*

y

5

o

v

x

1

~
y~

Y

"

xxx

XXX

"

1

c

XX

5
x

"

X

X
-x.

~H

y

X

X

v~

X

X

X

X

X

x

X

X

><

>

>

X

X

X

X

X

-X*

'

Organizational Learning
regular, reflective meetings/
retreats
study qroups
formal process roles
consultants/external critics
criticism/self-criticism sessions

y

X

'

1

'

v

j

y

Y
jj

x
x

X

X

[

members

X..

XXX

-

1

"
X

X

x

XjX

X

n

'

SC

<lx

x

n-

o

3

1
x

—
v

Type
LC

M

^

5

1

"

inf flnanrft
iiairiLcndnce

•

2

RC

v

—

1 1

Type

nr
GC

22

28

6

3

140/400

7

3

15
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ever, we also see that the
number of structures in this
same category
increases for the successful Type
3 organizations as
well,
addition,
it is apparent that Type
3 organizations still have
relatively more
structures in the second area of
components
maintenance. Nevertheless, this comparison appears
to weaken the case for the
"three areas of
structural components" proposition.
Apparently the presence of formal

m

-

structures in all three areas is
no guarantee of success for an
alternative institution,

and some set of factors other than
formal structure

appears responsible for their success.

On the other hand,

there is

a

way of modifying the original
proposition slightly to make it more discriminating between successful and
unsuccessful alternative institutions
If we consider the role of formal
structures in alternative institu-

tions, particularly those in the
organizational

learning area, we can

easily agree that these structures should
be durable, regular, and enduring

-

not just invoked during

a

crisis, but ongoing features of al-

ternative institutions that serve the purpose of
deliberate reflection

regarding both the position
tional

life.

as well

as

the negative sides of organiza-

What this line of thinking suggests, of course,

is that

some additional standard of durability and regularity needs
to be added
to our original

proposition:

that in order to keep alternative institu-

tions alternative, three areas of sustained structural components need
to exist.

If we define "sustained"

have lasted at least

a

year

opmental history, we have

a

5

formal structures as those which

over the course of an organization's develbasis for one more comparison.

Comparing sustained formal structures.

From Table 29 we can see the ef-

—
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TABLE 29

STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF TYPE

2

AND TYPE

3

ORGANIZATIONS

LASTING AT LEAST ONE YEAR IN
THEIR HISTORIES
Type
Formal
I.

Structures

GC

2

Type

RC

MG

MC

'Work, Decision-making
and CoordinaTi^"
recoqni 7Pd work pm^,,^,

—

2.

3.

.

h
5

*

6.
8.
9.

10
11

12

written work procedures
qrQUP 1Qb dPSPr-j ptionc; "
-X
individual job description s
member work scheduTps
job rotation sy stems
regular member meeting s
recognized decision-making
procedures
written d ecision-making Proced
ures
regular meeting roles
representative, hired, or elected
"management" mechanisms
"management" position job
description

CFC

WC

3

LC

SC

I

"

-X-

—

-X
-X

-X'

X-

Maintenance
L clear member boundaries
written rights, duties
obi igations
member contracts/agreements
4.
new me mber trial periods
5.
new member orientation/training
ongoing member training
training/orientation materials
mecha nism for resolving disputes
8.
regular
rev iew process
—
rryr
_jpersonal
k ^
1U.
accepting/hiring procedures
11
removing/firing procedures
12.
vehi cles for sharing feeling s
Hi economic feedback mechanisms
14
"management level" information
sharing

II.

-X-

1_

'

III.
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

Organizational Learning
regular, reflective meetings/
retreats
study groups
formal process roles
consultants/external critics
criticism/ self-criticism sessions

members

X
1

"

X

"
i

X

22

28

6

3

140/400

7

X
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fects of adding the one-year
criterion to our original
proposition.
Before we attempt to interpret
Table 29, however, it is necessary
to con-

sider the side-effects created by
the addition of the one-year
criterion
and also issues surrounding two
of the sample organizations.
Effects, of

a^Wtions and

del etions

year criterion does result once again
in
tial

While the addition of the one-

.

a

pattern similar to our ini-

comparison of present structures in Table
27, there are some addi-

tions (-X-) and deletions (*) which
deserve explanation.

In essence,

this criterion results in the following
changes relative to Table 27:
(1)

any structures lasting one year or more
in an organization's history

are added even if they do not exist at
present; and (2) any structures
lasting less than one year do not appear, even
if they exist presently

within an organization.

Relative to their present state, then the one-

year criterion adds twelve more structural features
to Tyoe
tions, but deletes only one.

2

organiza-

Most of these additions occur in the case

of the Mechanics' Collective (MC), since structural changes
over the
last year of its development resulted in the disappearance
of several

sustained formal structures which existed previously.

The one deletion

concerns the Magazine Group's (MG) trial period for new members, which
exists at present, ,but has been in place less than one year.
3

For Type

organizations, on the other hand, we find that four formal structures

are added, and three are deleted.

Three of the additions occur with the

Literature Collective, since they represent structural features characteristic of the earlier development of the organization, when it was

a

volunteer collective; and individual job descriptions did exist at the

Warehouse Collective in the past, but no longer, largely due to the cur-
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rent job rotation system.

The deletions all occur
in the case of the

Warehouse Collective, since
three of their structures
(1-9, H-5, and
H-6) have been in place less than
one year.

As we will

see, these

additions and deletions will
have two effects upon our
comparison.
First of all, these additions
and deletions tend to give
Type 2 organizations a net gain of eleven
examples of past formal structure,
par-

ticularly affecting the area of
work, decision-making, and
coordination.
For Type 3 organizations, however,
there is a net gain of only one
example of added formal structure.
In other words, the one-year
criterion
increases the number of sustained formal
structures considerably more
for Type 2 organizations.

Secondly, and more importantly, the
one-year criterion means that

comparisons of formal structure for some items
are made between formal

structures which may not exist at present in
the sample organizations.
Put another way, in some cases we are
comparing patterns of sustained
formal structures without concern about whether
they are currently used

or not.

As we will

major ways.

see, however, this will not affect our comparison
in

Before we can move on to an examination of the details
of

this last comparison in Table 29, however, we need to
also consider

features of two of the sample organizations, in order to discuss
their

suitability as sources of information for this comparison.

Excluding

a special^ case.

In

the first place, there is probably

good reason to withdraw the Magazine Group (MG) from our comparisons be-

cause financial rather than structural features played such
in

its structural development.

a

major role

As we may recall, MG's first steo in the

direction of consensual democracy was the creation of

a

representative
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"Publishers'

ranged,

group."

Dissatisfied with son. of the
asoects of this ar-

MG members instituted

second formal structure
approximately

a

three and one half months
later:

a

two-person "management team,"
whose

day-to-day authority was balanced
by the final authority
of the members
constituting the "policy and
planning committee." In brief,
the longterm viability of this structure
was never tested, due to
cial

crisis at MG.

cause of
left

a

a

major finan-

This financial crisis, of
course, was the primary

large number of member resignations

"management team" without

over it.

a

-

resignations which

membership to exert final authority

a

After these resignations, then, very
few formal structures

any of the component areas
remained

bers who resigned.

-

in

they literally left with the mem-

For these reasons, the pattern of
formal structures

for MG over the three previous
comparisons becomes more understandable.

At present MG has only three of the
formal structures on our list (Table
27).

Examining Table 28, on the other hand, we
find that MG had eleven

formal structures at some point in its
history.

Since most of these

structures were put in place less than one year
previous to the financial

tural

crisis, however, we find in Table 29

tfiat

features which have endured more than

a

MG has only two struc-

year -- "recognized deci-

sion-making procedures" (1-8), and "clear member boundaries"
(II-l).
With the benefit of this detail, we should be able to see
the reason for disqualifying MG from our three comparisons.

In

essence, MG's

structural development does not allow us to test our central proposition, in any form, since financial

factors for the most part, rather

than the presence or absence of particular structural features, diverted
MG's course away from its previous consensual/democratic direction.

At
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the same time, of course,
it is possible to argue
that had MG developed
appropriate and workable formal

structures earlier in its
development,

it might have been able
to plan and administer
its finances more effectively than it did.
In fact some of the
members who resigned took this

position, concluding that MG had
"too little structure, too
late."
While this conclusion may be
true, we have no way of ever
verifying it,
and consequently still must
withdraw MG's data from the comparisons.
One other case study has similar
elements, but they fall into a
differ-

ent pattern --

Including
Mechanics'

a

pattern worth mentioning.

a

simijar case

.

Given the structural history of the

Collective (MC), we can recall

a

scenario vaguely resembling

that of the Magazine Group, complete
with early attempts at consensual/

democratic structure,

a

financial crisis, and resignations.

In short,

MC members created a service manager
position to perform coordinating

functions, an arrangement which lasted approximately
two and one half

years.

In

this case, however, the resignations came as
MC's financial

situation deteriorated at the end of this term, largely
brought on by an

unscrupulous service manager who filled the position during
its last
year.

These resignations, of course, did reduce the number
of members

by one-half, and in turn, affected MC's structural

development

—

both

the bi-weekly member meetings and the service manager
position disap-

peared (see Tables 27, 28 and 29 for details).

What differentiates the

development of the Mechanics' Collective from that of the Magazine
Group, however, is that MC's financial difficulties did not abbreviate
its first attempts at sustained formal

structure

parently deteriorated for other reasons.

—

these structures ap-

Although financial factors
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have clearly affected HC's
current structural state,
then, we are nonetheless able to evaluate our
central proposition on the
basis of sustained formal structure which
existed long before the financial
crisis
ever occurred.

Now that we have redefined our
sample by the exclusion of
information from the Magazine Group,
we are finally in a position
to examine
our comparison of sustained, formal
structure more carefully. As we
will
discover, the exclusion of MG not
only makes for a fairer comparison,
but actually makes the case for
our central proposition slightly
less
evident.

Jhe actual comearison.

From Table 29, we can finally examine
the ef-

fects of adding the one-year criterion
to our original proposition:

the

overall pattern reverts to that of our
initial comparison in Table 27.

Type

organizations are distinguished from Type

3

factors:
in

(1)

Type

3

the organizational

2

organizations by two

organizations have had sustained formal structures
learning area, while Tyoe

2

organizations have had

no sustained formal structure in this third area
at any point in their

histories; and (2) Type

3

organizations have had more sustained formal

structures in the maintenance area than Type
we have found strong evidence for
original
actual

a

2

organizations.

Now that

slightly modified version of our

proposition, it is appropriate to look more closely at the

formal structures which discriminate successful alternative in-

stitutions from their less successful counterparts in this third comparison.

Differences in first component area.

As we can see from Table 29, there
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are few differences between
Type

2

and Type

3

organizations in terms of

the number of sustained
formal structures in the area
of work, decisionmaking and coordination.
The only notable difference
concerns "job rotation systems" (1-6), where
all Type 3 organizations
have this characteristic, but only one Type
2 organization, Country
Food Co-op (CFC).

There was also

a

similar difference with "recognized
decision-making

procedures" (1-8), where only one
Type

terized by this item.

2

organization could be charac-

There are, however, some major
differences in the

qua1it y of these structures which do
deserve to be mentioned.
-

In

general, the present/absent criterion,
as we might expect,

biases this comparison in favor of Type

often have only the bare essentials
of

organizations, which in fact

2
a

particular formal structure.

More specifically, one group of major
qualitative differences tends to

cluster in those structures associated with
meetings, differences which

were immediately apparent from my initial research
and contract presentations at member meetings.

The only member meetings that

I

did not ob-

serve were those of the Mechanics' Collective
(MC), due to their desire
to discuss

the matter without my presence.

In

the instance of "regular

meeting roles" (1-10), for example, all of the organizations
defined sample use or have used these devices.
Type

2

organizations

I

In

2

the re-

terms of the three

was able to observe, however, the use of these

roles was much less effective than in all of the Type

With Type

in

3

organizations.

organizations, roles such as "facilitator" or "chairperson"

were less defined, more awkwardly employed, and occasionally neglected

altogether in the course of the meeting; in addition, it was evident
that persons filling these roles lacked the sense of certainty that

267

often comes with the repeated
practice of such functions.

In

Type

3

or-

ganizations, on the other hand,
the reverse was generally
the case
members had a better sense of
what these roles meant and
were more
skilled at employing them.
If a facilitator or chairperson
did momentarily lose the sense of
procedural direction, the other
members present
would often assist him or her in
a graceful way, pointing
out the

-

threads of continuity, but allowing
the person in the role to pick
them
up.

One other feature of Type

meetings not included in the list
of

3

formal structures was also quite
noticeable

-

the use of regularized

formats that placed different types
of topics within the context of an
overall

agenda.

Issues of feelings and interpersonal

conflicts, for ex-

ample, were usually given special places
in the agenda that allowed them
to be distinctly set aside from business
items.

Summarizing the differences
systems"

.

With the exception of "job rotation

(1-6) and "recognized decision-making procedures"

(1-8), then,

there were no other major quantitative
differences between Type

2

and

Type 3 organizations in terms of the sustained
formal structures they

employed in the area of work, decision-making and coordination.

By sup-

plementing this comparison with qualitative information, however,
we can
see some differences do exist which are not captured by the
presence/

absence criterion.

In

general, formal structure regarding meeting roles

appeared more developed and defined in Type

were more fluent with it.

3

organizations, and members

Having examined this first area of structural

components, we now turn to the second area.

Differences in the maintenance area

.

Glancing once again at Table 29,
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we can see that Type

3

organizations have

higher number of sustained

a

formal structures in the
maintenance area than do Type

2

organizations.

The most obvious differences
occur with "vehicles for
sharing feelings"
(H-12) and '"management level'
information -sharing" (H-l 4
), where all
three Type 3 organizations
have these formal structures,
but none of the
Type 2 organizations have ever
evidenced them.
In addition, Table 29
also suggests that Type
3 organizations are generally
stronger in those

structures associated with orientation
and training functions (II-5,
7)

than Type 2 organizations.

And finally, two of the Type

tions have formal structures for

resolving

characteristic of none of the Type

2

disputes (II-8),

organizations.

6,

organiza-

3
a

feature

Of all these dif-

ferences, however, only the first two
are clearly strong enough to de-

serve further elaboration.
In

the areas of "vehicles for sharing
feelings", the formal struc-

tures of Type 3 organizations all take

a

similar form.

For the Ware-

house Collective (WC) this function is
deliberately included as
ture of the monthly meetings.

a

fea-

At the Literature Collective (LC), this

structure is built into the format of bi-weekly
meetings.

And in the

case of the Studio Collective (SC), this structure
is also tied to meetings, but occurs much less frequently.

At SC, the lengthy annual or

semi-annual retreats serve as the explicit forum for sharing
feelings,
although this function tends to carry over in

a

more informal way to

weekly member meetings as well.
In all

Type

3

organizations the structures for "'management level'

information-sharing" are largely identical:

at their member meetings

there are regular, expected reports from members who are charged with
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various "management" functions.

At the weekly meetings of
the Studio

Collective, for examole, there
is almost always

a

treasurer's report

which details current information
relevant to the organization's
financial status.
Due to the small number of
formal maintenance structures
in Type

2

organizations, qualitative differences
were more difficult to assess.
The only noteworthy difference
occurs in the area of "accepting/hiring
procedures" (11-10).

In

all

Type

organizations, these procedures are

3

well organized, thorough, and employ

consideration of applicants.

a

time-frame that allows thoughtful

each case it was evident that these
or-

In

ganizations consider the addition of new
members
deserves special attention.

In

Type

2

a

major matter which

organizations utilizing these

procedures, however, the process was typically
rushed, allowing neither
the new candidates nor the organizations
enough time to adequately evaluate each other.

Consequently, decisions to take some new members were

often regretted later on, by both parties.

Summarizing the differences
Type

3

organizations clearly have

structures than Type

2

In terms of the maintenance area,

.

a

greater number of sustained formal

organizations.

These differences are most pro-

nounced in terms of structures for sharing feelings and management- level
information, but are also evident in those areas concerned with orientation and training.

In

addition, some qualitative differences exist as

well, most notably in the more developed hiring/acceptance mechanisms

employed by Type

3

organizations.

Differences in organizational learning

.

As pointed out previously,

the

270

most striking result of our comparison
of sustained formal structures
the organizational

cessful

Type

3

in

learning area (Table 29) is that
only the more suc-

organizations have them.

At this point it appears appro-

priate to consider these formal
structures in some detail, on

a

case-by-

case basis.
Turning first to the Warehouse Collective
(WC), we remember that
for two years it has held "monthly
meetings" which are rotated among
members'

homes.

We should also remerrfcer that WC members
discovered the

value of these meetings quite by accident

-

when all the members of

a

Federation personnel committee failed to appear
for an evaluation of one
WC member.
is

This forum is still

used for internal personnel reviews, but

also used explicitly to resolve interpersonal issues,
to perform

long-range planning and to develop policy proposals.

The past products

of this "monthly meeting" are more indicative of its functions
than the
topics it considers, however.

For example, the earliest attempts to im-

plement job rotation, member training and new member orientations

emerged from these meetings.

Furthermore, the meetings were continually

used to evaluate such structural innovations as well as refine them.

In

addition, the idea for the formal constitutional democracy which combines WC and Federation governance was both initially discussed and

later refined at the "monthly meetings."

And finally, the original

single goal of serving co-ops in the Federation was modified in these
meetings to include

a

trolled workplace.

In sum,

secondary goal of developing WC as

to create an array of formal

a

worker-con-

WC members have consistently used this forum

structures consistent with consensual/demo-

cratic ideals, and then have employed it again in evaluating and modify-
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ing these same creations as well
as their internal

goals.

Within the Literature Collective (LC),
structures of organizational

learning take

somewhat different shape, but fulfill
essentially simi-

a

lar purposes.

Members interviewed traced their first
deliberate at-

tempts at self-examination back to the
institutionalization of criti-

cism/self-criticism sessions

the beginning of 1978.

in

Placed at the

end of their large meetings, the use of this
device rapidly led to the

development of
roles.

In

a

sophisticated meeting format, comolete with rotated

the resulting meetings, members eventually decided
to halt

their operations entirely during the summer of 1978, so that
they could
devote all of their available time to the development of both
internal

structures and business procedures at LC.

Later on, these wel 1 -organi zed

meetings served as the setting in which both the paid and volunteer members decided that their collective should be composed of paid members
only, a major shift in goals.

In

the late spring of 1979, another regu-

lar basis for reflecting upon larger issues emerged at LC when the entire second half of their bi-weekly meeting was set aside for such pur-

poses.

Once again, most of the recent structural innovations at LC have

emerged from this regular forum.

The existing job rotation system was

reviewed and completely overhauled, creating the current elaborate system, and formal

structures were developed for the orientation and train-

ing of new members.

And at the Studio Collective, the story is much the same.

Ever

since the spring of 1977, SC members have held at least one, and often
two, lengthy retreats each year in addition to their weekly membership

meetings.

Concrete products of these retreats have included the rein-
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statement of both rotated general
maintenance and formal member
contracts.
In both cases, the effects
of letting these structures
lapse
were examined and found to be
detrimental to SC's organizational
wellbeing.

In

addition, these retreats have also
served as the basis for

developing SC's secondary goal of
promoting the personal and professional

growth of members,

goal which occasionally displaces
the original

a

goal of providing members with stable,
S ummarizi ng, the d ifferences

.

inexpensive studio space.

As we have seen, Type 2 organizations

not only lack the sustained formal
structures of organizational learning

characteristic of Type

3

organizations, but also appear to lack the im-

portant ongoing functions performed by these
structures.

While some of

the Type 3 organizations use these forums
in part for maintenance purposes, such as resolving interpersonal disputes
and sharing feelings, it
is

very evident that another major function is
also present

-

ongoing,

reflective consideration of the state of organizational
affairs and
practices.

From this reflective activity, members in all three
organi-

zations have created new formal structures, modified old
ones, and even

altered their organizational goals in major ways.

In Argyris

and

Schon's (1978) terms, then, we find that these sustained structures
of

organizational learning had elements of both single loop and double loop

learning -- they not only served as

a

basis for creating and modifying

organizational structures to meet existing organizational goals, but
they also resulted in modifications of the goals themselves.

In order

to fully appreciate the significance of sustained structures of organi-

zational

learning, however, we need to look at them in relation to the

other two components, in effect, putting the organizations back together

.
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again

intej^cti^

ar^

Considering all of the compo-

nents of sustained formal structure
at once, we can begin to fully
ap-

preciate the particular functions
played by all three areas.

As sug-

gested previously, it is clear that
formal structures in the first area
-- work,

decision-making, and coordination

-

define the basic activi-

ties of both types of organizations,
but this definition is more explicit and regularized within Type 3
organizations.

As we move to the main-

tenance area, however, we can see how the
additional structures in Type
3

organizations provide better support for the functions
of the first

area by attending to issues of members'

information.

feelings, skills, and access to

And finally, when we consider the area of
organizational

learning, we begin to understand its crucial

function within Type

ganizations more fully.

3

In

each of the Type

or-

3

organizations, the formal

structures of organizational learning have consistently served
as the
source of either new or refined formal structures in the other
two com-

ponent areas
nance.

In

—

work, decision-making, and coordination; and mainte-

fact, if we turn back to the structural histories of each or-

ganization (Tables 9, 12, and 19), we find this dynamic graphically dis-

played in each case.
Furthermore, an abbreviated version of this last dynamic can also
be seen in the structural

histories of some Type

2

organizations.

In

these cases, however, the failure to continue formal structures of or-

ganizational learning appears to have resulted in the eventual demise of
structural innovations or modifications.

Reconsidering the structural
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history of the Country Food Co-oo
(Table 23), for example, we
see that
a short-lived study
group generated a large number
of new formal structures in both of the first two
comoonent areas, but that most
of these

structures rapidly deteriorated over
the next two years.

In a

similar

way, six months of periodic
evaluation meetings at the Restaurant
Col-

lective (Table 14) resulted in changes
of the coordination structure,
changes which failed to work effectively,
but were nevertheless continued.

In both

these Type

2

organizations,

a

point was reached where the

new structures were not evaluated in
terms of their original purposes

because the formal structures of organizational
learning, which might
have performed these functions, had been
discontinued.

The situation

which resulted, of course, was much like that
of travelers who plan an
extensive trip with the aid of
with them

-

they become lost.

a

map and then forget to bring the map

Without an ongoing reflective forum,

members in both these organizations were unable to
evaluate the path

created by their structural changes.

Although in both cases there was

a

clear sense that the organizations were not working as planned,
no formal

,

public, and enduring vehicle existed in either case for raising

these issues.

Consequently, very important gaps between consensual /de-

mocratic ideals and organizational practice were never formally questioned, then or later.

In

fact, an informal but persistent taboo about

the topic quickly emerged in both cases, effectively submerging these im-

portant questions.
The comparison of the short-lived structures of organizational

learning of some Type

2

organizations with the more durable structures

characteristic of all Type

3

organizations is indeed significant.

This
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comparison not only demonstrates
the critical role played
by organizational learning structures,
but also adds additional
confirming evidence
to our original proposition
regarding the necessity of all
three componnents of formal structure.
In order to conclude
the case for this major
proposition, we now need to review
the evidence which has emerged
from
the comparisons.

Summarizing the overan structural
comparison.

With regard to the sam-

ple organizations, at least, we
now have strong evidence for

modified version of our original
proposition:

a

slightly

that alternative institu-

tions, in order to remain alternative,
need three areas of sustained formal

structure.

The most striking feature of our final
comparison was

that the more successful

(Type

3)

organizations were characterized by

sustained formal structures in all three areas,
while the less successful

(Type 2) organizations lacked structures in
the organizational

learning area altogether.

In

ordination, we found that Type

the area of work, decision-making, and co2

and Type

3

organizations had similar

numbers of sustained formal structures, but that
among Type
tions, these were often of higher quality.

3

organiza-

Moving on to the second

area, that of maintenance, we could clearly see that Type
3 organiza-

tions had more of these structures than each of the less
successful or-

ganizations.

And finally, we considered all three components together,

noting in particular the role of organizational learning structures in
the creation and modification of formal structures in the first
two

areas.

In addition, we also examined the effects of unsustained struc-

tures of organizational learning in two of the Type

2

organizations,
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further bolstering the strength
of our major finding.

With this over-

view, then, we can now consider
some broader conclusions
which have

emerged from our comparison.

An updated perspective

.

On the basis of all

the information that we

have considered up to this point,
it is evident that contemporary
alternative institutions need not follow
the developmental path detailed
by

Holleb and Abrams

(1975), a fact demonstrated by the case
studies alone.

Among the same organizations we were
able to recognize that successful
attempts to move to cojis^nsual dempcrjcy;
could begin prior to formal

differentiation
only

a

,

brief stay

starting from
in

irifp^ djff^^

cpnsejTs_uaJ_ anarxhy_.

or eve n after

Put in more direct terms, we

can now say with certainty that
"earlier choices" do exist for alterna-

tive institutions

-

that at least in the short run,
bureaucratization

is not an inevitable feature of their
development.

Secondly, the current research results support

a

distinct conclu-

sion about which factors determine the success or
failure of alternative

institutions.

Holleb and Abrams, of course, pinpointed member political

commitment as the deciding factor.
however, it

is

From the findings of our comparison,

now possible to identify specific structural features

which are strongly related to success or failure in these
organizations.
As suggested in previous chapters, this shift in emphasis
from personal
to structural features is a significant one,

in that it directs our at-

tention away from questions of choosing the "right people" in an alter-

native institution to questions of choosing the right structures.
is not to say that personal

This

features might not be important, but rather
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to compensate for their sole
emphasis in the past.

of findings which support

a

Due to the clarity

structural interpretation of
organizational

success, then, we know not only
that "earlier choices" exist,
but also
that these choices take the form
of specific and applicable
structures
in

particular combination.
And thirdly, we are finally
beginning to see the three areas of

structural components not as individual
pieces of an organization, but
as an interactive system or process
which creates the opportunity for

the further development and refinement
of an alternative institution

along consensual /democrat!

c

lines.

This "process" view allows us to

phrase the problem of bureaucratization
in somewhat more constructive
ways.

Instead of attempting to identify the forces
which lead to bu-

reaucratization, we are now in

a

position to see bureaucratization as

a

consequence of neglecting, discontinuing or not
establishing the "process" which appears to characterize the more
successful sample organizations.

In many ways,

then, the view of alternative institutions which

emerges from the results closely parallels Bernstein's
(1976) analysis

of workplace democratization

—

certain components are necessary for

this process to move forward, but if they are weak or missing, the
process decays.

At this point, of course, we have primarily considered the

positive side of this cycle, and it now appears appropriate to briefly

explore the negative side as well.

Several of the Type

2

organizations,

for example, appear to have stabilized in a bureaucratized state.

We

know that they lack the basic "process" characteristic of successful organizations, but at this point, we have only vague hints about why this
is actually the case.

By considering the "process" created by the three
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areas of formal structure, and
the effects of Sonne
non-structural

fac-

tors upon it, we may be able
to point in the direction
of some answers
to this question.

Secondary Comparisons
In

addition to the structural information
which formed the basis of

the case studies,

there was a considerable amount
of supplemental infor-

mation which is also of comparative
interest.

Since the major focus of

data-gathering concerned the central research
proposition, the collection of supplemental

information was less thorough, reducing
consider-

ably both the quantity and quality of the
data which it produces.

ertheless, some valuable comparisons are still
possible.

Nev-

As we will

discover, the inclusion of secondary factors in
our analysis complements

our understanding of the dynamics underlying
our central structural
finding.

The first, and most obvious, secondary factor
concerns the

rate at which members join and leave alternative
institutions.

In

this

and the remaining comparisons, information from the
Magazine Group is

included since such inclusion appeared justifiable.

Member turnover

.

Although exact turnover figures were somewhat diffi-

cult to determine for the relatively small sample organizations, it is
possible in all but one case to assign each organization to one of three
general categories of high, medium, and low, based on average turnover

throughout its history.
ly,

Low turnover was taken to be below 20% annual-

high turnover was considered to be in excess of 60%, and medium

turnover was represented by the gap in between.

Examining Table 30, we
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TABLE 30

MEMBER TURNOVER AMONG TYPE

Type

GC

—

2

AND TYPE

3

2

ORGANIZATIONS

Type

High

WC

RC -- High

—

3

Low

LC -- Low

MG -- Low/ Medium

SC -- Low

MC -- Medium

CFC

Medium

see the results of this comparison.

The designation of "low/medium" for

the Magazine Group (MG) reflects the fact that this
organization had

very low turnover until the recent member resignations.
In

general, the case studies suggest that there

is

a

unique rela-

tionship between member turnover and the sustained formal structures
which appear to underlie organizational success.

In particular,

high and

medium turnover appears to undermine the functioning and creation of
these structures in Type

2

organizations, while in Type

3

organizations,

the presence of certain structural features actually seems to lower

turnover.

In

order to gain

a

better sense of these dynamics, let

first look at the issue of turnover in the Type

Type

2

turnover

.

2

us

organizations.

While in previous chapters it was argued that

high turnover among members can encourage bureaucratization because new

members represent

a

conventionalizing influence, this effect appeared to

be less important than others.

True, the dilution of the by-laws at the

.
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Country Food Co-oo seemed to
follow this pattern, but at
the Grocery
Collective (GC), the Restaurant
Collective (RC), and the Mechanics'
Collective (MC), another pattern
emerged.
In all three organizations,
the

primary effect of high and medium
turnover was the automatic
"pronation"
of those members who remained,
encouraging the rise of informal
managers.

In the Grocery Collective,

the high turnover rates also
reduced

the election of coordinators
or "clerks" to a largely meaningless
event,

since newly-arrived members, representing

a

majority each year, could

know neither the office-seekers nor
the actual responsibilities of the
coordinators'

positions.

continuity suffered as

a

And in all three organizations,
year-to-year
consequence of high member turnover.

New mem-

bers were less the carriers of conventional
assumptions and actions than

they were simply uninformed about their
organizations and their fellow

members
In terms

of the structural approach which emerged from our
earlier

comparisons, then, we can see that high and medium
member turnover seems
to operate primarily on

the structures of work, decision-making, and
co-

ordination, preventing democratic procedures from really
being democratic, and making seniority, not informed member
control,

the major factor

determining which members would rise to leadership positions.

In addi-

tion we might suspect that high or medium turnover, because of the
lack

of continuity it produces, would tend to discourage both the creation
and the continuation of formal structures of organizational learning.

Without the benefit of

a

large number of members who could recall the

original purposes of an organization and the intent of past structural

innovations, it would seem unlikely that questions of consistency be-
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tween founding ideals and actual
practices would be raised.
the situation is quite different
in the case of Type

Ml 2 turnover.

3

In

general,

organizations.

The consistently low turnover rates
in all Type

3

organizations appeared to result in an informed
membership, deliberate
selection of persons in leadership positions,
and

a

greater sensitivity

to issue of founding ideals and
organizational practice.

It is clear,

however, that some of the structural features
of these organizations
directly affect their turnover rates as well.

ganizations place

a

In particular,

Type

3

or-

strong emphasis on the process of selecting new mem-

bers, stressing in this process the obligations
of membership as well as
its benefits.

quires

a

In

addition, the exemplary Studio Collective also re-

relatively long trial period without voting privileges.

The

overall effect of these structures is to ensure that the choice
of mem-

bership is
ganization.

a

suitable one, both for the new applicant as well as the orSuch del iberateness obviously reduces the number of indi-

viduals who might join casually and then leave after only

of membership.

In

addition, all Type

3

a

brief period

organizations tend to incorpo-

rate more and better developed orientation and training structures, in
an attempt to ensure that new members, once carefully chosen, are then

quickly integrated into the organizations.

And finally, the organiza-

tional success of the Type 3 organizations is clearly another factor re-

ducing member turnover.

The realization among members that they are in

fact putting their ideals into practice creates

a

cohesiveness and

a

sense of comraderie within these organizations which members often re-

ported is difficult to leave behind.

Turnover summary

.

With the aid of supplemental information avail-

.
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able from the case studies, we
were able to compare the
dynamics of high
and medium turnover in Type
2 organizations with the low
turnover found
in Type 3 organizations.

upon the structural

Although the detrimental effect
of turnover

features of Type

2

organizations was evident, we

were also able to see the way in
which the structural features of Type
organizations, in turn, actually seemed
to reduce turnover.

3

Once sum-

marized, these tentative findings directly
contradict earlier conclu-

sions about turnover in alternative
institutions suggested by Rothschild

Whitt (1976).

In

her examination of conditions which
facilitate and in-

hibit participatory/ democratic functioning
in alternative institutions,
she implies that the high rate of
transiency among members tends to mit-

igate against the process of bureaucratization.

From our treatment of

the issue of turnover, however, we can now
understand that, if anything,
high and medium levels of turnover mitigate
against effective partici-

patory/democratic functioning, since they undermine the functions
performed by essential formal structures.
an important secondary factor,

Although turnover appears to be

there are others which deserve attention

as well

Differences in applying process- skills

.

From direct observation of

meetings, interviews, and the case study material, it was possible to

make some very general judgments of the level of process skills in all
but one of the organizations (MC).
the ability of members to apply

a

These skills were roughly defined as

knowledge of group dynamics in

lic way to improve the effectiveness of member meetings.

a

pub-

For example,

at the beginning of a meeting, one member might ask that others share
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their expectations for what they
hoped to accomplish; members
might deliberately stop the business of a meeting
when it became clear that un-

derlying interpersonal

conflicts needed airing; or,

ment that he or she felt

a

member might com-

a

particular decision was being rushed,
alert-

ing others to the possibility that
the decision might in fact require

more thoughtful consideration.

Organizations were categorized as high,

medium, or low on their overall application
of process skills on the
basis of whether several, some, or very few
instances were either seen

or reported.

Due to the necessity to make a large proportion
of these

judgments on the basis of direct observation, the
resulting categorization reflects the current state of the organizations
only.
31, we can see the results of this comparison.

Type

organizations

2

either the low or medium categories, while Type

fall

in

fall

only in the high category.

From Table

organizations

3

While it is obvious that observations

on which these judgments are based represent a limited
sampling of

TABLE

APPLICATION OF PROCESS SKILLS

Type

31

IN TYPE 2

AND TYPE

2

Type

GC -- Low

WC

RC

LC

Low

MG -- Medium
MC
CFC -- Medium

3

SC

—
—
—

ORGANIZATIONS

3

High
High
High

.
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behavior in meetings,

I

feel

that they are generally
representative

nonethel ess

The relationship between the
application of process skills and
structural features was, of course,
clearest in Type

3

organizations.

For the most part, the repeated
application of these skills made the

regular meetings run smoothly, sharpened
the sense and effectiveness of

meeting roles, and introduced
making.

In

tone of del iberateness into decision-

a

this way the use of process skills
represented the use of an

informal practice to support an existing formal
structure.
the low turnover rates in Type

3

In addition,

organizations allowed new members un-

familiar with these skills to learn them through the
repeated example of

other members.

And finally, there was

a

general pattern in Type

3

orga-

nizations as to which members used these skills -- typically
more senior
members with previous experience

in

other alternative institutions.

This pattern, of course, suggests another comparison.

Differences

i_n

age and experience

tions is in any way

a

.

If the success of Type 3 organiza-

result of lessons learned from "first wave" orga-

nizations, either through direct experience or indirectly, it seems rea-

sonable to assume that at least some members of Type

would need to be old enough
lessons were learned.

to have lived through

much.

3

organizations

the time when these

Examining Table 32, we see an estimated age range

for each of the Type 2 and Type

members in Type

3

3

organizations.

As we might expect,

organizations do tend to be slightly older, but not by

With the exception of Studio Collective members, who are consid-

erable older, we find that estimated average age, and presumably the ex-
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TABLE 32

ESTIMATES OF MEMBER AGE RANGES FOR TYPE

Type

--

GC

2

—

AND TYPE 3 ORGANIZATIONS

Type

early twenties

3

WC -- late twenties

RC - - early twenties

MG

2

LC -- middle twenties

late twenties

SC

middle thirties

MC -- late twenties
CFC -- late twenties

perience that might go with it, does not appear to be

inating factor.
create

a

a

major discrim-

Examining average past experience itself, however, does

more complete picture.

Although information regarding past experience with other alternative institutions was gathered only for those members who were inter-

viewed, we nevertheless can develop
the sample organizations.

a

very rough idea of this factor in

On the basis of three general categories of

past experience -- none or little, some, or much -- it was possible to

sort organizations in terms of the members who were interviewed, creating

a

very global sense of the distribution of past experience in each

organization.

The certainty of this estimate, of course, is lowest for

the Country Food Co-op, given the large number of their members relative
to those interviewed.

In

all

other cases, however, my contact with the

organizations allowed me to verify to
which resulted.

a

large degree the categorization
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TABLE 33

ESTIMATES OF MEMBER PAST EXPERIENCE FOR
TYPE

^

J

GC
RC

MG

MC

CFC

—
—
—
—
—

2

AND TYPE

e 2

Type

little

WC

ttl e

LC

1 i

some

SC

—
—

3

ORGANIZATIONS

3

much

some
much

little
some

From Table 33 we see the results of this general comparison.
2

Type

organizations fall into the little and some categories with
regard to

past experience, while Type

categories.

3

organizations fall into the some and much

Members of the Literature Collective (LC), we should re-

call, based the bulk of their structural innovations on

appearing in an "alternative" publication.

a

single article

Thus, as we apparently see

here, past member experience (and age presumably) represented

portant factor in their organizational success.

a

less im-

Within both the Ware-

house Collective and the Studio Collective, however, it was clear that
many of the specific structural features which they developed emerged in
part from members' past experiences in other alternative institutions.

And as an aside, one intriguing connection emerged during the process of

evaluating member past experience.
Given the limited geographical area of the sample, it should come
as no great surprise that several

current members of Type

3

organiza-
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tions had been previous members of
some of the Type

years past.

In

this way

I

discovered

a

organizations in

unique function olayed by the

Grocery Collective and the Restaurant
Collective
a

2

-

they often serve as

training ground for undergraduates with
virtually no prior experience

with alternative institutions; upon
"graduation" some of their members
then seek membership in other alternative
institutions in the same general

region.

In this way, we can see that the "age
and experience"

argument can become only an "experience" argument

-

some of the lessons

to be learned from "first wave" alternative
institutions can still

be

learned in unsuccessful "second wave" organizations as
well.

Other possible secondary comparisons
that we have just seen,

a

.

In

addition to the comparisons

number of other comparisons were performed as

well, but were not included because of their failure to reveal
charac-

teristics which discriminated between Type

2

and Type

3

organizations.

Among other factors, issues of size, external pressures, and part-time
versus full-time members were considered, but failed to show any recog-

nizable patterns between the two types of organizations.

On

a

case-by-

case basis, however, the effects of some of these variables appeared to
be somewhat relevant to the development of individual organizations.

Summary of secondary comparisons

.

In order to briefly examine some non-

structural differences which appeared to emerge from the case studies,
four additional comparisons were made of Type

2

and Type

3

organiza-

tions, in the areas of member turnover, application of process skills,

member age, and member experience.

Although the information upon which

these comparisons were based was of

a

much more general nature than that
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of previous structural
comparisons, some differences did
emerge.

more successful Type

3

organizations were shown to have
consistently

lower member turnover rates than Type

appeared that turnover in Type

2

2

organizations.

Furthermore, it

organizations acts to inhibit or render

ineffective some necessary structural
features.

In Type 3 organiza-

tions, however, the direction of influence
seemed to be reversed
mal
In

The

-

for-

structure in these organizations tended to
reduce member turnover.
the area of process skills, Type

dence

a

3

organizations were found to evi-

higher degree of the application of these skills
in their meet-

ings than Type 2 organizations.

And finally, the ages of members in

both Type 2 and Type 3 organizations were compared,
based on the assumption that age and experience with alternative
institutions might be re-

lated.

Type

organizations to be only slightly older than their less success-

counterparts.

ful

in

3

In the comparison, however, there was a tendency
for members of

A complementary comparison of member past experience

other alternative institutions did aopear to differentiate Type

Type

3

2

and

organizations more successfully, however, and Dointed to an im-

portant role played by some of the Type
of eventual members of Type

3

2

organizations in the training

organizations.

While none of these comparisons could serve as the basis of definitive statements about either the sample or alternative institutions

more generally, they do suggest that further study of non-structural
features of alternative institutions might lead to

a

better understand-

ing of how such features interact with the structural components neces-

sary for the success of these organizations.

.
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Chapter Reflections

In this

chapter we have demonstrated that three
areas of sustained

formal structure appear to be necessary in
order to keep alternative in-

stitutions alternative.

Secondly, we have been able to see at least

some ways in which these structures operate
together to produce

pro-

a

cess for the further elaboration and refinement
of these organizations.

And lastly, following Bernstein's (1976) lead, we
began an exploration
of non-structural

features of these organizations, tracing where possi-

ble their interaction with the three areas of structural
components.

Before we begin the task of tracing the implications of our
results,
however, it is appropriate to stop and consider for

a

moment just what

these formal structures represent and the nature of their effect
upon
the members of alternative institutions.

Throughout this paper it has been stated several times and in several different ways that the creation of formal structures within alter-

native institutions is essential for transforming consensual/democratic

ideals into actual organizational practice.

Although this case has been

made primarily on the organizational level, little has been said,

beyond occasional hints, about why this case is relevant on the individual level as well
As we have seen from the case studies and our analysis of them,

formal

the

structures in these organizations are little more than the ex-

plicit expression of

a

belief about how things are to be done --

of agreements shared by members.

a

set

If we step back from the details of

the research, and consider the more successful organizations in our sam-
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Pie, a curious fact emerges.

These are organizations, of
seven, three,

and fifteen members, but compared
to conventional organizations
of
roughly the same size, they all have
a relatively large number
of formal

structures.

What this fact should alert us to

is

the particular role

that formal structures play in
alternative institutions.
In essence,

the disproportionate number of formal
structures in al-

ternative institutions is indicative of
an important way in which these

organizations compensate for the prior training
of their members within
the conventional world:

these organizations need an extensive number
of

formal structures precisely because they
are attempting to create new

sets of relationships within organizational

tween

a

member and

a

life.

The relationship be-

coordinator, for instance, is obviously very dif-

ferent than that which exists between manager and
employee.

In

order to

know how to act as either a member or a coordinator,
however, it is ne-

cessary to reach some agreement about the shape of that
relationship.
In

the case of employees and managers, many of the basic agreements
are

already in place before their first encounter -- implicit agreements

about the nature of work and decision-making which arise for both parties from their respective, but very similar, past experiences in the

conventional world.

Attempting to create relationships which are contrary to or absent
from their common conventional experience, members of successful alternative institutions employ formal structures as vehicles for both defining and regularizing these new relationships.

As we have seen from the

case studies, it takes more than criticism to keep
"acting like

a

a

coordinator from

manager," or for that matter, to keep members from acting
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like employees

-

it takes formal structures and the
shared agreements

which they represent to shape other ways
of acting.

In

this fashion,

then, we can finally begin to
appreciate the connections between the
or-

ganizational development of alternative
institutions and the individual

development of their members.

The creation of formal structures consis-

tent with con sensual /democratic ideals not
only ensures that these orga-

nizations will continue to function in new ways,
but also provides the
basis for the individuals within them to learn
how to think and act in

new ways.

In a

parallel fashion, of course, Bernstein (1976)
has

pointed to similar individual effects which occur as

a

involvement in the workplace democratization process.

consequence of
More specifical-

ly, Bernstein cites evidence which suggests that the
members of successful

workplace democratization projects tend

to carry their

participa-

tory/democratic consciousness out into their communities, often becoming
very active in political and civic organizations.
On the basis of the interviews conducted within the current re-

search, there were clear hints of

development.

In brief,

a

a

complementary process of individual

common theme emerged in interviews with some

members of the more successful organizations -tion.

a

theme of politiciza-

After working within their organizations for

more years, these members experienced

a

a

period of two or

figure/ground reversal of sorts.

While at the beginning of their membership they were usually clear about
the basic purposes and necessity of formal structures in their organiza-

tions, these structures initially seemed to be somewhat artificial and

awkward -- creating boundaries and rules that restricted their individual

actions.

With the passage of time, however, as members operated
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within the confines of these structures,
their apparentness largely dis-

appeared

-

were done.
tual

they became not

way of doing things, but the way
things

a

And at the same time, and more
importantly,

change seemed to occur,

a

very politicizing one:

a

second percep-

the extent and

oppressive nature of much of the implicit structure
in the conventional

world was brought into sharp relief for them.

Some of these members in-

dicated that this shift only strengthened their
previous convictions,

while others pointed to this shift as

a

major factor underlying their

political activism in the communities where they lived.

With the aid of this one example and the material which
preceded
it,

then, we are alerted to one of the more intriguing
intricacies of

alternative institutions which emerged during the course of this research.

There were, of course, several other apparent relationships be-

tween the individual and organizational levels uncovered as well, but

limitations of time and space prohibit their discussion.

In

essence,

the hints of these additional relationships suggest the need for more

research which focuses specifically upon the interplay between individual

experience and formal structures in alternative institutions.

While

it is important to bear in mind the more intricate features of our sam-

ple organizations, at this point it is appropriate that we now return to
the major findings of the research and, in light of our overall purpose,

consider their implications.

CHAPTER

IX

IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

As stated in the first chapter, the major
purpose of this research

was to gain

a

better sense of the problem of bureaucratization
and to

use these insights to improve both the design of new
alternative insti-

tutions and intervention in existing ones.

Given this purpose and the

clarity of our results, the implications discussed in this chapter
are

quite practical in nature.

As we will

see, the findings of this re-

search not only indicate how alternative institutions can be desighed to

circumvent the problem of bureaucratization, but they also point to

a

number of specific directions for the interventionist concerned with
these organizations.

Designing New Al ternati ve Institutions

In a

general way, at least, the results of this study are quite ex-

plicit about the ideal characteristics of
stitution.

a

successful alternative in-

The organization needs to have sustained formal structures

in three areas:

(1) work,

decision-making, and coordination; (2) main-

tenance; and (3) organizational learning.

As

the results have shown,

these formal structures can vary somewhat according to an organization's

particular operations, size, and other factors, but the essential functions remain the same.

In

the first area, the function of these struc-
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tures is to insure that the central
activities of an organization are

shared by members in an explicit manner,
and if not shared, delegated in
such a fashion that the underlying
principle of member control is validly upheld.

In

particular, the results suggest special
attention in this

regard to the areas of decision-making and
job-rotation.

The function

of the second area of formal structures is
essentially to maintain the
integrity of those in the first area, by ensuring
that the membership is

relatively continuous, informed, well-trained and
able to resolve underlying conflicts.

The third area, of course, functions as an important

vehicle for monitoring and modifying structures in the
first two areas
in light of organizational

times.

goals, and even redefining these goals at

The results, of course, suggest regular retreats or meetings set

aside for this purpose.

In

addition, the ideal organization attempts by

various maintenance structures to keep member turnover low, and member

process skills and past experience high.

If all

these features can be

put into place, it appears from our results that an alternative institution will have established the basic functions that are necessary for
its successful continuation.

In reality, of course,

it is difficult to

create

a

new alternative institution with all these features in place at

once.

Nevertheless, it is helpful to know where to start.

If we review

very briefly the early days of the Studio Collective, however, there are

some very good clues.

Lessons from an exemplary case

.

After some early planning, the founders

of the Studio Collective luckily discovered

a

defunct but ideally-suited

corporation and then wisely reactivated it for their own purposes.

By
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incorporating at such an early time in their
development, even before
they began to rent

a

building, the founders created an
organization

which had five formal structures right
from the start:

cision-making procedures, which included

a

(4)

written de-

process for amending these

procedures; (2) an elected "management" mechanism;
boundaries;

(1)

(3)

clear membership

procedures for accepting members; and (5) procedures
for

removing members.

In

terms of the three areas of formal structure,

then, we see that the Studio Collective began with
two structures in the

first area and three in the second.

The only way in which we could

fault the founders of this organization would be in terms of their
ne-

glect of the organizational learning area

—

their first formal retreat

did not occur until roughly three years later.
The essential lesson to be gleaned from the early days at the Studio Collective is that the act of incorporation with the appropriate bylaws is an excellent way to begin an alternative institution, even while
it is still

in

the planning stages.

From the history of this organiza-

tion it is clear that the early formality of the agreements among mem-

bers was essential to its continued survival over the first three years.

Without these agreements, for example, it is doubtful that the members
who failed to live up to them could have been successfully removed from
the organization.

What the founders of the Studio Collective estab-

lished, of course, was

a

constitutional democracy which outlined several

essential formal structures, but also provided for
for changing those structures.
a

formal

a

formal mechanism

While the Studio Collective did not have

structure for organizational learning at its start, it is evi-

dent from its case material that an informal structure met this essen-
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need initially.

From the case study it was clear
that member gath-

erings in the restaurant located in the
Studio Collective's building

provided an ongoing forum for both the discussion
of organizational affairs and their subsequent modification.

Prior to their first formal

retreat, for instance, members apparently used
this informal mechanism

of organizational learning in modifying their
by-laws, beginning the rotation of general maintenance, and creating several
other structural

changes.

From the perspective of our major findings, then, the
Studio

Collective was also very lucky in this second instance

-

the particular

physical aspects of their building created an informal setting
in which

members could engage in organizational learning.

In

the design of new

alternative institutions, however, it appears ill-advised
formal

to rely on

in-

structures to perform such an important function, even from the

very beginning.

While the findings of the research point to general features of the
ideal

alternative institution, it

is

obvious from the brief discussion

of the early days of the Studio Collective that exemplary cases of suc-

cessful alternative institutions can also be instructive, in that they

point to specific sets of workable arrangements.

In particular, such

cases, when examined in light of our findings, point to the basic elements of formal structure which need to be put in place in order for

fledgling alternative institution to start out on the right foot.

a

So

while our research did not examine the structural conditions which appear necessary for successful beginnings of alternative institutions,
the findings nevertheless provide
the problem.

In

a

specific framework for considering

addition, this same structural framework does have im-
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plications for at least one major problem
which alternative institutions

might encounter.

Designing organizations to counter member turnover

.

In several

of our

less successful cases, we were able to see
the debilitating effects of

member turnover upon alternative institutions.

While our results have

shown that more successful organizations can
counter turnover by careful

attention to the selection of members, the use of trial
periods, etc.,
it is clear that in some situations there may be real
limits to the ef-

fectiveness of these structural answers.

In the cases of both the Gro-

cery Collective and the Restaurant Collective, for instance, member

turnover was also due in part to the fact that members were undergraduate students whose maximum tenure could be no more than four or five

years in length.

In other words,

the pool of applicants from which

these organizations drew their members had

turnover.

In

a

high "background level" of

terms of our major findings, it appears that such

a

condi-

tion could be countered not only by attempts to reduce turnover among

members, but also by efforts to alter certain maintenance structures in

order to compensate for the problem.

In

particular, the framework of

our findings suggests two possibilities in these particular cases.
First, it seems reasonable to suggest that those formal
in

structures

the area of orientation and training would need to be especially

elaborated under such conditions, making it possible to integrate new
members quickly and effectively into the organization.

And secondly,

given the large number of applicants in both of these cases, it also
seems sound to suggest that members be selected perhaps midway through
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the semester prior to their actually
working merrfcershi

p,

a

mechanism

which not only would allow the time necessary
for adequate training to
take place, but would also help ensure
that the election of coordinators
was

more informed and deliberate event.

a

What these examples suggest, of course, is that
the structures

which fall in the three areas can be modified in
creative ways to counteract the particular set of external pressures
that may impinge on an

alternative institution.

These examples, of course, also raise ques-

tions of how we might even go about encouraging less
successful organi-

zations,
tions.

like those in our sample, to consider such structural
innovaAs we will

see, the findings of the research also point to very

practical suggestions in this area as well.

Interventi on

i_n

Alternative Institutions

The research findings are particularly relevant to intervention

activity within alternative institutions because they not only identify
for the interventionist what should be occurring within these organizations, but also because they actually point in general terms to

work for intervention itself.

In

a

frame-

order to appreciate these points, we

need first to consider briefly the alternative institutions which seek

outside assistance and the nature of this assistance when it finally arrives.

Typical conditions of intervention

.

It is rare in my experience to find

alternative institutions which have successfully reached consensual democracy needing little more than helpful hints or new information.

As
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our research has shown, these
organizations have all three areas
of
structural components and are usually
quite able to use them effectively
to

confront any internal problems that
might arise.

The organizations

who seek out assistance are more like
the less successful alternative

-

institutions among our sample

typically weak in the maintenance area

and lacking formal structures of
organizational learning.

approach

a

They do not

consultant with the idea of adding more
structural compo-

nents, however; they usually seek help
because the pressure of internal

conflicts and strains has reached

a

certain breaking point.

Meetings

erupt in arguments, members threaten to resign,
important decisions cannot be made, and there appears to be no internal
route to resolving
these issues.

To make matters worse, whatever unbearable situation

finally emerges has probably been with the organization
for some time.
A typical
a

intervention

.

many cases, the first major meeting between

In

consultant and members results in their first retreat, or, at least

their first retreat in quite

a

while.

During this meeting, or in

a

series of them, it is usually the case that the consultant and members
will come to a basic agreement about the nature of the immediate problems of the organization, allowing the consultant to make suggestions

about what might be done about them.
to implement them,

Eager to find solutions, and even

the members are typically quite willing to accept the

consultant's suggestions.

Some members, of course, are skeptical, but

are generally willing to try the proposed changes.

often structural in nature

—

a

These changes are

new way of running meetings,

a

mechanism

for resolving disputes, or a job description for the coordinator.
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Subtleties and dilemmas for intervention

.

At first glance, it appears

that the findings of this research would be
of great value to
tant in the scenario like the one just described.
tural

features necessary for

a

a

consul-

Aware of the struc-

successful alternative institution, he or

she could simply evaluate what areas of components
were weak or missing
and propose that the
be instituted.

In

a D propriate

fact,

structural additions or modifications

this general style is currently very popular

among consultants who work with alternative institutions.

our findings, however, there appears to be

a

In

light of

significant shortcoming in

such an approach.
If,

as our findings suggest, successful

alternative institutions

require three areas of sustained formal structure, the approach de-

scribed in the previous scenario may work well for the first two areas,
but when it comes to the third area -- organizational learning

approach promises to be counterproductive.

—

this

The crux of the matter lies

with the nature of the intervention activity itself.

As we have defined

structures of organizational learning, the use of consultants clearly
falls in this category; and thinking back to our intervention scenario,

we can see why -- the activity often produces new structures and modifies existing ones within the organization.

There are several problems

inherent in the use of consultants to perform this vital function, however.
First, most alternative institutions are unable to afford the regu-

lar services of

a

consultant.

The result, of course, is that the orga-

nizational learning function served by the consultant cannot be sus-

tained in most cases.

Secondly, it is the consultant in this style of
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intervention who actually performs the
organizational learning function,
not the members of the organization.
True, they provide the relevant
information, but it is the consultant
who actually attempts to solve

pressing organizational problems.

Due to this feature of the consulting

arrangement, of course, the organization
tends to become very dependent
upon the consultant, seeing the resolution
of internal

problems as his or her domain.

conflicts and

And, to make matters worse, if the con-

sultant is particularly successful with proposed
changes in the organization, this dependency is bound to grow.

From this brief overview, then, we can see that this
style of intervention is actually contrary to the implications of the
research.
This situation arises not only because the use of
consultants is neces-

sarily discontinuous for financial reasons, but also because it
places
the important function of organizational

learning with the consultant

rather than with an organization's members.

Turning back to the actual

methods of this research, however, it is possible to uncover

a

way in

which these problems might be circumvented.

Hints of another approach

.

Stated more positively, the findings of this

research suggest that at least one goal of intervention in alternative

institutions is the creation of sustained formal structures of organizational learning.

From our previous example, it is clear that some im-

portant variation

in

the typical style of intervention is necessary if

this goal is to be achieved, a variation that allows the function ful-

filled by the consultant to be transferred to the members in
is neither time-consuming or expensive.

In

a

way that

addition, this variation

.
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must also be able to capture the attention
of members whose foremost

concern is usually to find immediate answers to
pressing organizational
i

ss

ue s
In

the course- of pursuing this research, it became obvious
that one

aspect of the method pointed in
two or three interviews,

I

a

promising direction.

began to conclude these sessions by showing

members the basic Holleb and Abrams stages, along with

of their model.

After the first

a

brief overview

My purpose, of course, was to have members verify more

directly the information which seemed to emerge from the interviews, by

having them identify any stages which characterized the current state of
the organization and any past stages as well.

The reaction to the Hol-

leb and Abrams material was nearly the same with all

the members

I

in-

terviewed -- they were intrigued by the stage model, particularly as it

related to their own organization, and inevitably asked me for

a

copy.

Their interest was really quite understandable; the Holleb and Abrams
model not only allows an organization to be placed within a broader con-

text of development, but it also explains that many of the issues and

difficulties which an organization faces are characteristic of

cular stage of development.

a

parti-

For members of less successful organiza-

tions in particular, the realization that other organizations also faced

similar problems was
--

a

source of fascination, and in some cases, relief

it made their own situations more understandable.

From this experi-

ence, it was evident that the Holleb and Abrams model was not only

diagnostic device, but an educational one as well --

a

a

potentially valu-

able way to share the perspective of an interventionist with the members

of alternative institutions.
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the hands of members of one of
these organizations, the Holleb

and Abrams model raises three essential
questions:

how did the organi-

zation begin; where is it now; and where
is it going.

This third ques-

tion, of course, is dramatized to some
extent by the mutually exclusive

nature of the last two stages of the model
bureaucracy.

-

consensual temocjrac^ or

As we should recognize, these are the
basic questions

asked during the organizational learning process,

a

m

feature which sug-

gests both another possible use for the Holleb
and Abrams model and some

features of different intervention styles.

Some elements of

a

different approach

My experiences during the course

.

of the research suggest that it might be one excellent device
to shift
the

locus of responsibility for organizational learning from the
consul-

tant back to the members of an alternative institution.

Holleb and Abrams model can become

of the intervention process

—

a

Basically, the

central part of one important step

diagnosis.

It is relatively easy to

imagine how the Holleb and Abrams model, combined in

a

format which in-

cluded the entire list of formal structures, might lead to

effective initial diagnostic session with an organization.

a

relatively
In

order to

further remove the consultant from this process, it might also be possible to mail

these materials with

a

brief written explanation to the or-

ganization prior to the consultant's arrival.

We need to remember at

the same time, however, that encouraging members to think about the

broader issues of their organization is no guarantee that they will actually meet and discuss them.

This issue points to one other step in

the intervention process that might be

a

reasonable area for encouraging
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formal

structures of organizational learning.

Contracting

Usually near the beginning of

.

a

consulting relation-

ship, some sort of contract is
negotiated between consultant and client.

These contracts often vary in expl ici
tness

,

and in the situation we are

concerned with, it appears the more explicit
the contract, the better.
As we might expect, there are strong
pressures, even in alternative in-

stitutions, that can push

scribed earlier.

a

consultant back into the common role de-

At the risk of being repetitive, it is
clear that

different intervention style also needs explicit
agreements
and sustain it.

to

a

define

Furthermore, there could be features of this contract

which would encourage formal structures of organizational
learning in
the client organization.

In

my own consulting experience, the period of

contracting can be an especially appropriate time to pursue enduring
arrangements, since both the client organization's sense of need and
willingness to accept such arrangements are heightened by the existing internal crisis.

Waiting until after crisis has been resolved to insti-

tute such innovations is less likely to succeed

necessary to the client.
a

—

they don't seem as

For example, the consultant could require, as

condition of his or her involvement, that members meet once every

month by themselves somewhere other than workplace.

As we have seen

from the case of the Warehouse Collective, just the act of meeting together in

a

non-business setting can be fruitful enough to encourage

such meetings on

a

regular basis.

Another possible feature of the con-

tract might be an item which restricts the consultant's role to an in-

formation-providing but not advice-giving role, either soon after the

start of consultation or at some pre-defined point in its course.

This
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arrangement, as we can see, concretizes the
expectation that at some

point the client organization will need to
take primary responsibility
for its own organization learning.

And finally, one other possible fea-

ture of the initial contract could be the
creation of formal

roles,

groups, or even positions within the organization
for purposes of orga-

nizational learning.

In

particular, ongoing "process roles" or study

groups can facilitate such

a

function, and can be enduring, provided the

members in these positions have their duties formally included
in their
job descriptions and are reimbursed for the time they spend
at them.
In

the other areas of the intervention process

—

initial

contact,

implementation, evaluation and termination -- we can see that this general

theme of placing responsibility for solving internal problems and

issues with the client organization could be possible as well.

At the

same time, however, we should not pretend that any of these notions are

particularly new in themselves.

In many ways,

they follow some of the

general principles of intervention put forth by Argyris (1970).

To my

knowledge, however, Argyris has never attempted to apply them to the
unique predicaments of alternative institutions.

Imp! ications Summary

In

this chapter, we have seen that the results of this research

have very practical applications.

Not only do they provide

a general

description of an ideal alternative institution, but they also create

a

basic framework for the evaluation of the beginnings of exemplary orga-

nizations, an evaluation which can point to important first steps for

emergent alternative institutions.

In

addition, these results suggest

306

that prevailing intervention attempts, in
the long run at least, are

contrary to the creation of

a

set of structural

the success of alternative institutions.

features necessary for

In light of this observation,

some modifications of prevailing intervention
methods were suggested.

CHAPTER

X

SUMMARY

This research investigated the issue of keeping
alternative institutions alternative both as an organizational
problem of bureaucratization and as

a

research area with methodological complications.

More

specifically, the research addressed both sides of
the issue by defining

bureaucratization as gradual transformation of member control
into conventional hierarchical control, and by employing an
action-research
model.

To develop a coherent context for substantive and
methodological

questions,

a

detailed literature review identified several relevant

areas of past research and commentary.

In this review the Holleb and

Abrams (1975) model of organizational development was examined in detail.

Following consideration of workplace democratization and organi-

zational learning areas,

a

central research proposition emerged:

suc-

cessful alternative institutions require formal organizational structure
in

three areas:

(1)

work, decision-making and coordination; (2) main-

tenance; and (3) organizational learning.

To evaluate this proposition,

interviews and documents were obtained from eight varied alternative in-

stitutions from the same geographical region.

By employing the Holleb

and Abrams model, the current state and the previous structural develop-

ment of each organization was assessed, resulting
studies.

in

eight detailed case

By equating organizational success with the same model's con-

sensual democracy stage, the case studies were divided into three suc-
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cessful and five unsuccessful instances,
and were then subjected to
three comparisons of structural features
to test the research proposition.

The first comparison examined current
structural features and ap-

peared to support the proposition.
all

Successful organizations employed

three areas of formal structure while unsuccessful
ones employed

only those in the first two areas.

In

order to assess the converse of

the proposition, that no organization with formal
structures in all

three areas could be unsuccessful,

a

second comparison was devised that

considered instances of formal structure throughout each organization's
history.

In

this comparison, both types of organizations evidenced for-

mal structures in all

tion.

Based on

a

three areas, apparently invalidating the proposi-

rationale that formal structure should be enduring,

the original proposition was modified to say organizational success re-

sulted from sus tained formal structure in all three areas.

sustained structures as those lasting at least one year,
ison was performed which produced

the first comparison:
mal

a

a

By defining

third compar

pattern of results very similar to

successful organizations employed sustained for-

structures in all three areas, while unsuccessful organizations em-

ployed them only in the first two areas.

Since the results strongly

supported the modified proposition, the comparison was examined in detail.

In

the area of work, decision-making, and coordination, only sue

cessful organizations employed sustained structures of job rotation and

decision-making.

In

the maintenance area, successful organizations

showed considerably more structures than unsuccessful organizations, es
pecially in regard to information sharing, conflict resolution, and mem
ber orientation and training.

Since only successful organizations em-

.
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ployed sustained formal structures of organizational
learning, their
specific structures, usually retreats or special
portions of meetings,
were scrutinized closely.

This examination revealed that the
organiza-

tional learning structures were consistently
used by members to create

and modify structures in the first two areas,
as well as to alter organizational

goals.

From this examination, it was apparent that sustained

formal structures of organizational

learning were central to the success

of these alternative institutions.

Following this major structural com-

parison, some comparisons of no n- structural features were also made.
The results of these secondary comparisons generally suggested that
in

contrast to unsuccessful organizations, successful organizations have
lower member turnover, and slightly older members with better process
skills and more relevant past experience.

The results were shown to

have practical applications for the design and creation of new alternative institutions, as well as for intervention activity within existing

ones

FOOTNOTES

throughout this paper the term "organizational structure"
(or

Sho
S defined in the
9 eneral terms outlined by Pugh
Z39):
All organizations have to make provisions
p.
for continuing activities directed towards the achievement
of given aims
Reqularities in such activities as task allocation, the
exercise of authority and co-ordination functionings are developed.
Such regularities
constitute the organization's structure.
." (italics mine).
On a more
concrete level, organizational structure refers to the
roles, rules and
procedures which specify how tasks are allocated, how authority
is exercised and how co-ordination is achieved.

nlzl
U9M> t

&M

!$J

.

While most definitions of bureaucratic hierarchy are drawn
from
Weber's (1947, pp. 329-336) descriptions of ideal bureaucratic
forms,
close examination of his descriptive characteristics reveals that
many
of these could be applied to non-bureaucratic settings as well (e.g.
"a
continuous organization of official functions bound by rules"). Herbst
(1976) offers another definition of bureaucratic hierarchy which appears
most useful.
He defines bureaucratic hierarchy by identifying the assumptions on which this form of organization is predicated:
(1) that a
single hierarchical structure exists in terms of which units and individuals are related to one another; (2) that a uniform superior-subordinate relationship is ideal (thus excluding relationships between units
and individuals on the same level); (3) that the tasks of the organization can be divided into successively smaller and independent elements;
(4) that one job should be equated with one person or unit and viceversa; and (5) that distinct, single boundaries should separate units
and individuals. According to Herbst, it is much easier to define bureaucratic hierarchy on the basis of these assumptions than to attempt
categorization by descriptive elements.
In order to provide some variety in terminology, the adjective "conventional" will be used synonymously with the adjectives bureaucratic and hierarchical.
3 The

term bureaucratization as used here refers to the deterioration of systems based upon the ideals of shared work and decision-making, be they informal or institutionalized, into more conventional relationships endemic to bureaucratic hierarchy, where authority, power and
over-all responsibility are the province of a few in an organization.
Given such a definition, two extreme cases of bureaucratization are possible.
In the first and more common situation, work and decisions are
initially shared in a vague, informal way, but move toward conventional
arrangements.
In the second case, shared work and decision-making are
formally institutionalized arrangements which decay in the direction of
bureaucratic and hierarchical ones. Although the degree of initial institutionalization of participatory ideals may vary, then, the basic
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direction of bureaucratization remains the same
4 The term
formal structure as it is used here and
throughout the
text refers to regularized organizational
activities which are explicitly recognized and used by members of an

organization.
This explicitness
may extend to written form, as in the case of
by-laws.
Informal structure is not characterized by this explicitness.
ihe one-year criterion deserves some explanation.

Actually a
two-year criterion was also considered, but this standard
eliminated so
many of the formal structures in less successful
organizations that the
resulting comparisons were based upon very little information.
The oneyear criterion seemed justifiable for other reasons as well.
Members
usually recalled events and structures in terms of seasons and
years.
A criterion of less than one year (e.g. six months) proved
unwieldy
since members could rarely pinpoint events and the duration of particular arrangements in terms more accurate than years and seasons.
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